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LECTURE XIX.

INTENTION.

In the preceding Lectures I have endeavoured to analyse the expressions ‘legal Right and Duty,’ or to determine generally the nature and essence of legal Rights and Duties.

Before I can complete the analysis of ‘Right’ and ‘Duty,’ or before I can determine completely the import of those complex terms, I must advert in a general manner to legal Injuries or Wrongs, and to legal or political Sanctions.

But before I could proceed to the consideration of Injuries and Sanctions, or could distinguish Duty or Obligation from physical compulsion or restraint, it was necessary that I should examine the meaning of ‘Will’ and ‘Motive,’ ‘Intention’ and ‘Negligence:’ Including, in the term ‘Negligence,’ negligence strictly so called; with the closely allied, though somewhat different notions, which are styled ‘ Rashness ‘ or ‘ Temerity,’ and ‘ Heedlessness.’

Accordingly, I examined, in the last Lecture, the meaning of ‘Will’ and ‘Motive;’ and I now proceed to the import of ‘Intention’ and ‘Negligence.’

Volitions and Motives.

As I stated in my last Lecture, some of our wishes or desires are followed immediately by their objects. In other words, some of our wishes or desires consummate themselves, or attain their appropriate ends without the intervention of means.

The only wishes or desires which consummate themselves, are wishes or desires for certain movements of our own bodily organs. All our other desires attain their appropriate ends, by means, or series of means: by means of the bodily movements which immediately follow our desires for them, or by means of those bodily movements coupled with additional means.

[The bodily movements which we will, or which immediately follow our desires of them, are not desired for themselves, but for their consequences. They are not desired as ends but as means to ends.

This (I believe) will hold universally. The movements in themselves are perfectly indifferent objects, and derive all their interest from the purposes which they subserve.]

The desires for those bodily movements which immediately follow our desires for them, are sometimes styled ‘volitions:’—419more frequently, ‘ determinations of the will,’ or of ‘the power or faculty of willing.’ For here (as in other cases of cause and effect) the customary sequence of the bodily movement upon the desire immediately preceding, has been ascribed to a fancied something styled a ‘power:’ A ‘power of willing’ which resides in the man, and by virtue whereof he produces the movement which is the instant consequence of his wish for it. The fancied something which comes between the wish and the movement, is commonly styled (with more brevity) ‘the Will.’ And whenever I find occasion to mention this mysterious being, I will (if you please) call it so.

For the structure of established speech forces me to talk of ‘willing;’ and to impute the bodily movements, which immediately follow our desires for them, to ‘the Will.’

To discard established terms is seldom possible; and where it is possible, is seldom expedient. A familiar expression, however obscure, is commonly less obscure, as well as more welcome to the taste, than a new and strange one. Instead of rejecting conventional terms because they are ambiguous and obscure, we shall commonly find it better to explain their meanings, or (in the language of Old Hobbes) ‘to snuff them with distinctions and definitions.’

Accordingly, I shall talk of ‘willing;’ of ‘determinations of the will;’ and of ‘motives determining the will.’ But all that I mean by those expressions is this. ‘To will,’ is to wish or desire certain of those bodily movements which immediately follow our desires of them. A ‘detemination of the will,’ or a ‘volition,’ is a wish or desire of the sort. A ‘motive determining the will,’ is a wish not a volition, but suggesting a wish which is. The wish styled a ‘motive.’ is not immediately followed by its appropriate object: But the bodily movement which is the appropriate object of the volition, seems to the party a certain or probable mean for attaining the something which is the appropriate object of the motive. In case that something be wished as a mean to an ulterior object, the wish of the ulterior object is a motive to a motive; as the wish of the intervening mean is a motive to the volition.

Acts.

The bodily movements which immediately follow our desires of them, are the only human acts, strictly and properly so called. For events which are not willed are not acts; and the bodily movements in question are the only events which we will. They are the only objects which follow our desires, without the intervention of means.

420But, as I observed in my last Lecture, most of the names which seem to be names of acts are names of acts strictly and properly so called, coupled with more or fewer of their consequences.

And as the names of acts comprise certain of their consequences, so it is said that those consequences are willed, although they are only intended. In the case which I have just supposed, it would be said that I willed the consequences of my voluntary muscular movements, as well as the movements themselves.

Nor is it in our power to discard these forms of speech, although they involve the nature of will and intention in thick obscurity. They are inseparably interwoven with the rest of established language; and if we attempted to change them for new and precise expressions, we should either resort to terms which others would not understand, or to tedious circumlocutions which others would not endure. To analyse, mark, and remember their complex import, is all that we can accomplish.

