LECTURE XXIII.
PHYSICAL COMPULSION DISTINGUISHED FROM SANCTION.
I now proceed to distinguish physical compulsion or restraint from the restraint which is imposed by duty or obligation.
A sanction is a conditional evil:—an evil which the party obliged may chance to incur, in case he violate the obligation, or disobey the command which imposes it The party obliged is obliged, because he is obnoxious to this evil in the event of 453disobedience, and because he is necessarily averse from it, or desires to avoid it.
The object of every duty is an act or forbearance: Or (changing the expression) every duty is a duty to act or forbear. But every act is the consequence of a volition, and every volition is the consequence of a desire: meaning by a desire, a desire which is not a volition, or a desire strictly so called. Consequently, every act is the consequence of a desire.
And, further, every forbearance is intended; and is either the effect of an aversion from the consequences of the act forborne, or is the effect of a preference for some object which is inconsistent with the performance of that act. Consequently, every forbearance, like every act, is the consequence of a desire.
Unless we are determined to obedience by disinterested hate of wrong, we fulfil an obligation because we are averse from the sanction. Our desire of avoiding the evil which we might chance to incur by disobedience, makes us will the act which the command enjoins, makes us forbear from the act which the command forbids. In other words, our desire of avoiding the evil, which we might chance to incur by disobedience, makes us desire the act, or makes us desire the forbearance.
Consequently, we cannot be obliged to that which depends not upon our desires, or which we cannot fulfil by desiring or wishing to fulfil it. A stupid and cruel Legislator may affect to command that, which the party cannot perform, although he desire to perform it. But though he inspire the party with a wish of fulfilling the command, he cannot attain his end by inspiring those wishes. Nor will the infliction of the pain operate in the way of example, or tend to confirm others in their desires of fulfilling their duties. Consequently, the compulsion or restraint which is implied in Duty or Obligation, is hate and fear of an evil which we may avoid by desiring: by desiring to fulfil a something, which we can fulfil if we wish.
Physical compulsion or restraint distinguished from that which is imported by duty or obligation.
Other compulsion or restraint may be styled merely physical. For the term ‘physical’ or ‘natural’ (as it is commonly used) is simply a negative expression: denoting that the object to which it is applied, is not some other object which is expressly or tacitly referred to. As applied to compulsion or restraint, it denotes that the compulsion or restraint to which it is applied, is not the compulsion or restraint which is imported by Obligation or Duty.
Physical compulsion or restraint, as thus understood, may affect the body, or may affect the mind.
454For example: If I am imprisoned in a cell of which the door is locked, physical restraint is applied to my body. I cannot move from my cell, although I desire to move from it. Whether I shall quit, or whether I shall stay in my cell, depends not upon my desires.
Again: I am imprisoned in a cell from which I am able to escape, but, knowing that I may be punished, in case I attempt to escape, the fear of the probable punishment determines or inclines me to stay there.
Now, in this instance, the restraint which is applied to me is not physical restraint, but I am obliged to stay in my cell. My desire to escape, is not controlled or prevented by outward obstacles. It is controlled or prevented by my opposite or conflicting desire of avoiding the probable punishment. Whether I shall quit, or whether I shall stay in my prison, depends upon my desires.
Further: If the judge sentence me to imprisonment, he may command that I shall be dragged to prison in case I refuse to go, or he may command me to go to prison under peril of an additional punishment. If I refuse to go to prison, and am dragged thither by the officers without a movement of my own, physical compulsion is applied to my body. My body moves to the prison in obedience to an outward impulse, and not in compliance with volitions of my own, prompted by a desire of my own. Whether I shall move to prison, or shall not move to prison, depends not upon my desires.
But if I go to prison, knowing that I shall be whipped in case I refuse to go, physical compulsion is not applied to my body, but I move to prison willingly in consequence of my obligation to go. Much as I hate imprisonment, I hate imprisonment coupled with whipping more. My aversion from the heavier punishment, being stronger than my aversion from the lighter punishment; it may be said, that I desire to go to my prison, i.e. I desire it as a mean: a mean of avoiding the greater evil, and that that desire makes me will the movements which carry my body to my prison.
As I observed in a former Lecture, the dominion of the will extends not to the mind.93 That is to say, no change in the state of the mind is accomplished by a mere desire. But, though no change in the mind immediately follows a desire for it, changes in the mind may be wrought through means to which we resort in consequence of such desires.
93 P. 413 ante.
455For example, I cannot know a science by simply wishing to know it. But by resorting to means suggested by the wish, I may come to know it. By reading, writing, and meditation, I shall acquire the knowledge which I desire. And so, virtues may be acquired by indirect consequence. Numerous changes in the mind are, therefore, wrought by desires: though none of the desires which work changes in the mind, can be likened to the peculiar desires which are styled volitions.
But a change in the mind may be wrought or prevented, whether we desire the change or whether we do not desire it. And, in all such cases, it may be said that the mind is affected by physical compulsion or restraint.
