We will spend two classes on this paper. Read sections I-IV (pp. 5-16) for Mon and sections V-VII (pp. 16-27) for Wed.

• The brief introductory section I sets out the sort of problem Walton wants to address and section II deepens it by arguing against some of the solutions that might suggest themselves. As you read this, it is worth thinking about how someone sympathetic to one of these approaches might reply to Walton’s criticisms, but it would also be worth coming back to this discussion after you read Walton’s own solution to see which of these might be its strongest competitor.

• Sections III and IV set out Walton’s own solution. In section III, he uses the idea of make-believe to explain the idea of “fictional truth.” This is one side of a general effort on Walton’s part to see the representational arts in terms of make-believe; for example, he sees a painting (at least a representational painting) as a prop in a game of make-believe seeing.^* Section IV sets out the particular form of make-believe that Walton sees as the solution to the particular problem he is addressing in this paper.

• Walton describes section V as an argument for his solution but it is at least as much a further development and clarification of that solution.

• Sections VI and VII then extend his solution further. In VI he considers other attitudes to fictions (besides fear) and compares his account to other views of these attitudes. In VII, he applies his approach to a couple of puzzles beyond the one he began with.

* If you are curious about further applications you can find on line a short summary of a book he wrote after this paper developing a number of aspects of his views; see Kendall L. Walton, “Précis of Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 51 (1991), pp. 379-382 (on JSTOR).