Phi 213 Sp11
 
Reading guide for Tues. 3/15: H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, ch. 8, § 1 (pp. 157-167)
 

In chapter 8, Hart says at least as much about morality as about law since he is beginning a discussion of the relation between the two that occupies his chs. 8 and 9 (we considered parts of this earlier). §1 of ch. 8 concerns the moral idea most closely related to the law, the concept of justice. Hart considers several traditionally recognized varieties or senses of justice and tries to show how each can be seen as a different application of the injunction to “treat like cases alike and different cases differently” (which itself is introduced at some length, pp. 157-159). Listing these with common labels (some but not all of which are mentioned by Hart), his discussion is divided as follows:

procedural justice (i.e., justice in the application of the law), pp. 160f,

distributive justice, pp. 161-163,

compensatory (or rectificatory) justice, pp. 163-165,

social justice, pp. 165f, and

the sense of justice in which democratic institutions are said to be more just, pp. 166f; I know of no commonly used label for this last variety, but political justice might be appropriate.

You should get a sense of what each of these sorts of justice is and the way Hart connects it with the slogan “treat like cases alike and different cases differently.” These connections differ considerable from one concept to another. One extreme example is social justice, which Hart describes as a value against which justice in other senses may be balanced. (It is not necessarily the only such value: traditionally, terms like equity or mercy have been opposed to justice as values that might be balanced against justice in at least some of the other senses Hart considers.)