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A
TREATISE
Concerning the
PRINCIPLES
OF
HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

WHEREIN THE

Chief Causes of Error and Difficulty in the *Sciences*,
with the Grounds Of *Scepticism*, *Atheism*, and
Irreligion, are inquired into.

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By *GEORGE BERKELEY*, M. A.
Fellow of *Trinity-College, Dublin*.

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INTRODUCTION.

1. PHILOSOPHY being nothing else but the study of Wisdom and Truth, it may with reason be expected, that those who have spent most Time and Pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of Mind, a greater clearness and evidence of Knowledge, and be less disturbed with Doubts and Difficulties than other Men. Yet so it is we see the Illiterate Bulk of Mankind that walk the High-road of plain, common Sense, and are governed by the Dictates of Nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing that's familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want of Evidence in their Senses, and are out of all danger of becoming *Sceptics*. But no sooner do we depart from Sense and Instinct to follow the Light of a

Superior Principle, to reason, meditate, and reflect on the Nature of Things, but a thousand Scruples spring up in our Minds, concerning those Things which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and Errors of Sense do from all Parts discover themselves to our view; and endeavouring to correct these by Reason we are insensibly drawn into uncouth Paradoxes, Difficulties, and Inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in Speculation: till at length, having wander'd through many intricate Mazes, we find our selves just where we were, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism.

2. The cause of this is thought to be the Obscurity of things, or the natural Weakness and Imperfection of our Understandings. It is said the Faculties we have are few, and those designed by Nature for the Support and Comfort of Life, and not to penetrate into the inward Essence and Constitution of Things. Besides, the Mind of Man being Finite, when it treats of Things which partake of Infinity, it is not to be wondered at, if it run into Absurdities and Contradictions; out of which it is impossible it should ever extricate it self, it being of the nature of Infinite not to be comprehended by that which is Finite.

3. But perhaps we may be too partial to our selves in placing the Fault originally in our Faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of them. It is a hard thing to suppose, that right Deductions from true Principles should ever end in Consequences which cannot be maintained or made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the Sons of Men, than to give them a strong desire for that Knowledge, which he had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to the wonted, indulgent Methods of Providence, which, whatever Appetites it may have implanted in the Creatures, doth usually furnish them with such means as, if rightly made use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater Part, if not all, of those Difficulties which have hitherto amus'd Philosophers, and block'd up the way to Knowledge, are intirely owing to our selves. That we have first rais'd a Dust, and then complain, we cannot see.

4. My Purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those Principles are, which have introduced all that Doubtfulness and Uncertainty, those Absurdities and Contradictions into the several Sects of Philosophy; insomuch that the Wisest Men have thought our Ignorance incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dullness and limitation of our Faculties. And surely it is a Work well deserving our Pains, to make a strict inquiry concerning the first Principles of

yet it conduceth to Clearness and Propriety, that we distinguish Things very different by different Names. It is also to be remarked, that all Relations including an Act of the Mind, we cannot so properly be said to have an Idea, but rather a Notion of the Relations and Habitudes between Things. But if in the modern way the word *Idea* is extended to Spirits, and Relations and Acts; this is after all an affair of verbal Concern.

143. It will not be amiss to add, that the Doctrine of *Abstract Ideas* hath had no small share in rendering those Sciences intricate and obscure, which are particularly conversant about spiritual Things. Men have imagined they could frame abstract Notions of the Powers and Acts of the Mind, and consider them prescinded, as well from the Mind or Spirit it self, as from their respective Objects and Effects. Hence a great number of dark and ambiguous Terms presumed to stand for abstract Notions, have been introduced into Metaphysics and Morality, and from these have grown infinite Distractions and Disputes amongst the Learned.

144. But nothing seems more to have contributed towards engaging Men in Controversies and Mistakes, with regard to the Nature and Operations of the Mind, than the being used to speak of those Things, in Terms borrowed from sensible Ideas. For Example, the Will is termed the *Motion* of the Soul: This infuses a Belief, that the Mind of Man is as a Ball in Motion, impelled and determined by the Objects of Sense, as necessarily as that is by the Stroke of a Racket. Hence arise endless Scruples and Errors of dangerous consequence in Morality. All which I doubt not may be cleared, and Truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could but Philosophers be prevailed on to retire into themselves, and attentively consider their own meaning.

145. From what hath been said, it is plain that we cannot know the Existence of other Spirits, otherwise than by their Operations, or the Ideas by them excited in us. I perceive several Motions, Changes, and Combinations of Ideas, that inform me there are certain particular Agents like my self, which accompany them, and concur in their Production. Hence the Knowledge I have of other Spirits is not immediate, as is the Knowledge of my Ideas; but depending on the Intervention of Ideas, by me referred to Agents or Spirits distinct from my self, as Effects or concomitant Signs.

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141. It must not be supposed, that they who assert the natural Immortality of the Soul are of opinion, that it is absolutely incapable of Annihilation even by the infinite Power of the CREATOR who first gave it Being: But only that it is not liable to be broken or dissolved by the ordinary Laws of Nature or Motion. They indeed, who hold the Soul of Man to be only a thin vital Flame, or System of animal Spirits, make it perishing and corruptible as the Body, since there is nothing more easily dissipated than such a Being, which it is naturally impossible should survive the Ruin of the Tabernacle, wherein it is inclosed. And this Notion hath been greedily embraced and cherished by the worst part of Mankind, as the most effectual Antidote against all Impressions of Virtue and Religion. But it hath been made evident, that Bodies of what Frame or Texture soever, are barely passive Ideas in the Mind, which is more distant and heterogeneous from them, than Light is from Darkness. We have shewn that the Soul is Indivisible, Incorporeal, Unextended, and it is consequently Incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer, than that the Motions, Changes, Decays, and Dissolutions which we hourly see befall natural Bodies (and which is what we mean by the *Course of Nature*) cannot possibly affect an active, simple, uncompounded Substance: Such a Being therefore is indissoluble by the force of Nature, that is to say, *the Soul of Man is naturally immortal*.

142. After what hath been said, it is I suppose plain, that our Souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless inactive Objects, or by way of *Idea*. *Spirits* and *Ideas* are Things so wholly different, that when we say, *they exist, they are known*, or the like, these Words must not be thought to signify any thing common to both Natures. There is nothing alike or common in them: And to expect that by any Multiplication or Enlargement of our Faculties, we may be enabled to know a Spirit as we do a Triangle, seems as absurd as if we should hope to see a *Sound*. This is inculcated because I imagine it may be of Moment towards clearing several important Questions, and preventing some very dangerous Errors concerning the Nature of the Soul. We may not I think strictly be said to have an *Idea* of an active Being, or of an Action, although we may be said to have a Notion of them. I have some Knowledge or Notion of my Mind, and its Acts about Ideas, inasmuch as I know or understand what is meant by those Words. What I know, that I have some Notion of. I will not say, that the Terms *Idea* and *Notion* may not be used convertibly, if the World will have it so. But

Humane Knowledge, to sift and examine them on all sides: especially since there may be some Grounds to suspect that those Lets and Difficulties, which stay and embarrass the Mind in its search after Truth, do not spring from any Darkness and Intricacy in the Objects, or natural Defect in the Understanding, so much as from false Principles which have been insisted on, and might have been avoided.

5. How difficult and discouraging soever this Attempt may seem, when I consider how many great and extraordinary Men have gone before me in the same Designs: Yet I am not without some Hopes, upon the Consideration that the largest Views are not always the Clearest, and that he who is Short-sighted will be obliged to draw the Object nearer, and may, perhaps, by a close and narrow Survey discern that which had escaped far better Eyes.