Accordingly, I must often speak of ‘acts,’ when I mean ‘acts and their consequences;’ and must often speak of those consequences as if they were willed, though, in truth, they are intended.

Internal Acts.

And here I must pause a moment for the purpose of correcting a mistake which I made in a former Lecture.

In that Lecture, I distinguished acts into acts internal, and acts external:⁷⁵ Meaning by acts internal, volitions or determinations of the will: and meaning by acts external, the bodily movements which are the appropriate objects of volitions.

I am convinced, on-reflection, that the terms are needless, and tend to darken their subjects. The term ‘volitions,’ or the term ‘determinations of the will,’ sufficiently denotes the objects to which I applied the term ‘internal acts:’ And it is utterly absurd (unless we are talking in metaphor) to apply such terms as ‘act’ and ‘movement’ to mental phenomena. I, therefore, repudiate the term ‘internal acts;’ and, with that term, the superfluous distinction in question. I hastily borrowed the distinction from the works of Mr. Bentham:⁷⁶ A writer, whom I much revere, and whom I am prone to follow, though I will not receive his dogmas with blind and servile submission. Impostors exact from their disciples ‘prostration of the understanding,’ because their doctrines will not endure examination. 421A man of Mr. Bentham’s genius may provoke inquiry; and may rest satisfied with the ample and genuine admiration which his writings will infallibly extort from scrutinising and impartial judges.

Intention as regarding present acts, or the consequences of present acts.

The bodily movements which immediately follow our desires of them, are acts (properly so called).

But every act is followed by consequences; and is also attended by concomitants, which are styled its circumstances.

To desire the act is to will it. To expect any of its consequences, is to intend those consequences.

The act itself is intended as well as willed. For every volition is accompanied by an expectation or belief, that the bodily movement wished will immediately follow the wish.

A consequence of the act is never willed. For none but acts themselves are the appropriate objects of volitions. Nor is it always intended. For the party who wills the act, may not expect the consequence. If a consequence of the act be desired, it is probably intended. But (as I shall shew immediately) an intended consequence is not always desired. Intentions, therefore, regard acts: or they regard the consequence of acts.

When I will an act, I expect or intend the act which is the appropriate object of the volition. And when I will an act, I may expect, contemplate, or intend some given event, as a certain or contingent consequence of the act which I will.

Confusion of Will and Intention.

Hence (no doubt) the frequent confusion of Will and Intention. Feeling that will implies intention (or that the appropriate objects of volitions are intended as well as willed) numerous writers upon Jurisprudence (and Mr. Bentham amongst the number) employ ‘will’ and ‘intention’ as synonymous or equivalent terms. They forget that intention does not imply will; or that the appropriate objects of certain intentions are not the appropriate objects of volitions. A consequence of an act may not be intended. The agent may not intend a consequence of his act. In other words, when the agent wills the act, he may not contemplate that given event as a certain or contingent consequence of the act which he wills.

For example:

My yard or garden is divided from a road by a high paling. I am shooting with a pistol at a mark chalked upon this paling. A passenger then on the road, but whom the fence intercepts from my sight, is wounded by one of the shots. For the shot pierces the paling; passes to the road; and hits the passenger.

Now, when I aim at the mark, and pull the trigger, I may not intend to hurt the passenger. I may not contemplate the 422hurt of a passenger as a contingent consequence of the act. For though the hurt of a passenger be a probable consequence, I may not think of it, or advert to it, as a consequence. Or, though I may advert to it as a possible consequence, I may think that the fence will intercept the shot, and prevent it from passing to the road. Or the road may be one which is seldom travelled, and I may think the presence of a stranger at that place and time extremely improbable.

On any of these suppositions, I am clear of intending the harm: Though (as I shall shew hereafter) I may be guilty of heedlessness or rashness. Before intention can be defined exactly, the import of those terms must be taken into consideration.

An intended consequence of an act may be wished or not.

Where the agent intends a consequence of the act, he may wish the consequence, or he may not wish it.

And if wished, it may be wished as an end, or as a mean.

And, if he wish the consequence, he may wish it as an end, or he may wish it as a mean to an end.

Consequence of an act wished as an end.

I will illustrate these three suppositions by adducing examples. But before I exemplify these three suppositions, I will endeavour to explain what I mean, when I say ‘that a consequence of an act may be wished as an end.’

Strictly speaking, no external consequence of any act is desired as an end.

