• First, in §§30-32, Leibniz returns to the question of freedom of will. His basic approach is captured by a term, “middle knowledge,” which appears in the title of §31 but which Leibniz does not employ explicitly in the text. This is a concept (due to the theologian Luis de Molina, 1535-1600) which appears in Leibniz’s discussion of possible individuals (e.g., Judas in §30, and Peter and John in §31) who God knows will make certain free choices. This is “middle” knowledge because it falls in between knowledge of necessary truths that are part of God’s understanding and knowledge of the actual truths that are products of God’s will (for, on the one hand, these individuals do not exist necessarily and, on the other, the course of their lives is defined by God’s understanding prior to God willing their existence).

• In §33, Leibniz discusses the relation between the soul and the body. Notice the parallels to his account of the relation between and cause and effect.

• The remaining sections, §§34-37, each concern, in one way or another, the place of minds in creation. In §§34-35, Leibniz distinguishes minds from other souls. The broad conception of souls that he employs here will be developed much further in the Monadology. The notes pointing to earlier text of these sections show Leibniz’s ambivalence regarding the question whether there are any real material substances. He never seems to have taken a firm stand on this question but in his later work he seemed to side more with the view that the only true substances are souls while material “substances” have the sort of reality found in the rainbow or a school of fish.

Finally, in §§36-37, Leibniz uses the distinction between minds and other souls to point towards the sort of moral philosophy that might fit with his metaphysics.