6. In order to prepare the Mind of the Reader for the easier conceiving what follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduction, concerning the Nature and Abuse of Language. But the unraveling this Matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my Design, by taking notice of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering Speculation intricate and perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable Errors and Difficulties in almost all parts of Knowledge. And that is the opinion that the Mind hath a power of framing *Abstract Ideas* or Notions of Things. He who is not a perfect Stranger to the Writings and Disputes of Philosophers, must needs acknowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstract Ideas. These are in a more especial manner, thought to be the Object of those Sciences which go by the name of *Logic* and *Metaphysics*, and of all that which passes under the Notion of the most abstracted and sublime Learning, in all which one shall scarce find any Question handled in such a manner, as does not suppose their Existence in the Mind, and that it is well acquainted with them.

7. It is agreed on all hands, that the Qualities or Modes of things do never really exist each of them apart by it self, and separated from all others, but are mix'd, as it were, and blended together, several in the same Object. But we are told, the Mind being able to consider each Quality singly, or abstracted from those other Qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to it self abstract Ideas. For example, there is perceived by Sight an Object extended, coloured, and moved: This mix'd or compound Idea the mind resolving into its Simple, constituent Parts, and viewing each by it self, exclusive of the rest, does frame the abstract Ideas of Extension, Colour, and Motion. Not that it is

possible for Colour or Motion to exist without Extension: but only that the Mind can frame to it self by *Abstraction* the Idea of Colour exclusive of Extension, and of Motion exclusive of both Colour and Extension.

8. Again, the Mind having observed that in the particular Extensions perceiv'd by Sense, there is something common and alike in all, and some other things peculiar, as this or that Figure or Magnitude, which distinguish them one from another; it considers apart or singles out by it self that which is common, making thereof a most abstract Idea of Extension, which is neither Line, Surface, nor Solid, nor has any Figure or Magnitude but is an Idea intirely prescinded from all these. So likewise the Mind by leaving out of the particular Colours perceived by Sense, that which distinguishes them one from another, and retaining that only which is common to all, makes an Idea of Colour in abstract which is neither Red, nor Blue, nor White, nor any other determinate Colour. And in like manner by considering Motion abstractedly not only from the Body moved, but likewise from the Figure it describes, and all particular Directions and Velocities, the abstract Idea of Motion is framed; which equally corresponds to all particular Motions whatsoever that may be perceived by Sense.

9. And as the Mind frames to it self abstract Ideas of Qualities or Modes, so does it, by the same precision or mental Separation, attain abstract Ideas of the more compounded Beings, which include several coexistent Qualities. For example, the Mind having observed that *Peter*, *James*, and *John*, resemble each other, in certain common Agreements of Shape and other Qualities, leaves out of the complex or compounded Idea it has of *Peter*, *James*, and any other particular Man, that which is peculiar to each, retaining only what is common to all; and so makes an abstract Idea wherein all the particulars equally partake, abstracting intirely from and cutting off all those Circumstances and Differences, which might determine it to any particular Existence. And after this manner it is said we come by the abstract Idea of *Man* or, if you please, Humanity, or Humane Nature; wherein it is true there is included Colour, because there is no *Man* but has some Colour, but then it can be neither White, nor Black, nor any particular Colour; because there is no one particular Colour wherein all *Men* partake. So likewise there is included Stature, but then it is neither Tall Stature nor Low Stature, nor yet Middle Stature, but something abstracted from all these. And so of the rest. Moreover, there being a great variety of other Creatures that partake in some Parts, but not all,

the Existence whereof consists in being perceived, should be the Image or Likeness of an Agent subsisting by it self, seems to need no other Refutation, than barely attending to what is meant by those Words. But perhaps you will say, that tho' an *Idea* cannot resemble a *Spirit* in its Thinking, Acting, or Subsisting by it self, yet it may in some other respects: And it is not necessary that an Idea or Image be in all respects like the Original.

138. I answer, If it does not in those mentioned, it is impossible it should represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the Power of Wiling, Thinking, and Perceiving Ideas, and there remains nothing else wherein the Idea can be like a Spirit. For by the Word *Spirit* we mean only that which thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and this alone, constitutes the Signification of that Term. If therefore it is impossible that any degree of those Powers should be represented in an Idea, it is evident there can be no Idea of a Spirit.

139. But it will be objected, that if there is no Idea signified by the Terms *Soul*, *Spirit*, and *Substance*, they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. I answer, those Words do mean or signify a real Thing, which is neither an Idea nor like an Idea, but that which perceives Ideas, and Wills, and Reasons about them. What I am myself, that which I denote by the Term I, is the same with what is meant by *Soul* or *Spiritual Substance*. If it be said that this is only quarrelling at a Word, and that since the immediate Significations of other Names are by common consent called *Ideas*, no reason can be assigned, why that which is signified by the Name *Spirit* or *Soul* may not partake in the same Appellation: I answer, All the unthinking Objects of the Mind agree, in that they are intirely passive, and their Existence consists only in being perceived: Whereas a Soul or Spirit is an active Being, whose Existence consists not in being perceived, but in perceiving Ideas and Thinking. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent Equivocation and confounding Natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish between *Spirit* and *Idea*. See *Secr. 27*.

140. In a large Sense indeed, we may be said to have an Idea, or rather a Notion of *Spirit*, that is, we understand the meaning of the Word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny any thing of it. Moreover, as we conceive the Ideas that are in the Minds of other Spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to be Resemblances of them: So we know other Spirits by means of our own Soul, which in that Sense is the Image or Idea of them, it having a like respect to other Spirits, that Blueness or Heat by me perceived has to those Ideas perceived by

they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless *Ideas*, that is, they exist in the Mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the Ideas of its own framing. The Ideas of Sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent than the Creatures of the Mind; but this is no Argument that they exist without the Mind. They are also less dependent on the Spirit, or thinking Substance which perceives them, in that they are excited by the Will of another and more powerful Spirit: yet still they are *Ideas*, and certainly no *Idea*, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a Mind perceiving it.

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135. Having despatched what we intended to say concerning the knowledge of *Ideas*, the Method we proposed leads us, in the next place, to treat of *Spirits*: With regard to which, perhaps Humane Knowledge is not so deficient as is vulgarly imagined. The great Reason that is assigned for our being thought ignorant of the nature of Spirits, is, our not having an Idea of it. But surely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in a Humane Understanding, that it does not perceive the Idea of *Spirit*, if it is manifestly impossible there should be any such *Idea*. And this, if I mistake not, has been demonstrated in *Sect. 27*: To which I shall here add that a Spirit has been shewn to be the only Substance or Support, wherein the unthinking Beings or Ideas can exist: But that this *Substance* which supports or perceives Ideas should it self be an *Idea* or like an *Idea*, is evidently absurd.

136. It will perhaps be said, that we want a Sense (as some have imagined) proper to know Substances without, which if we had, we might know our own Soul, as we do a Triangle. To this I answer, that in case we had a new Sense bestowed upon us, we could only receive thereby some new Sensations or Ideas of Sense. But I believe no Body will say, that what he means by the terms *Soul* and *Substance*, is only some particular sort of Idea or Sensation. We may therefore infer, that all things duly considered, it is not more reasonable to think our Faculties defective, in that they do not furnish us with an Idea of Spirit or active thinking Substance, than it would be if we should blame them for not being able to comprehend a *round Square*.

