122
[end of lecture 2]

LECTURE III.

Apology for introducing the principle of utility.

Although it is not the object of this course of lectures to treat of the science of legislation, but to evolve and expound the principles and distinctions involved in the idea of law, it was not a deviation from my subject to introduce the principle of utility. For I shall often have occasion to refer to that principle in my course, as that which not only ought to guide, but has commonly in fact guided the legislator. The principle of utility, well or ill understood, has usually been the principle consulted in making laws; and I therefore should often be unable to explain distinctly and precisely the scope and purport of a law, without having brought the principle of utility directly before you. I have therefore done so, not pretending to expound the principle in its various applications, which would be a subject of sufficient extent for many courses of lectures; but attempting to give you a general notion of the principle, and to obviate the most specious of the objections which are commonly made to it.

The connection of the third with the second lecture.

123  In my second lecture, I examined a current and specious objection to the theory of general utility.

The drift of the objection, you undoubtedly remember; and you probably remember the arguments by which I attempted to refute it.

Accordingly, I merely resume that general conclusion which I endeavoured to establish by the second of my two answers.

The conclusion may be stated briefly, in the following manner.—If our conduct were truly adjusted to the principle of general utility, our conduct would conform, for the most part, to laws or rules: laws or rules which are set by the Deity, and to which the tendencies of classes of actions are the guide or index.

A second objection to the theory of utility stated.

But here arises a difficulty which certainly is most perplexing, and which scarcely admits of a solution that will perfectly satisfy the mind.

If the Divine laws must be gathered from the tendencies of action, how can they, who are bound to keep them, know them fully and correctly?

So numerous are the classes of actions to which those laws relate, that no single mind can mark the whole of those classes, and examine completely their respective tendencies. If every single man must learn their respective tendencies, and thence infer the rules which God has set to mankind, every man’s scheme of ethics will embrace but a part of those rules, and, on many or most of the occasions which require him to act or forbear, he will be forced on the dangerous process of calculating specific consequences.

Besides, ethical, like other wisdom, ‘cometh by opportunity of leisure:’ And, since they are busied with earning the means of living, the many are unable to explore the field of ethics, and to learn their numerous duties by learning the tendencies of actions.

If the Divine laws must be gathered from the tendencies of actions, the inevitable conclusion is absurd and monstrous.—God has given us laws which no man can know completely, and to which the great bulk of mankind has scarcely the slightest access.

The considerations suggested by this and the next discourse, may solve or extenuate the perplexing difficulty to which I have now adverted.

An answer to that second objection introduced.

124  In so far as law and morality are what they ought to be (or in so far as law and morality accord with their ultimate test, or in so far as law and morality accord with the Divine commands), legal and moral rules have been fashioned on the principle of utility, or obtained by observation and induction from the tendencies of human actions. But, though they have been fashioned on the principle of utility, or obtained by observation and induction from the tendencies of human actions, it is not necessary that all whom they bind should know or advert to the process through which they have been gotten. If all whom they bind keep or observe them, the ends to which they exist are sufficiently accomplished. The ends to which they exist are sufficiently accomplished, though most of those who observe them be unable to perceive their ends, and be ignorant of the reasons on which they were founded, or of the proofs from which they were inferred.

According to the theory of utility, the science of Ethics or Deontology (or the science of Law and Morality, as they should be, or ought to be) is one of the sciences which rest upon observation and induction. The science has been formed, through a long succession of ages, by many and separate contributions from many and separate discoverers. No single mind could explore the whole of the field, though each of its numerous departments has been explored by numerous inquirers.

If positive law and morality were exactly what they ought to be (or if positive law and morality were exactly fashioned to utility), sufficient reasons might be given for each of their constituent rules, and each of their constituent rules would in fact have been founded on those reasons. But no single mind could have found the whole of those rules, nor could any single mind compass the whole of their proofs. Though all the evidence would be known, the several parts of the evidence would be known by different men. Every single man might master a portion of the evidence: a portion commensurate with the attention which he gave to the science of ethics, and with the mental perspicacity and vigour which he brought to the study. But no single man could master more than a portion: And many of the rules of conduct, which were actually observed or admitted, would be taken, by the most instructed, on authority, testimony, or trust.

