• The key material in the introductory section I is Buchanan’s outline of what he takes to be Naticchia’s 4 key arguments. You’ve read something of all of these arguments though not always in the order in which Buchanan lists them. The remainder of the paper addresses these arguments one by one, we will consider only his replies to the first three.

• The first issue on Buchanan’s list—whether his approach lacks “candor” or muddies the distinction between justice and criteria of recognition—is one of the simplest but it may be the most important. As you read Buchanan’s response in §II think not only whether he meets such concerns but also whether someone on the opposite side of him from Naticchia would have reason to say that he still makes too much use of pragmatic considerations.

• It is section III that deals most directly with the difference between his view and Naticchia’s that is presented in his title. The difference is analogous to the difference between the sort of “rule-utilitarianism” discussed by Rawls and an “act-utilitarianism” that assesses the utility of acts directly. The reason that Buchanan speaks of “act-consequentialism” here is that the consequences of acts are evaluated not in terms of happiness but instead in terms of the prevalence of peace and justice.

• In section IV, Buchanan considers the main arguments offered in Naticchia’s final section. We will discuss only the beginning, where he comments further on the differences between their views and, in particular, on Nattichia’s claim that the consequences of these views might be the same in practice.