137. From the opinion that Spirits are to be known after the manner of an Idea or Sensation, have risen many absurd and heterodox Tenets, and much Scepticism about the Nature of the Soul. It is even probable, that this Opinion may have produced a Doubt in some, whether they had any Soul at all distinct from their Body, since upon inquiry they could not find they had an Idea of it. That an *Idea* which is inactive, and

of the complex Idea of *Man*, the Mind leaving out those Parts which are peculiar to Men, and retaining those only which are common to all the living Creatures, frameth the Idea of *Animal*, which abstracts not only from all particular Men, but also all Birds, Beasts, Fishes, and Insects. The constituent Parts of the abstract Idea of Animal are Body, Life, Sense, and Spontaneous Motion. By *Body* is meant, Body without any particular Shape or Figure, there being no one Shape or Figure common to all Animals, without Covering, either of Hair, or Feathers, or Scales, &c. nor yet Naked: Hair, Feathers, Scales, and Nakedness being the distinguishing Properties of particular Animals, and for that reason left out of the *Abstract Idea*. Upon the same account the spontaneous Motion must be neither Walking, nor Flying, nor Creeping, it is nevertheless a Motion, but what that Motion is, it is not easy to conceive.

10. Whether others have this wonderful Faculty of *Abstracting their Ideas*, they best can tell: For my self I find indeed I have a Faculty of imagining, or representing to myself the Ideas of those particular things I have perceived and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a Man with Two Heads or the upper parts of a Man joined to the Body of a Horse. I can consider the Hand, the Eye, the Nose, each by it self abstracted or separated from the rest of the Body. But then whatever Hand or Eye I imagine, it must have some particular Shape and Colour. Likewise the Idea of Man that I frame to my self, must be either of a White, or a Black, or a Tawny, a Straight, or a Crooked, a Tall, or a Low, or a Middle-sized Man. I cannot by any effort of Thought conceive the abstract Idea above described. And it is equally impossible for me to form the abstract Idea of Motion distinct from the Body moving, and which is neither Swift nor Slow, Curvilinear nor Rectilinear; and the like may be said of all other abstract general Ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I own my self able to abstract in one Sense, as when I consider some particular Parts or Qualities separated from others, with which though they are united in some Object, yet, it is possible they may really Exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract one from another, or conceive separately, those Qualities which it is impossible should Exist so separated; or that I can frame a General Notion by abstracting from Particulars in the manner aforesaid. Which two last are the proper Acceptations of *Abstraction*. And there are Grounds to think most Men will acknowledge themselves to be in my Case. The Generality of Men which are Simple and Illiterate never pretend to *abstract Notions*. It is

said they are difficult and not to be attained without Pains and Study. We may therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be, they are confined only to the Learned.

11. I proceed to examine what can be alledged in defence of the Doctrine of Abstraction, and try if I can discover what it is that inclines the Men of Speculation to embrace an Opinion, so remote from common Sense as that seems to be. There has been a late deservedly Esteemed Philosopher, who, no doubt, has given it very much Countenance by seeming to think the having abstract general Ideas is what puts the widest difference in point of Understanding betwixt Man and Beast. "The having of general Ideas" (*sait he*) "is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt Man and Brutes, and is an Excellency which the Faculties of Brutes do by no means attain unto. For it is evident we observe no Footsteps in them of making use of general Signs for universal Ideas; from which we have reason to imagine that they have not the Faculty of *abstracting* or making general Ideas, since they have no use of Words or any other general Signs." *And a little after*. "Therefore, I think, we may suppose that it is in this that the Species of Brutes are discriminated from Men, and 'tis that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so wide a Distance. For if they have any Ideas at all, and are not bare Machines (as some would have them) we cannot deny them to have some Reason. It seems as evident to me that they do some of them in certain Instances reason as that they have Sense, but it is only in particular Ideas, just as they receive them from their Senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow Bounds, and have not (as I think) the Faculty to enlarge them by any kind of *Abstraction*." *Essay on Hum. Underst.* B. 2. C. 11. Sect. 10 and 11. I readily agree with this Learned Author, that the Faculties of Brutes can by no means attain to *Abstraction*. But then if this be made the distinguishing property of that sort of Animals, I fear a great many of those that pass for Men must be reckoned into their number. The reason that is here assigned why we have no Grounds to think Brutes have Abstract general Ideas, is that we observe in them no use of Words or any other general Signs; which is built on this Supposition, to wri, that the making use of Words, implies the having general Ideas. From which it follows, that Men who use Language are able to Abstract or Generalize their Ideas. That this is the Sense and Arguing of the Author will further appear by his answering the Question he in another place puts. "Since all things that exist are only Particulars, how come we by general Terms?" *His Answer is,*

30. The Ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the Imagination; they have likewise a Steadiness, Order, and Coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of Humane Wills often are, but in a regular Train or Series, the admirable Connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the Wisdom and Benevolence of its Author. Now the set Rules or established Methods, wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the Ideas of Sense, are called the *Laws of Nature*: And these we learn by Experience, which teaches us that such and such Ideas are attended with such and such other Ideas, in the ordinary course of Things.

31. This gives us a sort of Foresight, which enables us to regulate our Actions for the benefit of Life. And without this we should be eternally at a loss: We could not know how to act any thing that might procure us the least Pleasure, or remove the least Pain of Sense. That Food nourishes, Sleep refreshes, and Fire warms us; that to sow in the Seed-time is the way to reap in the Harvest, and, in general, that to obtain such or such Ends, such or such Means are conducive, all this we know, not by discovering any necessary Connexion between our Ideas, but only by the Observation of the settled Laws of Nature, without which we should be all in Uncertainty and Confusion, and a grown Man no more know how to manage himself in the Affairs of Life, than an Infant just born.

32. And yet this consistent uniform working, which so evidently displays the Goodness and Wisdom of that governing Spirit whose Will constitutes the Laws of Nature, is so far from leading our Thoughts to him, that it rather sends them a wandering after second Causes. For when we perceive certain Ideas of Sense constantly followed by other Ideas, and we know this is not of our own doing, we forthwith attribute Power and Agency to the Ideas themselves, and make one the Cause of another, than which nothing can be more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for Example, having observed that when we perceive by Sight a certain round Luminous Figure, we at the same time perceive by Touch the Idea or Sensation called *Heat*, we do from thence conclude the Sun to be the cause of Heat. And in like manner perceiving the Motion and Collision of Bodies to be attended with Sound, we are inclined to think the latter an effect of the former.

33. The Ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of Nature are called *real Things*: And those excited in the Imagination being less regular, vivid and constant, are more properly termed *Ideas*, or *Images of Things*, which they copy and represent. But then our Sensations, be

27. A Spirit is one simple, undivided, active Being: as it perceives Ideas, it is called the *Understanding*, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the *Will*. Hence there can be no Idea formed of a Soul or Spirit: For all Ideas whatever, being Passive and Inert, *vide Sect. 25*. they cannot represent unto us, by way of Image or Likeness, that which acts. A little Attention will make it plain to any one, that to have an Idea which shall be like that active Principle of Motion and Change of Ideas, is absolutely impossible. Such is the Nature of *Spirit* or that which acts, that it cannot be of it self perceived, but only by the Effects which it produceth. If any Man shall doubt of the Truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can frame the Idea of any Power or active Being; and whether he hath Ideas of two principal Powers, marked by the Names *Will* and *Understanding*, distinct from each other as well as from a third Idea of Substance or Being in general, with a relative Notion of its supporting or being the Subject of the aforesaid Powers, which is signified by the Name *Soul* or *Spirit*. This is what some hold; but so far as I can see, the Words *Will*, *Soul*, *Spirit*, do not stand for different Ideas, or in truth, for any Idea at all, but for something which is very different from Ideas, and which being an Agent cannot be like unto, or represented by, any Idea whatsoever. Though it must be owned at the same time, that we have some Notion of Soul, Spirit, and the Operations of the Mind, such as Willing, Loving, Hating, in as much as we know or understand the meaning of those Words.