In short, if a system of law and morality were exactly fashioned to utility, all its constituent rules might be known by all or most. But all the numerous reasons, upon which the 125system would rest, could scarcely be compassed by any: while most must limit their inquiries to a few of those numerous reasons; or, without an attempt to examine the reasons, must receive the whole of the rules from the teaching and example of others.

But this inconvenience is not peculiar to law and morality. It extends to all the sciences, and to all the arts.

Many mathematical truths are probably taken upon trust by deep and searching mathematicians:¹⁰ And of the thousands who apply arithmetic to daily and hourly use, not one in a hundred knows or surmises the reasons upon which its rules are founded. Of the millions who till the earth and ply the various handicrafts, few are acquainted with the grounds of their homely but important arts, though these arts are generally practised with passable expertness and success.

The powers of single individuals are feeble and poor, though the powers of conspiring numbers are gigantic and admirable. Little of any man’s knowledge is gotten by original research. It mostly consists of results gotten by the researches of others, and taken by himself upon testimony.

And in many departments of science we may safely rely upon testimony: though the knowledge which we thus obtain is less satisfactory and useful than that which we win for ourselves by direct examination of the proofs.

In the mathematical and physical sciences, and in the arts which are founded upon them, we may commonly trust the 126conclusions which we take upon authority. For the adepts in these sciences and arts mostly agree in their results, and lie under no temptation to cheat the ignorant with error. I firmly believe (for example) that the earth moves round the sun; though I know not a tittle of the evidence from which the conclusion is inferred. And my belief is perfectly rational, though it rests upon mere authority. For there is nothing in the alleged fact, contrary to my experience of nature: whilst all who have scrutinized the evidence concur in affirming the fact; and have no conceivable motive to assert and diffuse the conclusion, but the liberal and beneficent desire of maintaining and propagating truth.

An objection to the foregoing answer, stated.

But the case is unhappily different with the important science of ethics, and also with the various sciences—such as legislation, politics, and political economy—which are nearly related to ethics. Those who have inquired, or affected to inquire into ethics, have rarely been impartial, and, therefore, have differed in their results. Sinister interests, or prejudices begotten by such interests, have mostly determined them to embrace the opinions which they have laboured to impress upon others. Most of them have been advocates rather than inquirers. Instead of examining the evidence and honestly pursuing its consequences, most of them have hunted for arguments in favour of given conclusions, and have neglected or purposely suppressed the unbending and incommodious considerations which pointed at opposite inferences.

Now how can the bulk of mankind, who have little opportunity for research, compare the respective merits of these varying and hostile opinions, and hit upon those of the throng which accord with utility and truth? Here, testimony is not to be trusted. There is not that concurrence or agreement of numerous and impartial inquirers, to which the most cautious and erect understanding readily and wisely defers. With regard to the science of ethics, and to all the various sciences which are nearly related to ethics, invincible doubt, or blind and prostrate belief, would seem to be the doom of the multitude. Anxiously busied with the means of earning a precarious livelihood, they are debarred from every opportunity of carefully surveying the evidence: whilst every authority, whereon they may hang their faith, wants that mark of trustworthiness which justifies reliance on authority.

Accordingly, the science of ethics, with all the various 127sciences which are nearly related to ethics, lag behind the others. So few are the sincere inquirers who turn their attention to these sciences, and so difficult is it for the multitude to perceive the worth of their labours, that the advancement of the sciences themselves is comparatively slow; whilst the most perspicuous of the truths, with which they are occasionally enriched, are either rejected by the many as worthless or pernicious paradoxes, or win their laborious way to general assent through a long and dubious struggle with established and obstinate errors.

