Reading guide for Wed 4/8: Heidegger, The Origin of the Work of Art, “The Work and Truth,” HK 669-683
 

This section is in many ways the heart of the essay. Although there are no clear subdivisions, there are definite shifts in the topics discussed, and the notes below are divided accordingly. I’ve tried to suggest connections between Heidegger and other things you’ve read in addition to suggesting ways of understanding his views in their own right.

Our discussion in class will focus on his example of the Greek temple and the ideas of world and earth that he uses it to illustrate (HK 670-677). Although the broad significance suggested by the terms “world” and “earth” is no doubt intended, you should also keep in mind features more specific to the example—i.e., the role of a work of art in a culture and the material from which it is formed (e.g., stone or paint).

• The self-subsistence of a work (HK 669-670). Although this serves as an introduction to Heidegger’s discussion of the way truth happens in a work, its discussion of withdrawal and decay points to topics discussed in the third part of the essay. Its chief significance for what follows immediately lies in showing that the self-subsistence of a work depends on its relations.

• World and earth (HK 670-677). You’ve already seen several examples of Heidegger’s readiness to forge new philosophical vocabulary in the way a poet might. You should regard the terms “world” and “earth,” too, in this way; although they draw their meanings in part from more ordinary uses, you should be alert to the special way Heidegger uses them.

• A Greek temple (HK 670-672). You can be sure that Heidegger is aware of Hegel’s discussion of the Greek temple (HK 439f) and it is worth comparing the two; but bear in mind that Heidegger uses the example for a purpose rather different from Hegel’s. In particular, Heidegger will make no attempt to employ Hegel’s distinctions among the symbolic, classical, and romantic arts.

• Setting up a world (HK 672-673). Although Heidegger would probably not endorse the term, much of what he describes in connection with the idea of a “world” could also be put under the rubric of “culture.” For a further example, reread his reflection on Van Gogh’s painting (HK 664) where the term “world” also appeared.

• Setting forth the earth (HK 674-675). Heidegger offered an initial characterization of “earth” already on HK 671 (as well as using this term, too, in his discussion of Van Gogh’s painting). Think about the phrase “setting forth” in connection with his efforts to distinguish earth from material that is used up, perishes, or disappears in equipment.

• Repose as striving (HK 675-677). Heidegger doesn’t think of the relation between world and earth as a contradiction, but there are definite relations between what he says here and Schelling’s idea of the work of art as the resolution of a contradiction. Be sure to think your way into the conflict be between world and earth; it will provide the basis for an important idea in the final part of the essay.

• The happening of truth (HK 677-682). Heidegger begins this part of his discussion with reality, ends with beauty, and uses metaphors of light along the way; that’s plenty of reason to recall the neo-Platonists. Moreover, his talk of unconcealedness might suggest Nietzsche’s way of distinguishing the attitudes of the “theoretical man” and the artist to the unveiling of truth (HK 551f). But keep in mind also what is distinctive about Heidegger: truth is spoken of less as an acting subject or as an object acted on than as an event or process, as something that happens.

• Truth as unconcealedness (HK 677-679). One way of approaching the identification of truth with the “lighted realm” (HK 679) of unconcealedness is to notice that for there to be truth there must be the possibility of thoughts that can be true or false. If we suppose that it is characteristic of our world that some things can be thought and others not, some will be unconcealed (not necessarily as known but as thinkable) while others remain concealed.

•  Clearing, refusal, and dissembling (HK 679-681). Thus, the idea of a clearing of unconcealedness can be seen as a way of approaching the idea of understanding. The ideas of refusal and dissembling then provide a comparable approach to the ideas of the limits of understanding and of misunderstanding. Notice the connections that are sketched (on HK 681) between the two oppositions unconcealedness/concealedness and world/earth.

• Beauty and unconcealedness (HK 681-682). Connections between the preceding general philosophical discussion and art are made here not only in the final comment about beauty but also, as will appear later, in the earlier comments on holding and keeping.

• Truth and createdness (HK 682-683). Here Heidegger poses a number of questions that set the stage for the last part of the essay.