28. I find I can excite Ideas in my Mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the Scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than Willing, and straightway this or that Idea arises in my Fancy: And by the same Power it is obliterated, and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of Ideas doth very properly denominate the Mind active. Thus much is certain, and grounded on Experience: But when we think of unthinking Agents, or of exciting Ideas exclusive of Volition, we only amuse our selves with Words.

29. But whatever Power I may have over my own Thoughts, I find the Ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like Dependence on my Will. When in broad Day-light I open my Eyes, it is not in my Power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular Objects shall present themselves to my View; and so likewise as to the Hearing and other Senses, the Ideas imprinted on them are not Creatures of my Will. There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them.

“Words become general by being made the Signs of general Ideas.” *Essay on Hum. Underst. B. 3. C. 3 Sect. 6*. But it seems that a Word becomes general by being made the Sign, not of an abstract general Idea but, of several particular Ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests to the Mind. For Example, When it is said *the change of Motion is proportional to the impressed force*, or that *whatever has Extension is divisible*; these Propositions are to be understood of Motion and Extension in general, and nevertheless it will not follow that they suggest to my Thoughts an Idea of Motion without a Body moved, or any determinate Direction and Velocity, or that I must conceive an abstract general Idea of Extension, which is neither Line, Surface nor Solid, neither Great nor Small, Black, White, nor Red, nor of any other determinate Colour. It is only implied that whatever Motion I consider, whether it be Swift or Slow, Perpendicular, Horizontal or Oblique, or in whatever Object, the Axiom concerning it holds equally true. As does the other of every particular Extension, it matters not whether Line, Surface or Solid, whether of this or that Magnitude or Figure.

12. By observing how Ideas become general, we may the better judge how Words are made so. And here it is to be noted that I do not deny absolutely there are general Ideas, but only that there are any *abstract general Ideas*: For in the Passages above quoted, wherein there is mention of general Ideas, it is always supposed that they are formed by *Abstraction*, after the manner set forth in *Sect. 8* and *9*. Now if we will annex a meaning to our Words, and speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge, that an Idea, which considered in it self is particular, becomes general, by being made to represent or stand for all other particular Ideas of the same sort. To make this plain by an Example, suppose a Geometrician is demonstrating the Method, of cutting a Line in two equal Parts. He draws, for Instance, a Black Line of an Inch in Length, this which in it self is a particular Line is nevertheless with regard to its signification General, since as it is there used, it represents all particular Lines whatsoever; so that what is demonstrated of it, is demonstrated of all Lines, or, in other Words, of a Line in General. And as that particular Line becomes General, by being made a Sign, so the name *Line* which taken absolutely is particular, by being a Sign is made General. And as the former owes its Generality, not to its being the Sign of an abstract or general Line, but of all particular right Lines that may possibly exist, so the latter must be thought to derive its Generality from the same

Cause, namely, the various particular Lines which it indifferently denotes.

13. To give the Reader a yet clearer View of the Nature of abstract Ideas, and the Uses they are thought necessary to, I shall add one more Passage out of the *Essay on Human Understanding*, which is as follows. “*Abstract Ideas* are not so obvious or easy to Children or the yet unexercised Mind as particular ones. If they seem so to grown Men, it is only because by constant and familiar Use they are made so. For when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that general Ideas are Fictions and Contrivances of the Mind, that carry Difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves, as we are apt to imagine. For Example, Does it not require some Pains and Skill to form the general Idea of a Triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive and difficult) for it must be neither Oblique nor Rectangle, neither Equilateral, Equicrural, nor Scalennon, but *all and none* of these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist, an Idea wherein some Parts of several different and *inconsistent* Ideas are put together. It is true the Mind in this imperfect State has need of such Ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the conveniency of Communication and Enlargement of Knowledge, to both which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one has reason to suspect such Ideas are Marks of our Imperfection. At least this is enough to shew that the most abstract and general Ideas are not those that the Mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest Knowledge is conversant about.” B. 4. C. 7. Sect. 9. If any Man has the Faculty of framing in his Mind such an Idea of a Triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is, that the Reader would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such an Idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard Task for anyone to perform. What more easy than for anyone to look a little into his own Thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an Idea that shall correspond with the description that is here given of the general Idea of a Triangle, which is, *neither Oblique, nor Rectangle, Equilateral, Equicrural, nor Scalennon, but all and none of these at once?*

14. Much is here said of the Difficulty that abstract Ideas carry with them, and the Pains and Skill requisite to the forming them. And it is on all Hands agreed that there is need of great Toil and Labour of the Mind, to emancipate our Thoughts from particular Objects, and raise them to those sublime Speculations that are conversant about abstract

of material Substance.

24. It is very obvious, upon the least Inquiry into our own Thoughts, to know whether it be possible for us to understand what is meant, by the *absolute Existence of sensible Objects in themselves, or without the Mind*. To me it is evident those Words mark out either a direct Contradiction, or else nothing at all. And to convince others of this, I know no reader or fairer way, than to intreat they would calmly attend to their own Thoughts: And if by this Attention, the Emptiness or Repugnancy of those Expressions does appear, surely nothing more is requisite for their Conviction. It is on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that the absolute Existence of unthinking Things are Words without a Meaning, or which include a Contradiction. This is what I repeat and inculcate, and earnestly recommend to the attentive Thoughts of the Reader.

25. All our Ideas, Sensations, or the things which we perceive, by whatsoever Names they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive, there is nothing of Power or Agency included in them. So that one Idea or Object of Thought cannot produce, or make any Alteration in another. To be satisfied of the Truth of this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare Observation of our Ideas. For since they and every part of them exist only in the Mind, it follows that there is nothing in them but what is perceived. But whoever shall attend to his Ideas, whether of Sense or Reflexion, will not perceive in them any Power or Activity; there is therefore no such thing contained in them. A little Attention will discover to us that the very Being of an Idea implies Passiveness and Inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an Idea to do any thing, or, strictly speaking, to be the Cause of any thing: Neither can it be the Resemblance or Pattern of any active Being, as is evident from *Sect. 8*. Whence it plainly follows that Extension, Figure and Motion, cannot be the Cause of our Sensations. To say therefore, that these are the effects of Powers resulting from the Configuration, Number, Motion, and Size of Corpuscles, must certainly be false.

26. We perceive a continual Succession of Ideas, some are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore some Cause of these Ideas whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this Cause cannot be any Quality or Idea or Combination of Ideas, is clear from the preceding Section. It must therefore be a Substance; but it has been shewn that there is no corporeal or material Substance: It remains therefore that the Cause of Ideas is an incorporeal active Substance or Spirit.

well because I think, Arguments à *Posteriori* are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if I mistake not, sufficiently demonstrated à *Priori*, as because I shall hereafter find occasion to say somewhat of them.