Many of the legal and moral rules which obtain in the most civilized communities, rest upon brute custom, and not upon manly reason. They have been taken from preceding generations without examination, and are deeply tinctured with barbarity. They arose in early ages, and in the infancy of the human mind, partly from caprices of the fancy (which are nearly omnipotent with barbarians), and partly from the imperfect apprehension of general utility which is the consequence of narrow experience. And so great and numerous are the obstacles to the diffusion of ethical truth, that these monstrous or crude productions of childish and imbecile intellect have been cherished and perpetuated, through ages of advancing knowledge, to the comparatively enlightened period in which it is our happiness to live.

The foregoing objection to the foregoing answer, solved or extenuated.

It were idle to deny the difficulty. The diffusion and the advancement of ethical truth are certainly prevented or obstructed by great and peculiar obstacles.

But these obstacles, I am firmly convinced, will gradually disappear. In two causes of slow but sure operation, we may clearly perceive a cure, or, at least, a palliative of the evil.—In every civilized community of the Old and New World, the leading principles of the science of ethics, and also of the various sciences which are nearly related to ethics, are gradually finding their way, in company with other knowledge, amongst the great mass of the people: whilst those who accurately study, and who labour to advance these sciences, are proportionally increasing in number, and waxing in zeal and activity. From the combination of these two causes we may hope for a more rapid progress both in the discovery and in the diffusion of moral truth.

Profound knowledge of these, as of the other sciences, will 128always be confined to the comparatively few who study them long and assiduously. But the multitude are fully competent to conceive the leading principles, and to apply those leading principles to particular cases. And, if they were imbued with those principles, and were practised in the art of applying them, they would be docile to the voice of reason, and armed against sophistry and error. There is a wide and important difference between ignorance of principles and ignorance of particulars or details. The man who is ignorant of principles, and unpractised in right reasoning, is imbecile as well as ignorant. The man who is simply ignorant of particulars or details, can reason correctly from premises which are suggested to his understanding, and can justly estimate the consequences which are drawn from those premises by others. If the minds of the many were informed and invigorated, so far as their position will permit, they could distinguish the statements and reasonings of their instructed and judicious friends, from the lies and fallacies of those who would use them to sinister purposes, and from the equally pernicious nonsense of their weak and ignorant well-wishers. Possessed of directing principles, able to reason rightly, helped to the requisite premises by accurate and comprehensive inquirers, they could examine and fathom the questions which it most behoves them to understand: Though the leisure which they can snatch from their callings is necessarily so limited, that their opinions upon numerous questions of subordinate importance would continue to be taken from the mere authority of others.

The shortest and clearest illustrations of this most cheering truth, are furnished by the inestimable science of political economy, which is so interwoven with every consideration belonging to morals, politics, and legislation, that it is impossible to treat any one of these sciences without a continual reference to it.

The broad or leading principles of the science of political economy, may be mastered, with moderate attention, in a short period. With these simple, but commanding principles, a number of important questions are easily resolved. And if the multitude (as they can and will) shall ever understand these principles, many pernicious prejudices will be extirpated from the popular mind, and truths of ineffable moment planted in their stead.

For example, In many or all countries (the least uncivilized not excepted), the prevalent opinions and sentiments of the 129working people are certainly not consistent with the complete security of property. To the ignorant poor, the inequality which inevitably follows the beneficent institution of property is necessarily invidious. That they who toil and produce should fare scantily, whilst others, who ‘delve not nor spin,’ batten on the fruits of labour, seems, to the jaundiced eyes of the poor and the ignorant, a monstrous state of things: an arrangement upheld by the few at the cost of the many, and flatly inconsistent with the benevolent purposes of Providence.

A statement of the numerous evils which flow from this single prejudice, would occupy a volume. But they cast so clear a light on the mischiefs of popular ignorance, and show so distinctly the advantages of popular instruction, that I will briefly touch upon a few of them, though at the risk of tiring your patience.

In the first place, this prejudice blinds the people to the cause of their sufferings, and to the only remedy or palliative which the case will admit.