The end or ultimate purpose of every volition and act is a feeling or sentiment:—is pleasure, direct or positive; or is the pleasure which arises indirectly from the removal or prevention of pain. But where the pleasure, which (in strictness) is the end of the act, can only be attained through a given external consequence, that external consequence is inseparable from the end; and is styled (with sufficient precision) the end of the act and the volition. For example, If you shoot me to death because you hate me mortally, my death is a necessary condition to the attainment of your end. The end of the act, is to allay the deadly antipathy. But the end can only be attained through my death. And my death (which is an intended consequence of the act) may, therefore, be styled the end of the act and the volition.

I stated in my last Lecture, that the bodily movements, which are the appropriate objects of volitions, are not desired as ends.

But that is true of every outward object which is the object of a desire. This, therefore, will not distinguish volitions from other desires.

Nor can it be said, that the appropriate objects of volitions 423are desired as means to ends external, or to remote ends. In most cases they are. But in some they are not. Namely, dancing, etc., for nothing but the present pleasure.

The true test is, that they are the only desires immediately followed by their appropriate or direct objects.

Concurrence of Motive and Intention.

Where an intended consequence is wished as an end or a mean, motive and intention concur. In other words, The consequence intended is also wished; and the wish of that consequence suggests the volition.

Exemplifications of the three foregoing suppositions.

I will now exemplify those three varieties of intention at which I have pointed already:

The varieties are the following:

1st. The agent may intend a consequence; and that consequence may be the end of his act.

2ndly. He may intend a consequence; but he may desire that consequence as a mean to an end.

3rdly. He may intend the consequence, without desiring it.

As examples of these three varieties, I will adduce three cases of intentional killing.

Of the first supposition.

You hate me mortally: And, in order that you may appease that painful and importunate feeling, you shoot me dead.

Now here you intend my death: And (taking the word ‘end’ in the meaning which I have just explained) my death is the end of the act, and of the volition which precedes the act. Nothing but that consequence would accomplish the purpose, which (speaking with metaphysical precision) is the end of the act and the volition. Nothing but that consequence would allay the painful sentiment of which you purpose ridding yourself when you shoot me. Nothing but that consequence would appease your hate, or satisfy your malice.

Of the second supposition.

Again:

You shoot me, that you may take my purse. I refuse to deliver my purse, when you demand it. I defend my purse to the best of my ability. And, in order that you may remove the obstacle which my resistance opposes to your purpose, you pull out a pistol and shoot me dead.

Now here you intend my death, and you also desire my death. But you desire it as a mean, and not as an end. Your desire of my death is not the ultimate motive suggesting the volition and the act. Your ultimate motive is your desire of my purse. And if I would deliver my purse, you would not shoot me.

424Lastly:

Of the third supposition.

You shoot at Sempronius or Styles, at Titius or Nokes, desiring and intending to kill him. The death of Styles is the end of your volition and act. Your desire of his death, is the ultimate motive to the volition. You contemplate his death, as the probable consequence of the act.

But when you shoot at Styles, I am talking with him, and am standing close by him. And, from the position in which I stand with regard to the person you aim at, you think it not unlikely that you may kill me in your attempt to kill him. You fire, and kill me accordingly. Now here you intend my death, without desiring it. The end of the volition and act, is the death of Styles. My death is neither desired as an end, nor is it desired as a mean: My death subserves not your end: you are not a bit the nearer to the death of Styles, by killing me. But, since you contemplate my death as a probable consequence of your act, you intend my death although you desire it not.

Forbearances are intended, but not willed.

It follows from the nature of Volitions, that forbearances from acts are not willed, but intended.

To will, is to wish or desire one of those bodily movements which immediately follow our desires of them. These movements are the only acts, properly so called. Consequently, ‘To will a forbearance’ (or ‘to will the absence or negation of an act’), is a flat contradiction in terms.

When I forbear from an act, I will. But I will an act other than that from which I forbear or abstain: And, knowing that the act which I will, excludes the act forborne, I intend the forbearance. In other words, I contemplate the forbearance as a consequence of the act which I will; or, rather, as a necessary condition to the act which I will. For if I willed the act from which I forbear, I should not will (at this time) the act which I presently will.

For example, it is my duty to come hither at seven o’clock. But, instead of coming hither at seven o’clock, I go to the Playhouse at that hour, conscious that I ought to come hither.

Now, in this case, my absence from the room is intentional. I know that my coming hither is inconsistent with my going thither: that, if my legs brought me to the University, they would not carry me to the Playhouse.

If I forgot that I ought to come hither, my absence would not be intentional, but the effect of negligence.