Locke’s discussion Monyneux’s problem at the end of the last assignment appeared in a chapter on perception, which Locke describes as “the first faculty of the mind exercised about our ideas” and “the first and simplest idea we have from reflection” (bk. II, ch. ix, §1). He goes on in the next chapter to discuss “retention” (i.e., memory) and then turns, at the beginning of this assignment (ch. xi), to a series of further “operations of the mind.” We will go on to look at his classification of “complex” ideas (in ch. xii) and parts of his later discussions of each of the three sorts of complex ideas that he distinguishes.
Ch. xi (§§ 1, 4, 6, 8-11, 15, 17, pp. 63-66). Pay special attention to Locke’s discussion of abstraction. This was an important faculty for both Decartes and Leibniz (who would agree that “brutes abstract not”); but it is more problematic for Locke since he must trace abstract ideas to the sensation and reflection, and his way of solving this problem was rejected by Berkeley and Hume, the two empiricists who we will go on to read.
Ch. xii (pp. 66-68). Among complex ideas, Locke distinguishes “modes,” substances, and relations.
The term “mode” has largely died out in philosophical discussion. However, although we didn’t often encounter it in Descartes and Leibniz, it was important in the 17th century since it provided a useful substitute for the terms the Scholastics had used for the properties of substances. We will go on to look at only Locke’s discussion of “mixed modes” (which play an important role on books III and IV), but his discussion of simple modes is important for his project since he locates our ideas of space, time, and number among the simple modes (and his discussion of them also includes his account of how we may acquire the idea of infinity).
Ch. xxii (§§1-5, 9-11, pp. 114-117). Locke contrasts mixed modes with simple ideas in ch. xxii, §2, in a way that is at the heart of all he will say about them, both in this chapter and later in the book.
From ch. xxiii (§§1-12, pp. 117-122). Locke characterizes his idea of “pure substance in general” (see §2) using a phrase, “something, I know not what,” that has become famous and will have echoes in later people we will read. Notice also what he has to say about our ideas of particular substances.
From ch. xxv (§§1, 7-10, pp. 129f, 131). Finally, I've assigned a brief selection from Locke’s discussion of relations to fill out the very little he says in ch. xii, §7.