Want and labour spring from the niggardliness of nature, and not from the inequality which is consequent on the institution of property. These evils are inseparable from the condition of man upon earth; and are lightened, not aggravated, by this useful, though invidious institution. Without capital, and the arts which depend upon capital, the reward of labour would be far scantier than it is; and capital, with the arts which depend upon it, are creatures of the institution of property. The institution is good for the many, as well as for the few. The poor are not stripped by it of the produce of their labour; but it gives them a part in the enjoyment of wealth which it calls into being. In effect, though not in law, the labourers are co-proprietors with the capitalists who hire their labour. The reward which they get for their labour is principally drawn from capital; and they are not less interested than the legal owners in protecting the fund from invasion.

It is certainly to be wished, that their reward were greater; and that they were relieved from the incessant drudgery to which they are now condemned. But the condition of the working people (whether their wages shall be high or low; their labour, moderate or extreme) depends upon their own will, and not upon the will of the rich. In the true principle of population, detected by the sagacity of Mr. Malthus, they must look for the cause and the remedy of their penury and excessive toil. There they may find the means which would give them comparative 130affluence; which would give them the degree of leisure necessary to knowledge and refinement; which would raise them to personal dignity and political influence, from grovelling and sordid subjection to the arbitrary rule of a few.

And these momentous truths are deducible from plain principles, by short and obvious inferences. Here, there is no need of large and careful research, or of subtle and sustained thinking. If the people understood distinctly a few indisputable propositions, and were capable of going correctly through an easy process of reasoning, their minds would be purged of the prejudice which binds them to the cause of their sufferings, and they would see and apply the remedy which is suggested by the principle of population. Their repinings at the affluence of the rich, would be appeased. Their murmurs at the injustice of the rich, would be silenced. They would scarcely break machinery, or fire barns and corn-ricks, to the end of raising wages, or the rate of parish relief. They would see that violations of property are mischievous to themselves: that such violations weaken the motives to accumulation, and, therefore, diminish the fund which yields the labourer his subsistence. They would see that they are deeply interested in the security of property: that, if they adjusted their numbers to the demand for their labour, they would share abundantly, with their employers, in the blessings of that useful institution.

Another of the numerous evils which flow from the prejudice in question, is the frequency of crimes.

Nineteen offences out of twenty, are offences against property. And most offences against property may be imputed to the prejudice in question.

The authors of such offences are commonly of the poorer sort. For the most part, poverty is the incentive. And this prejudice perpetuates poverty amongst the great body of the people, by blinding them to the cause and the remedy.

And whilst it perpetuates the ordinary incentive to crime, it weakens the restraints.

As a check or deterring motive, as an inducement to abstain from crime, the fear of public disapprobation, with its countless train of evils, is scarcely less effectual than the fear of legal punishment. To the purpose of forming the moral character, of rooting in the soul a prompt aversion from crime, it is infinitely more effectual.

The help of the hangman and the gaoler would seldom be called for, if the opinion of the great body of the people were 131cleared of the prejudice in question, and, therefore, fell heavily upon all offenders against property. If the general opinion were thoroughly cleared of that prejudice, it would greatly weaken the temptations to crime, by its salutary influence on the moral character of the multitude: The motives which it would oppose to those temptations, would be scarcely less effectual than the motives which are presented by the law: And it would heighten the terrors, and strengthen the restraints of the law, by engaging a countless host of eager and active volunteers in the service of criminal justice. If the people saw distinctly the tendencies of offences against property; if the people saw distinctly the tendencies and the grounds of the punishments; and if they were, therefore, bent upon pursuing the criminals to justice; the laws which prohibit these offences would seldom be broken with impunity, and, by consequence, would seldom be broken. An enlightened people were a better auxiliary to the judge than an army of policemen.

But, in consequence of the prejudice in question, the fear of public disapprobation scarcely operates upon the poor to the end of restraining them from offences against the property of the wealthier classes. For every man’s public is formed of his own class: of those with whom he associates: of those whose favourable or unfavourable opinion sweetens or embitters his life. The poor man’s public is formed of the poor. And the crimes, which affect merely the property of the wealthier classes, are certainly regarded with little, or rather with no abhorrence, by the indigent and ignorant portion of the working people. Not perceiving that such crimes are pernicious to all classes, but considering property to be a benefit in which they have no share, and which is enjoyed by others at their expense, the indigent and ignorant portion of the working people are prone to consider such crimes as reprisals made upon usurpers and enemies. They regard the criminal with sympathy rather than with indignation. They rather incline to favour, or, at least, to wink at his escape, than to lend their hearty aid towards bringing him to justice.