22. I am afraid I have given cause to think me needlessly prolix in handling this Subject. For to what purpose is it to dilate on that which may be demonstrated with the utmost Evidence in a Line or two, to any one that is capable of the least Reflexion? It is but looking into your own Thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a Sound, or Figure, or Motion, or Colour, to exist without the Mind, or unperceived. This easy Trial may make you see, that what you contend for, is a downright Contradiction. Inasmuch that I am content to put the whole upon this Issue; if you can but conceive it possible for one extended moveable Substance, or in general, for any one Idea or any thing like an Idea, to exist otherwise than in a Mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the Cause: And as for all that *compages* of external Bodies which you contend for, I shall grant you its Existence, though you cannot either give me any Reason why you believe it exists, or assign any use to it when it is supposed to exist. I say, the bare possibility of your Opinion's being true, shall pass for an Argument that it is so.

23. But say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine Trees, for instance, in a Park, or Books existing in a Closet, and no Body by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it: But what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your Mind certain Ideas which you call *Books* and *Trees*, and the same time omitting to frame the Idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you your self perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: It only shews you have the Power of imagining or forming Ideas in your Mind; but it doth not shew that you can conceive it possible, the Objects of your Thought may exist without the Mind: To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest Repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the Existence of external Bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own Ideas. But the Mind taking no notice of it self, is deluded to think it can and doth conceive Bodies existing unthought of or without the Mind; though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in it self. A little Attention will discover to any one the Truth and Evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any other Proofs against the Existence

Ideas. From all which the natural Consequence should seem to be, that so difficult a thing as the forming abstract Ideas was not necessary for *Communication*, which is so easy and familiar to all sorts of Men. But we are told, if they seem obvious and easy to grown Men, *It is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so*. Now I would fain know at what time it is, Men are employed in surmounting that Difficulty, and furnishing themselves with those necessary helps for Discourse. It cannot be when they are grown up, for then it seems they are not conscious of any such Pains-taking; it remains therefore to be the business of their Childhood. And surely, the great and multiplied Labour of framing abstract Notions, will be found a hard Task for that tender Age. Is it not a hard thing to imagine, that a couple of Children cannot prate together, of their Sugar-plumbs and Rattles and the rest of their little Trinkets, till they have first tacked together numberless Inconsistencies, and so framed in their Minds *abstract general Ideas*, and annexed them to every common Name they make use of?

15. Nor do I think them a whit more needful for the *Enlargement of Knowledge* than for *Communication*. It is I know a Point much insisted on, that all Knowledge and Demonstration are about universal Notions, to which I fully agree: But then it doth not appear to me that those Notions are formed by *Abstraction* in the manner premised; *Universality*, so far as I can comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive Nature or Conception of any thing, but in the relation it bears to the Particulars signified or represented by it: By virtue whereof it is that Things, Names, or Notions, being in their own Nature *Particular*, are rendered *Universal*. Thus when I demonstrate any Proposition concerning Triangles, it is to be supposed that I have in view the universal Idea of a Triangle; which ought not to be understood as if I could frame an Idea of a Triangle which was neither Equilateral nor Scalennon nor Equicrural. But only that the particular Triangle I consider, whether of this or that sort it matters not, doth equally stand for and represent all Rectilinear Triangles whatsoever, and is in that sense *Universal*. All which seems very Plain and not to include any Difficulty in it.

16. But here it will be demanded, how we can know any Proposition to be true of all particular Triangles, except we have first seen it demonstrated of the abstract Idea of a Triangle which equally agrees to all? For because a Property may be demonstrated to agree to some one particular Triangle, it will not thence follow that it equally belongs to any other Triangle, which in all respects is not the same with it. For

Example, Having demonstrated that the three Angles of an Isosceles Rectangular Triangle are equal to two right Ones, I cannot therefore conclude this Affection agrees to all other Triangles, which have neither a right Angle, nor two equal Sides. It seems therefore that, to be certain this Proposition is universally true, we must either make a particular Demonstration for every particular Triangle, which is impossible, or once for all demonstrate it of the *abstract Idea of a Triangle*, in which all the Particulars do indifferently partake, and by which they are all equally represented. To which I answer, that though the Idea I have in view whilst I make the Demonstration, be, for instance, that of an Isosceles Rectangular Triangle, whose Sides are of a determinate Length. I may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other Rectilinear Triangles, of what Sort or Bigness soever. And that, because neither the right Angle, nor the Equality, nor determinate Length of the Sides, are at all concerned in the Demonstration. It is true, the Diagram I have in view includes all these Particulars, but then there is not the least mention made of them in the Proof of the Proposition. It is not said, the three Angles are equal to two right Ones, because one of them is a right Angle, or because the Sides comprehending it are of the same Length. Which sufficiently shews that the right Angle might have been Oblique, and the Sides unequal, and for all that the Demonstration have held good. And for this reason it is, that I conclude that to be true of any Obliquangular or Scalenon, which I had demonstrated of a particular Right-angled, Equicrural Triangle; and not because I demonstrated the Proposition of the abstract Idea of a Triangle. And here it must be acknowledged that a Man may consider a Figure merely as triangular, without attending to the particular Qualities of the Angles, or relations of the Sides. So far he may abstract: But this will never prove, that he can frame an abstract general inconsistent Idea of a Triangle. In like manner we may consider *Peter* so far forth as Man, or so far forth as Animal, without framing the forementioned abstract Idea, either of Man or of Animal, in as much as all that is perceived is not considered.

17. It were an endless, as well as an useless Thing, to trace the *Schoolmen*, those great Masters of Abstraction, through all the manifold inextricable Labyrinths of Error and Dispute, which their Doctrine of abstract Natures and Notions seems to have led them into. What Bickerings and Controversies, and what a learned Dust have been raised about those Matters, and what mighty Advantage hath been from thence derived to Mankind, are things at this Day too clearly known to

is not necessary for the producing our Ideas: Since it is granted they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be produced always in the same Order we see them in at present, without their Concurrence.

19. But though we might possibly have all our Sensations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of their Production, by supposing external Bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise; and so it might be at least probable there are such things as Bodies that excite their Ideas in our Minds. But neither can this be said; for though we give the Materialists their external Bodies, they by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our Ideas are produced: Since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner Body can act upon Spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any Idea in the Mind. Hence it is evident the Production of Ideas or Sensations in our Minds, can be no reason why we should suppose Matter or corporeal Substances, since that is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable with, or without this Supposition. If therefore it were possible for Bodies to exist without the Mind, yet to hold they do so, must needs be a very precarious Opinion; since it is to suppose, without any reason at all, that God has created innumerable Beings that are intirely useless, and serve to no manner of purpose.

20. In short, if there were external Bodies, it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very same Reasons to think there were that we have now. Suppose, what no one can deny possible, an Intelligence, without the help of external Bodies, to be affected with the same train of Sensations or Ideas that you are, imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his Mind. I ask whether that Intelligence hath not all the Reason to believe the Existence of corporeal Substances, represented by his Ideas, and exciting them in his Mind, that you can possibly have for believing the same thing? Of this there can be no Question; which one Consideration is enough to make any reasonable Person suspect the strength of whatever Arguments be may think himself to have, for the Existence of Bodies without the Mind.

21. Were it necessary to add any farther Proof against the Existence of Matter, after what has been said, I could instance several of those Errors and Difficulties (not to mention Impieties) which have sprung from that Tenet. It has occasioned numberless Controversies and Disputes in Philosophy, and not a few of far greater moment in Religion. But I shall not enter into the detail of them in this Place, as

positive, yet if you have any meaning at all, you must at least have a relative Idea of Matter; though you know not what it is, yet you must be supposed to know what Relation it bears to Accidents, and what is meant by its supporting them. It is evident *Support* cannot here be taken in its usual or literal Sense, as when we say that Pillars support a Building: In what Sense therefore must it be taken?

