• In the sections assigned from chs. 1 and 2, Locke sets out the foundations of his view, with ch. 1 identifying the two sources of ideas, sensation and reflection, that Leibniz mentioned in his criticisms of Locke. Book II is structured (to the extent it has a structure) by a classification of ideas, and ch. 2 identifies the first of the classes he distinguishes. (Although, books II-IV are not primarily critical, Locke is not done criticizing views of people like Descartes, and the sections Winkler includes from ch. 1 that I have left out of the assignment continue an argument begun in §10 that we think constantly, something Locke takes to be an implication of the Cartesian view that we are essentially thinking things.)

• Ch. 8 develops a distinction among the qualities of objects in terms of their relations to our ideas of them. This is a threefold distinction between primary qualities, secondary qualities, and powers, but it is the distinction between the first two of these that is most important—and it is important not only for Locke but also for the direction philosophy takes after him. (But this is not to say that he is the first one to make the distinction; it is clearly sketched in Galileo, and Locke takes his terminology for it from Robert Boyle.)

• The two sections I’ve assigned from ch. 9 concern what is known as “Molyneux’s problem.” This is not problem for Locke in the sense of an objection but rather a question that is raised by Locke’s perspective on our understanding. Although the question and Locke’s answer are far less important historically than the other parts of this assignment, they are worth thinking about and well capture the special character of Locke’s views.