Those who have inquired into the causes of crimes, and into the means of lessening their number, have commonly expected magnificent results from an improved system of punishments. And I admit that something might be done by a judicious mitigation of punishments, and by removing that frequent inclination to abet the escape of a criminal which springs from their repulsive severity. Something might also be accomplished by improvements in prison-discipline, and by providing a refuge for criminals 132who have suffered their punishments. For the stigma of legal punishment is commonly indelible; and, by debarring the unhappy criminal from the means of living honestly, forces him on further crimes.

But nothing but the diffusion of knowledge through the great mass of the people will go to the root of the evil. Nothing but this will cure or alleviate the poverty which is the ordinary incentive to crime. Nothing but this will extirpate their prejudices, and correct their moral sentiments: will lay them under the restraints which are imposed by enlightened opinion, and which operate so potently on the higher and more cultivated classes.

The evils which I have now mentioned, with many which I pass in silence, flow from one of the prejudices which enslave the popular mind. The advantages at which I have pointed, with many which I leave unnoticed, would follow the emancipation of the multitude from that single error.

And this, with other prejudices, might be expelled from their understandings and affections, if they had mastered the broad principles of the science of political economy, and could make the easiest applications of those simple, though commanding truths.

The functions of paper-money, the incidence of taxes, with other of the nicer points which are presented by this science, the multitude, it is probable, will never understand distinctly: and their opinions on such points (if ever they shall think of them at all) will, it is most likely, be always taken from authority. But the importance of those nicer points dwindles to nothing, when they are compared with the true reasons which call for the institution of property, and with the effect of the principle of population on the price of labour. For if these (which are not difficult) were clearly apprehended by the many, they would be raised from penury to comfort: from the necessity of toiling like cattle, to the enjoyment of sufficient leisure: from ignorance and brutishness, to knowledge and refinement: from abject subjection, to the independence which commands respect.

If my limits would permit me to dwell upon the topic at length, I could show, by many additional and pregnant examples, that the multitude might clearly apprehend the leading principles of ethics, and also of the various sciences which are nearly related to ethics: and that, if they had seized these principles, and could reason distinctly and justly, all the more momentous of the derivative practical truths would find access to their understandings and expel the antagonist errors.

133 And the multitude (in civilized communities) would soon apprehend these principles, and would soon acquire the talent of reasoning distinctly and justly, if one of the weightiest of the duties, which God has laid upon governments, were performed with fidelity and zeal. For, if we must construe those duties by the principles of general utility, it is not less incumbent on governments to forward the diffusion of knowledge, than to protect their subjects from one another by a due administration of justice, or to defend them by a military force from the attacks of external enemies. A small fraction of the sums which are squandered in needless war, would provide complete instruction for the working people: would give this important class that portion in the knowledge of the age, which consists with the nature of their callings, and with the necessity of toiling for a livelihood.

It appears, then, that the ignorance of the multitude is not altogether invincible, though the principle of general utility be the index to God’s commands, and, therefore, the proximate test of positive law and morality.

If ethical science must be gotten by consulting the principle of utility, if it rest upon observation and induction applied to the tendencies of actions, if it be matter of acquired knowledge and not of immediate consciousness, much of it (I admit) will ever be hidden from the multitude, or will ever be taken by the multitude on authority, testimony, or trust. For an inquiry into the tendencies of actions embraces so spacious a field, that none but the comparatively few, who study the science assiduously, can apply the principle extensively to received or positive rules, and determine how far they accord with its genuine suggestions or dictates.

But the multitude might clearly understand the elements or groundwork of the science, together with the more momentous of the derivative practical truths. To that extent, they might be freed from the dominion of authority: from the necessity of blindly persisting in hereditary opinions and practices; or of turning and veering, for want of directing principles, with every wind of doctrine.

Nor is this the only advantage which would follow the spread of those elements amongst the great body of the people.