17. If we inquire into what the most accurate Philosophers declare themselves to mean by *Material Substance*; we shall find them acknowledge, they have no other meaning annexed to those Sounds, but the Idea of Being in general, together with the relative Notion of its supporting Accidents. The general Idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract and incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting Accidents, this, as we have just now observed, cannot be understood in the common Sense of those Words; it must therefore be taken in some other Sense, but what that is they do not explain. So that when I consider the two Parts or Branches which make the signification of the Words *Material Substance*, I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But why should we trouble our selves any farther, in discussing this *Material Substratum* or Support of Figure and Motion, and other sensible Qualities? Does it not suppose they have an Existence without the Mind? And is not this a direct Repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable?

18. But though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable Substances may exist without the Mind, corresponding to the Ideas we have of Bodies, yet how is it possible for us to know this? Either we must know it by Sense, or by Reason. As for our Senses, by them we have the Knowledge only of our Sensations, Ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived by Sense, call them what you will: But they do not inform us that things exist without the Mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived. This the Materialists themselves acknowledge. It remains therefore that if we have any Knowledge at all of external Things, it must be by Reason, inferring their Existence from what is immediately perceived by Sense. But what reason can induce us to believe the Existence of Bodies without the Mind, from what we perceive, since the very Patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend, there is any necessary Connexion betwixt them and our Ideas? I say it is granted on all hands (and what happens in Dreams, Phrensies, and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the Ideas we have now, though no Bodies existed without, resembling them. Hence it is evident the Supposition of external Bodies

need being insisted on. And it had been well if the ill Effects of that Doctrine were confined to those only who make the most avowed Profession of it. When Men consider the great Pains, Industry and Parts, that have for so many Ages been laid out on the Cultivation and Advancement of the Sciences, and that notwithstanding all this, the far greater Part of them remain full of Darkness and Uncertainty, and Disputes that are like never to have an end, and even those that are thought to be supported by the most clear and cogent Demonstrations, contain in them Paradoxes which are perfectly irreconcilable to the Understandings of Men, and that taking all together, a small Portion of them doth supply any real Benefit to Mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent Diversion and Amusement: I say, the Consideration of all this is apt to throw them into a Despondency, and perfect Contempt of all Study. But this may perhaps cease, upon a view of the false Principles that have obtained in the World, amongst all which there is none, methinks, hath a more wide Influence over the Thoughts of Speculative Men, than this of abstract general Ideas.

18. I come now to consider the Source of this prevailing Notion, and that seems to me to be Language. And surely nothing of less extent than Reason it self could have been the Source of an Opinion so universally received. The truth of this appears as from other Reasons, so also from the plain Confession of the ablest Patrons of abstract Ideas, who acknowledge that they are made in order to naming; from which it is a clear Consequence, that if there had been no such thing as Speech or Universal Signs, there never had been any thought of Abstraction. See B. 3. C. 6. Sect. 39. and *elsewhere of the Essay on Human Understanding*. Let us therefore examine the manner wherein Words have contributed to the Origin of that Mistake. First then, 'Tis thought that every Name hath, or ought to have, one only precise and settled Signification, which inclines Men to think there are certain *abstract, determinate Ideas*, which constitute the true and only immediate Signification of each general Name. And that it is by the mediation of these abstract Ideas, that a general Name comes to signify any particular Thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise and definite Signification annexed to any general Name, they all signifying indifferently a great number of particular Ideas. All which doth evidently follow from what has been already said, and will clearly appear to anyone by a little Reflexion. To this it will be objected, that every Name that has a Definition, is thereby restrained to one certain Signification. For Example, a *Triangle* is defined to be a *plain Surface*

comprehended by three right Lines; by which that Name is limited to denote one certain Idea and no other. To which I answer, that in the Definition it is not said whether the Surface be Great or Small, Black or White, nor whether the Sides are Long or Short, Equal or Unequal, nor with what Angles they are inclined to each other; in all which there may be great Variety, and consequently there is no one settled Idea which limits the Signification of the word *Triangle*. 'Tis one thing for to keep a Name constantly to the same Definition, and another to make it stand every where for the same Idea: the one is necessary, the other useless and impracticable.

19. But to give a farther Account how Words came to produce the Doctrine of abstract Ideas, it must be observed that it is a received Opinion, that Language has no other End but the communicating our Ideas, and that every significant Name stands for an Idea. This being so, and it being withal certain, that Names, which yet are not thought altogether insignificant, do not always mark out particular conceivable Ideas, it is straightway concluded that they stand for abstract Notions. That there are many Names in use amongst Speculative Men, which do not always suggest to others determinate particular Ideas, is what no Body will deny. And a little Attention will discover, that it is not necessary (even in the strictest Reasonings) significant Names which stand for Ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the Understanding the Ideas they are made to stand for: In Reading and Discoursing, Names being for the most part used as Letters are in *Algebra*, in which though a particular quantity be marked by each Letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each Letter suggest to your Thoughts, that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for.

20. Besides, the communicating of Ideas marked by Words is not the chief and only end of Language, as is commonly supposed. There are other Ends, as the raising of some Passion, the exciting to, or deterring from an Action, the putting the Mind in some particular Disposition: to which the former is in many Cases barely subservient, and sometimes intirely omitted, when these can be obtained without it, as I think doth not unfrequently happen in the familiar use of Language. I intreat the Reader to reflect with himself, and see if it doth not often happen either in Hearing or Reading a Discourse, that the Passions of Fear, Love, Hatred, Admiration, Disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his Mind upon the Perception of certain Words, without any Ideas coming between. At first, indeed, the Words might have occasioned Ideas that

Idea answering the Word *Unity*, I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could not miss finding it; on the contrary it should be the most familiar to my Understanding, since it is said to accompany all other Ideas, and to be perceived by all the ways of Sensation and Reflexion. To say no more, it is an *abstract Idea*.

14. I shall farther add, that after the same manner, as modern Philosophers prove certain sensible Qualities to have no Existence in Matter, or without the Mind, the same thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible Qualities whatsoever. Thus, for Instance, it is said that Heat and Cold are Affections only of the Mind, and not at all Patterns of real Beings, existing in the corporeal Substances which excite them, for that the same Body which appears Cold to one Hand, seems Warm to another. Now why may we not as well argue that Figure and Extension are not Patterns or Resemblances of Qualities existing in Matter, because to the same Eye at different Stations, or Eyes of a different Texture at the same Station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the Images of any thing settled and determinate without the Mind? Again, It is proved that Sweetness is not really in the sapid Thing, because the thing remaining unaltered the Sweetness is changed into Bitter, as in case of a Fever or otherwise viated Palate. Is it not as reasonable to say, that Motion is not without the Mind, since if the Succession of Ideas in the Mind become swifter, the Motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower without any Alteration in any external Object?

15. In short, let any one consider those Arguments, which are thought manifestly to prove that Colours and Tastes exist only in the Mind, and he shall find they may with equal force, be brought to prove the same thing of Extension, Figure, and Motion. Though it must be confessed this Method of arguing doth not so much prove that there is no Extension or Colour in an outward Object, as that we do not know by Sense which is the true Extension or Colour of the Object. But the Arguments foregoing plainly shew it to be impossible that any Colour or Extension at all, or other sensible Quality whatsoever, should exist in an unthinking Subject without the Mind, or in truth, that there should be any such thing as an outward Object.