The conviction produced by evidence, is a case of physical compulsion. If I perceive that premisses are true, and that the inference is justly drawn, I admit the conclusion though I do not wish to admit it, or though the truth be unwelcome, and I would reject the truth if I could. Accordingly, if I love darkness, and hate the light, I naturally eschew the evidence which might expel the grateful error. I refuse to examine the proofs which might render the truth resistless, and I dwell with complacency upon every shadow of proof which tends to confirm my prepossession.94
94 For this reason, non-belief may be blamable. Where (e.g.) it is the result of insufficient examination, refusal to examine, partiality or antipathy indirectly removable, etc.
Obligations to suffer and not to suffer.95
I observe, that certain writers talk of obligations to suffer, and of obligations not to suffer. And, as an instance of an obligation to suffer, they cite the supposed obligation to suffer punishment, which is incumbent upon a criminal.
95 Traités, etc. vol. i. pp. 239, 245.
But it is clear that we cannot be obliged to suffer, or not to suffer. For whether we shall suffer, or shall not suffer, does not depend upon our desires. By acts or forbearances which do depend upon our desires, we may induce suffering upon ourselves, or we may avert suffering from ourselves; but the sufferance or passion itself is not immediately dependent upon our wishes to suffer or not.
The Criminal who is condemned to punishment is never obliged to suffer, although he may be obliged to acts which facilitate the infliction of the suffering, or may be obliged to forbear from acts which would prevent or hinder the infliction.
For example: If I am condemned to imprisonment, I am not obliged to suffer the imprisonment, although I may be obliged to walk to prison, or to forbear from breaking prison. 456Whether I shall walk to prison, or shall not walk to prison, or whether I shall forbear or not from attempting to break my prison, depends upon my desires. And I can, therefore, be bound or obliged by fear of additional punishment, to do the act, or to observe the forbearance. But whether I shall suffer the imprisonment, or shall not suffer the imprisonment, does not depend upon my desires in the last result. If, in spite of the additional punishment with which I am threatened, I refuse to go to prison, or attempt to break prison, I may not only be visited with the additional punishment, but physical compulsion or restraint may be applied to my body. I may be dragged to prison by the officers of justice; or, when I am there, I may be secured by walls and chains which defy my attempts to escape.
Passion or suffering, what. Is the ultimate sanction of every obligation.
To talk of obligation to suffer, is to confound obligation with the ultimate basis of obligation: In the last result, every obligation is sanctioned by suffering: that is to say, by some pain which may be inflicted upon the wrong-doer whether he consent or not: i.e. by some pain which may be inflicted upon the wrong-doer independently of an act or forbearance of his own. If this were not the case, and if every obligation were sanctioned by a further obligation, no obligation could be effectual. One obligation might be broken after another; and as no obligation could be enforced without the consent of the wrong-doer, he would not be obliged at all.
For example: I am condemned to restore a house which I detain from the owner; to make satisfaction for a breach of contract; to pay damages for an assault, to the injured party; or to pay a fine for the same offence.
The sanction which attaches upon me, in this the first stage, is an obligation: An obligation to deliver the house, or to pay the damages or fine.
If I refuse to perform this obligation, I may incur a further obligation: for instance, an obligation to pay a fine or to suffer imprisonment.
But if this were again sanctioned by a further obligation, and that by another, and so on, it is manifest that I should be exempt (in effect) from all obligation.
Either in the first instance, or at some subsequent point, I must be visited with a sanction which can be inflicted without my consent. Suffering, therefore, is the ultimate sanction. Or (changing the expression) every obligation is ultimately sanctioned by suffering, although (in innumerable cases to which I 457shall advert hereafter) the immediate sanction of the obligation is another obligation.
But though suffering is the, ultimate sanction, we cannot be obliged to suffer. For that supposes that we can be obliged to a something which depends not upon our desires. The only possible objects of duties or obligations are acts and forbearances.
Suffering may be inflicted without physical compulsion or restraint.
Before I conclude I beg leave to observe, that suffering must not be confounded with physical compulsion and restraint. To suffer, is to incur an evil independently of our own consent: a pain which is inflicted upon us, independently of an act or forbearance of our own.
Now, though physical compulsion or restraint, is commonly the mean or instrument by which suffering is inflicted, suffering may be inflicted without it. For instance, certain obligations are sanctioned by nullities; others again are sanctioned by penalties which are purely infamising: by a declaration, pronounced by competent authority, that the party shall be held infamous or merits infamy.
In these and in other cases, the sanction is applied without the consent of the party, and without physical compulsion or restraint (or, at least, without such compulsion or restraint applied to the body).
In other cases, the suffering is inflicted by physical compulsion or restraint: Or at least physical compulsion or restraint may be necessary (e.g. Punishments which affect the body).
In most of the cases, in which it may be necessary to inflict suffering by physical compulsion or restraint, the physical compulsion or restraint is, in fact, needless: because the party, knowing it may be applied, submits voluntarily.