If the elements of ethical science were widely diffused, the science would advance with proportionate rapidity.

134 If the minds of the many were informed and invigorated, their coarse and sordid pleasures, and their stupid indifference about knowledge, would be supplanted by refined amusements, and by liberal curiosity. A numerous body of recruits from the lower of the middle classes, and even from the higher classes of the working people, would thicken the slender ranks of the reading and reflecting public: the public which occupies its leisure with letters, science, and philosophy; whose opinion determines the success or failure of books; and whose notice and favour are naturally courted by the writers.

And until that public shall be much extended, shall embrace a considerable portion of the middle and working people, the science of ethics, with all the various sciences which are nearly related to ethics, will advance slowly.

It was the opinion of Mr. Locke, and I fully concur in the opinion, that there is no peculiar uncertainty in the subject or matter of these sciences: that the great and extraordinary difficulties, by which their advancement is impeded, are extrinsick; are opposed by sinister interests, or by prejudices which are the offspring of such interests: that, if they who seek, or affect to seek the truth, would pursue it with obstinate application and with due ‘indifferency,’ they might frequently hit upon the object which they profess to look for.

Now few of them will pursue it with this requisite ‘indifferency’ or impartiality, so long as the bulk of the public, which determines the fate of their labours, shall continue to be formed from the classes which are elevated by rank or opulence, and from the peculiar professions or callings which are distinguished by the name of ‘liberal.’

In the science of ethics, and in all the various sciences which are nearly related to ethics, your only sure guide is general utility. If thinkers and writers would stick to it honestly and closely, they would frequently enrich these sciences with additional truths, or would do them good service by weeding them of nonsense and error. But, since the peculiar interests of particular and narrow classes are always somewhat adverse to the interests of the great majority, it is hardly to be expected of writers, whose reputation depends upon such classes, that they should fearlessly tread the path which is indicated by the general well-being. The indifferency in the pursuit of truth which is so earnestly inculcated by Mr. Locke, is hardly to be expected of writers who occupy so base a position. Knowing that a fraction of the community can make or mar their reputa135tion, they unconsciously or purposely accommodate their conclusions to the prejudices of that narrower public. Or, to borrow the expressive language of this greatest and best of philosophers, ‘they begin with espousing the well-endowed opinions in fashion; and, then, seek arguments to show their beauty, or to varnish and disguise their deformity.’

The treatise by Dr. Paley on Moral and Political Philosophy exemplifies the natural tendency of narrow and domineering interests to pervert the course of inquiry from its legitimate purpose.

As men go, this celebrated and influential writer was a wise and a virtuous man. By the qualities of his head and heart, by the cast of his talents and affections, he was fitted, in a high degree, to seek for ethical truth, and to expound it successfully to others. He had a clear and just understanding; a hearty contempt of paradox, and of ingenious, but useless refinements; no fastidious disdain of the working people, but a warm sympathy with their homely enjoyments and sufferings. He knew that they are more numerous than all the rest of the community, and he felt that they are more important than all the rest of the community to the eye of unclouded reason and impartial benevolence.

But the sinister influence of the position which he unluckily occupied, cramped his generous affections, and warped the rectitude of his understanding.

A steady pursuit of the consequences indicated by general utility, was not the most obvious way to professional advancement, nor even the short cut to extensive reputation. For there was no impartial public, formed from the community at large, to reward and encourage, with its approbation, an inflexible adherence to truth.

If the bulk of the community had been instructed, so far as their position will permit, he might have looked for a host of readers from the middle classes. He might have looked for a host of readers from those classes of the working people, whose wages are commonly high, whose leisure is not inconsiderable, and whose mental powers are called into frequent exercise by the natures of their occupations or callings. To readers of the middle classes, and of all the higher classes of the working people, a well made and honest treatise on Moral and Political Philosophy, in his clear, vivid, downright, English style, would have been the most easy and attractive, as well as instructive and useful, of abstract or scientific books.