16. But let us examine a little the received Opinion. It is said Extension is a Mode or Accident of Matter, and that Matter is the *Substratum* that supports it. Now I desire that you would explain what is meant by Matter's *supporting* Extension: Say you, I have no Idea of Matter, and therefore cannot explain it. I answer, though you have no

Qualities, and not, even in Thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the Mind. But I desire any one to reflect and try, whether he can by any Abstraction of Thought, conceive the Extension and Motion of a Body, without all other sensible Qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an Idea of a Body extended and moved, but I must withhold give it some Colour or other sensible Quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the Mind. In short, Extension, Figure, and Motion, abstracted from all other Qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible Qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the Mind and no where else.

11. Again, *Great* and *Small*, *Swift* and *Slow*, are allowed to exist no where without the Mind, being intirely relative, and changing as the Frame or Position of the Organs of Sense varies. The Extension therefore which exists without the Mind, is neither great nor small, the Motion neither swift nor slow, that is, they are nothing at all. But, say you, they are Extension in general, and Motion in general: Thus we see how much the Tenet of extended, moveable Substances existing without the Mind, depends on that strange Doctrine of *abstract Ideas*. And here I cannot but remark, how nearly the Vague and indeterminate Description of Matter or corporeal Substance, which the Modern Philosophers are run into by their own Principles, resembles that antiquated and so much ridiculed Notion of *Materia prima*, to be met with in *Aristotle* and his Followers. Without Extension Solidity cannot be conceived; since therefore it has been shewn that Extension exists not in an unthinking Substance, the same must also be true of Solidity.

12. That Number is intirely the Creature of the Mind, even though the other Qualities be allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever considers, that the same thing bears a different Denomination of Number, as the Mind views it with different respects. Thus, the same Extension is One or Three or Thirty Six, according as the Mind considers it with reference to a Yard, a Foot, or an Inch. Number is so visibly relative, and dependent on Mens Understanding, that it is strange to think how any one should give it an absolute Existence without the Mind. We say one Book, one Page, one Line; all these are equally Unites, though some contain several of the others. And in each Instance it is plain, the Unite relates to some particular Combination of Ideas arbitrarily put together by the Mind.

13. Unity I know some will have to be a simple or uncompounded Idea, accompanying all other Ideas into the Mind. That I have any such

were fit to produce those Emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will be found that when Language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the Sounds or Sight of the Characters is oft immediately attended with those Passions, which at first were wont to be produced by the intervention of Ideas, that are now quite omitted. May we not, for Example, be affected with the promise of a *good Thing*, though we have not an Idea of what it is? Or is not the being threatened with Danger sufficient to excite a Dread, though we think not of any particular Evil likely to befall us, nor yet frame to our selves an Idea of Danger in Abstract? If any one shall join ever so little Reflexion of his own to what has been said, I believe it will evidently appear to him, that general Names are often used in the propriety of Language without the Speaker's designing them for Marks of Ideas in his own, which he would have them raise in the Mind of the Hearer. Even proper Names themselves do not seem always spoken, with a Design to bring into our view the Ideas of those Individuals that are supposed to be marked by them. For Example, when a Schoolman tells me *Aristotle hath said it*, all I conceive he means by it, is to dispose me to embrace his Opinion with the Deference and Submission which Custom has annexed to that Name. And this effect may be so instantly produced in the Minds of those who are accustomed to resign their Judgment to the Authority of that Philosopher, as it is impossible any Idea either of his Person, Writings, or Reputation should go before. Innumerable Examples of this kind may be given, but why should I insist on those things, which every one's Experience will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him?

21. We have, I think, shewn the Impossibility of *abstract Ideas*. We have considered what has been said for them by their ablest Patrons; and endeavored to shew they are of no Use for those Ends, to which they are thought necessary. And lastly, we have traced them to the Source from whence they flow, which appears to be Language. It cannot be denied that Words are of excellent Use, in that by their means all that Stock of Knowledge which has been purchased by the joint Labours of inquisitive Men in all Ages and Nations, may be drawn into the view and made the possession of one single Person. But at the same time it must be owned that most parts of Knowledge have been strangely perplexed and darkened by the abuse of Words, and general ways of Speech wherein they are delivered. Since therefore Words are so apt to impose on the Understanding, whatever Ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare and naked into my View, keeping out of my Thoughts, so far as I am able, those Names which long and

constant Use hath so strictly united with them; from which I may expect to derive the following Advantages.

22. First, I shall be sure to get clear of all Controversies purely Verbal; the springing up of which Weeds in almost all the Sciences has been a main Hindrance to the Growth of true and sound Knowledge. Secondly, this seems to be a sure way to extricate my self out of that fine and subtle Net of *abstract Ideas*, which has so miserably perplexed and entangled the Minds of Men, and that with this peculiar Circumstance, that by how much the finer and more curious was the Wit of any Man, by so much the deeper was he like to be ensnared, and faster held therein. Thirdly, so long as I confine my Thoughts to my own Ideas divested of Words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The Objects I consider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking I have an Idea which I have not. It is not possible for me to imagine, that any of my own Ideas are alike or unlike, that are not truly so. To discern the Agreements or Disagreements there are between my Ideas, to see what Ideas are included in any compound Idea, and what not, there is nothing more requisite, than an attentive Perception of what passes in my own Understanding.

23. But the attainment of all these Advantages doth presuppose an intire Deliverance from the Deception of Words, which I dare hardly promise my self; so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an Union so early begun, and confirmed by so long a Habit as that betwixt Words and Ideas. Which Difficulty seems to have been very much increased by the Doctrine of *Abstraction*. For so long as Men thought abstract Ideas were annexed to their Words, it doth not seem strange that they should use Words for Ideas: It being found an impracticable thing to lay aside the Word, and retain the abstract Idea in the Mind, which in it self was perfectly inconceivable. This seems to me the principal Cause, why those Men who have so emphatically recommended to others, the laying aside all use of Words in their Meditations, and contemplating their bare Ideas, have yet failed to perform it themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of the absurd Opinions and insignificant Disputes, which grow out of the abuse of Words. And in order to remedy these Evils they advise well, that we attend to the Ideas signified, and draw off our Attention from the Words which signify them. But how good soever this Advice may be, they have given others, it is plain they could not have a due regard to it themselves, so long as they thought the only immediate use of Words was to signify Ideas, and that the immediate Signification of every general Name was a

Substratum of those Ideas.

8. But say you, though the Ideas themselves do not exist without the Mind, yet there may be Things like them whereof they are Copies or Resemblances, which Things exist without the Mind, in an unthinking Substance. I answer, an Idea can be like nothing but an Idea; a Colour or Figure can be like nothing but another Colour or Figure. If we look but ever so little into our Thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a Likeness except only between our Ideas. Again, I ask whether those supposed Originals or external Things, of which our Ideas are the Pictures or Representations, be themselves perceivable or no? If they are, then they are Ideas, and we have gained our Point; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be Sense, to assert a Colour is like something which is invisible; Hard or Soft, like something which is Intangible; and so of the rest.

9. Some there are who make a Distinction betwixt *Primary* and *Secondary* Qualities: By the former, they mean Extension, Figure, Motion, Rest, Solidity or Impenetrability and Number: By the latter they denote all other sensible Qualities, as Colours, Sounds, Tastes, and so forth. The Ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the Resemblances of any thing existing without the Mind or unperceived; but they will have our Ideas of the primary Qualities to be Patterns or Images of Things which exist without the Mind, in an unthinking Substance which they call *Matter*. By Matter therefore we are to understand an inert, senseless Substance, in which Extension, Figure, and Motion, do actually subsist. But it is evident from what we have already shewn, that Extension, Figure and Motion are only Ideas existing in the Mind, and that an Idea can be like nothing but another Idea, and that consequently neither They nor their Archetypes can exist in an unperceiving Substance. Hence it is plain, that that the very Notion of what is called *Matter* or *Corporeal Substance*, involves a Contradiction in it.

10. They who assert that Figure, Motion, and the rest of the Primary or Original Qualities do exist without the Mind, in unthinking Substances, do at the same time acknowledge that Colours, Sounds, Heat, Cold, and suchlike secondary Qualities, do not, which they tell us are Sensations existing in the Mind alone, that depend on and are occasioned by the different Size, Texture and Motion of the minute Particles of Matter. This they take for an undoubted Truth, which they can demonstrate beyond all Exception. Now if it be certain, that those original Qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible

nicer Strain of Abstraction than to distinguish the Existence of sensible Objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive them Existing unperceived? Light and Colours, Heat and Cold, Extension and Figures, in a word the Things we see and feel, what are they but so many Sensations, Notions, Ideas or Impressions on the Sense; and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any of these from Perception? For my part I might as easily divide a Thing from it Self. I may indeed divide in my Thoughts or conceive apart from each other those Things which, perhaps, I never perceived by Sense so divided. Thus I imagine the Trunk of a Humane Body without the Limbs, or conceive the Smell of a Rose without thinking on the Rose it self. So far I will not deny I can abstract, if that may properly be called *Abstraction*, which extends only to the conceiving separately such Objects, as it is possible may really exist or be actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining Power does not extend beyond the possibility of real Existence or Perception. Hence as it is impossible for me to see or feel any Thing without an actual Sensation of that Thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in my Thoughts any sensible Thing or Object distinct from the Sensation or Perception of it.

6. Some Truths there are so near and obvious to the Mind, that a Man need only open his Eyes to see them. Such I take this Important one to be, to wit, that all the Choir of Heaven and Furniture of the Earth, in a word all those Bodies which compose the mighty Frame of the World, have not any Subsistence without a Mind, that their Being is to be perceived or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my Mind or that of any other created Spirit, they must either have no Existence at all, or else subsist in the Mind of some eternal Spirit: It being perfectly unintelligible and involving all the Absurdity of Abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an Existence independent of a Spirit. To be convinced of which, the Reader need only reflect and try to separate in his own Thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived.

7. From what has been said, it follows, there is not any other Substance than *Spirit*, or that which perceives. But for the fuller proof of this Point, let it be considered, the sensible Qualities are Colour, Figure, Motion, Smell, Taste, and such like, that is, the Ideas perceived by Sense. Now for an Idea to exist in an unperceiving Thing, is a manifest Contradiction; for to have an Idea is all one as to perceive: that therefore wherein Colour, Figure, and the like Qualities exist, must perceive them; hence it is clear there can be no unthinking Substance or

determinate, abstract Idea.

24. But these being known to be Mistakes, a Man may with greater Ease prevent his being imposed on by Words. He that knows he has no other than particular Ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the abstract Idea, annexed to any Name. And he that knows Names do not always stand for Ideas, will spare himself the labour of looking for Ideas, where there are none to be had. It were therefore to be wished that every one would use his utmost Endeavours, to obtain a clear View of the Ideas he would consider, separating from them all that dress and incumbrance of Words which so much contribute to blind the Judgment and divide the Attention. In vain do we extend our View into the Heavens, and pry into the Entrails of the Earth, in vain do we consult the Writings of learned Men, and trace the dark Footsteps of Antiquity; we need only draw the Curtain of Words, to behold the fairest Tree of Knowledge, whose Fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our Hand.

25. Unless we take care to clear the first Principles of Knowledge, from the embarras and delusion of Words, we may draw infinite Reasonings upon them to no purpose; we may draw Consequences from Consequences, and be never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only lose our selves the more irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled in Difficulties and Mistakes. Whoever therefore designs to read the following Sheets, I intreat him to make my Words the Occasion of his own Thinking, and endeavour to attain the same Train of Thoughts in Reading, that I had in writing them. By this means it will be easy for him to discover the Truth or Falsity of what I say. He will be out of all danger of being deceived by my Words, and I do not see how he can be led into an Error by considering his own naked, undisguised Ideas.





OF THE
P R I N C I P L E S
OF
Humane Knowledge.

P A R T I.

1. **T**H is evident to any one who takes a Survey of the Objects of Humane Knowledge, that they are either Ideas actually imprinted on the Senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the Passions and Operations of the Mind, or lastly Ideas formed by help of Memory and Imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By Sight I have the Ideas of Light and Colours with their several Degrees and Variations. By Touch I perceive, for Example, Hard and Soft, Heat and Cold, Motion and Resistance, and of all these more and less either as to Quantity or Degree. Smelling furnishes me with Odors; the Palate with Tastes, and Hearing conveys Sounds to the Mind in all their variety of Tone and Composition. And as several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one Name, and so to be reputed as one Thing. Thus, for Example, a certain Colour, Taste, Smell, Figure and Consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct Thing, signified by the Name *Apple*. Other collections of Ideas constitute a Stone, a Tree, a Book, and the like sensible Things: which, as they are pleasing or disagreeable, excite the Passions of Love, Hatred, Joy,

Grief, and so forth.

2. But besides all that endless variety of Ideas or Objects of Knowledge, there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers Operations, as Willing, Imagining, Remembering about them. This perceiving, active Being is what I call *Mind, Spirit, Soul* or *my Self*. By which Words I do not denote any one of my Ideas, but a thing intirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived: for the Existence of an Idea consists in being perceived.

3. That neither our Thoughts, nor Passions, nor Ideas formed by the Imagination, exist without the Mind, is what every Body will allow. And it seems no less evident that the various Sensations or Ideas imprinted on the Sense, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever Objects they compose) cannot exist otherwise than in a Mind perceiving them. I think an intuitive Knowledge may be obtained of this, by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the Term *Exist* when applied to sensible Things. The Table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my Study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my Study I might perceive it, or that some other Spirit actually does perceive it. There was an Odor, that is, it was smelled; There was a Sound, that is to say, it was heard; a Colour or Figure, and it was perceived by Sight or Touch. This is all that I can understand by these and the like Expressions. For as to what is said of the absolute Existence of unthinking Things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their *Esse* is *Percipi*, nor is it possible they should have any Existence, out of the Minds or thinking Things which perceive them.

4. It is indeed an Opinion strangely prevailing amongst Men, that Houses, Mountains, Rivers, and in a word all sensible Objects have an Existence Natural or Real, distinct from their being perceived by the Understanding. But with how great an Assurance and Acquiescence soever this Principle may be entertained in the World; yet whoever shall find in his Heart to call it in Question, may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest Contradiction. For what are the forementioned Objects but the things we perceive by Sense, and what do we perceive besides our own Ideas or Sensations; and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any Combination of them should exist unperceived?

5. If we thoroughly examine this Tenet, it will, perhaps, be found at Bottom to depend on the Doctrine of *Abstract Ideas*. For can there be a