136 But those numerous classes of the community were commonly too coarse and ignorant to care for books of the sort. The great majority of the readers who were likely to look into his book, belonged to the classes which are elevated by rank or opulence, and to the peculiar professions or callings which are distinguished by the name of ‘liberal.’ And the character of the book which he wrote betrays the position of the writer. In almost every chapter, and in almost every page, his fear of offending the prejudices, commonly entertained by such readers, palpably suppresses the suggestions of his clear and vigorous reason, and masters the better affections which inclined him to the general good.

He was one of the greatest and best of the great and excellent writers, who, by the strength of their philosophical genius, or by their large and tolerant spirit, have given imperishable lustre to the Church of England, and extinguished or softened the hostility of many who reject her creed. He may rank with the Berkeleys and Butlers, with the Burnets, Tillotsons and Hoadlys.

But, in spite of the esteem with which I regard his memory, truth compels me to add that the book is unworthy of the man. For there is much ignoble truckling to the dominant and influential few. There is a deal of shabby sophistry in defence or extenuation of abuses which the few are interested in upholding.

If there were a reading public numerous, discerning, and impartial, the science of ethics, and all the various sciences which are nearly related to ethics, would advance with unexampled rapidity.

By the hope of obtaining the approbation which it would bestow upon genuine merit, writers would be incited to the patient research and reflection, which are not less requisite to the improvement of ethical, than to the advancement of mathematical science.

Slight and incoherent thinking would be received with general contempt, though it were cased in polished periods studded with brilliant metaphors. Ethics would be considered by readers, and, therefore, treated by writers, as the matter or subject of a science: as a subject for persevering and accurate investigation, and not as a theme for childish and babbling rhetoric.

This general demand for truth (though it were clothed in homely guise), and this general contempt of falsehood and nonsense (though they were decked with rhetorical graces), 137would improve the method and the style of inquiries into ethics, and into the various sciences which are nearly related to ethics. The writers would attend to the suggestions of Hobbes and of Locke, and would imitate the method so successfully pursued by geometers: Though such is the variety of the premises which some of their inquiries involve, and such are the complexity and ambiguity of some of the terms, that they would often fall short of the perfect exactness and coherency, which the fewness of his premises, and the simplicity and definiteness of his expressions, enable the geometer to reach. But, though they would often fall short of geometrical exactness and coherency, they might always approach, and would often attain to them. They would acquire the art and the habit of defining their leading terms; of steadily adhering to the meanings announced by the definitions; of carefully examining and distinctly stating their premises; and of deducing the consequences of their premises with logical rigour. Without rejecting embellishments which might happen to fall in their way, the only excellencies of style for which they would seek, are precision, clearness, and conciseness: the first being absolutely requisite to the successful prosecution of inquiry; whilst the others enable the reader to seize the meaning with certainty, and spare him unnecessary fatigue.

And, what is equally important, the protection afforded by this public to diligent and honest writers, would inspire into writers upon ethics, and upon the nearly related sciences, the spirit of dispassionate inquiry: the ‘indifferency’ or impartiality, in the pursuit of truth, which is just as requisite to the detection of truth as continued and close attention, or sincerity and simplicity of purpose. Relying on the discernment and the justice of a numerous and powerful public, shielded by its countenance from the shafts of the hypocrite and the bigot, indifferent to the idle whistling of that harmless storm, they would scrutinize established institutions, and current or received opinions, fearlessly, but coolly; with the freedom which is imperiously demanded by general utility, but without the antipathy which is begotten by the dread of persecution, and which is scarcely less adverse than ‘the love of things ancient’ to the rapid advancement of science.

This patience in investigation, this distinctness and accuracy of method, this freedom and ‘indifferency’ in the pursuit of the useful and the true would thoroughly dispel the obscurity by 138which the science is clouded, and would clear it from most of its uncertainties. The wish, the hope, the prediction of Mr. Locke would, in time, be accomplished: and ‘ethics would rank with the sciences which are capable of demonstration.’ The adepts in ethical, as well as in mathematical science, would commonly agree in their results: And, as the jar of their conclusions gradually subsided, a body of doctrine and authority to which the multitude might trust would emerge from the existing chaos. The direct examination of the multitude would only extend to the elements, and to the easier, though more momentous, of the derivative practical truths. But none of their opinions would be adopted blindly, nor would any of their opinions be obnoxious to groundless and capricious change. Though most or many of their opinions would still be taken from authority, the authority to which they would trust might satisfy the most scrupulous reason. In the unanimous or general consent of numerous and impartial inquirers, they would find that mark of trustworthiness which justifies reliance on authority, wherever we are debarred from the opportunity of examining the evidence for ourselves.

The second objection to the theory of utility, together with the foregoing answer to that second objection, briefly re-stated.

With regard, then, to the perplexing difficulty which I am trying to solve or extenuate, the case stands thus:

If utility be the proximate test of positive law and morality, it is simply impossible that positive law and morality should be free from defects and errors. Or (adopting a different, though exactly equivalent expression) if the principle of general utility be our guide to the Divine commands, it is impossible that the rules of conduct actually obtaining amongst mankind should accord completely and correctly with the laws established by the Deity. The index to his will is imperfect and uncertain. His laws are signified obscurely to those upon whom they are binding, and are subject to inevitable and involuntary misconstruction.

For, first, positive law and morality, fashioned on the principle of utility, are gotten by observation and induction from the tendencies of human actions: from what can be known or conjectured, by means of observation and induction, of their uniform or customary effects on the general happiness or good. Consequently, till these actions shall be marked and classed with perfect completeness, and their effects observed and ascertained with similar completeness, positive law and morality, fashioned on the principle of utility, must be more or less defective, and more or less erroneous. And these actions being infinitely various, and their effects being infinitely diversified, the work 139of classing them completely, and of collecting their effects completely, transcends the limited faculties of created and finite beings. As the experience of mankind enlarges, as they observe more extensively and accurately and reason more closely and precisely, they may gradually mend the defects of their legal and moral rules, and may gradually clear their rules from the errors and nonsense of their predecessors. But, though they may constantly approach, they certainly will never attain to a faultless system of ethics: to a system perfectly in unison with the dictates of general utility, and, therefore, perfectly in unison with the benevolent wishes of the Deity.

And, secondly, if utility be the proximate test of positive law and morality, the defects and errors of popular or vulgar ethics will scarcely admit of a remedy. For, if ethical truth be matter of science, and not of immediate consciousness, most of the ethical maxims, which govern the sentiments of the multitude, must be taken, without examination, from human authority. And where is the human authority upon which they can safely rely? Where is the human authority bearing such marks of trustworthiness, that the ignorant may hang their faith upon it with reasonable assurance? Reviewing the various ages and the various nations of the world, reviewing the various sects which have divided the opinions of mankind, we find conflicting maxims taught with equal confidence, and received with equal docility. We find the guides of the multitude moved by sinister interests, or by prejudices which are the offspring of such interests. We find them stifling inquiry, according to the measure of their means: upholding with fire and sword, or with sophistry, declamation and calumny, the theological and ethical dogmas which they impose upon their prostrate disciples.

Such is the difficulty.—The only solution of which this difficulty seems to admit, is suggested by the remarks which I have already submitted to your attention, and which I will now repeat in an inverted and compendious form.

In the first place, the diffusion of ethical science amongst the great bulk of mankind will gradually remove the obstacles which prevent or retard its advancement. The field of human conduct being infinite or immense, it is impossible that human understanding should embrace and explore it completely. But, by the general diffusion of knowledge amongst the great bulk of mankind, by the impulse and the direction which the diffusion will give to inquiry, many of the defects and errors in existing law and morality will in time be supplied and corrected.

140 Secondly: Though the many must trust to authority for a number of subordinate truths, they are competent to examine the elements which are the groundwork of the science of ethics, and to infer the more momentous of the derivative practical consequences.

And, thirdly, as the science of ethics advances, and is cleared of obscurity and uncertainties, they who are debarred from opportunities of examining the science extensively, will find an authority, whereon they may rationally rely, in the unanimous or general agreement of searching and impartial inquirers.¹¹

[beginning of lecture 4]