This paper offers a critique of a paper by Allen Buchanan; we will discuss Buchanan’s response to the critique on Friday. Since Buchanan’s paper appeared in the same journal, it is also available on JSTOR; but Naticchia’s account of Buchanan’s paper is detailed enough that his critique is self-contained.

The issue is the grounds on which states should be recognized, so this is a question regarding the moral justification of an aspect of international law. You have seen one statement of grounds for recognition in the “principle of effectiveness” that Kelsen stated at the end of his paper. Naticchia doesn’t discuss that principle directly; but the principle offered by Buchanan was intended as an alternative to it, and the alternative suggested here by Naticchia is, at least at first sight, yet another principle. But, while part of the question is what the principle of recognition should be, another part is the sort of justification that should be given to such principles; and this side of the dispute between Buchanan and Naticchia is analogous to the disputes between deontological and consequentialist approaches that you’ve seen in a number of issues in municipal law.

• Naticchia’s introduction and first section present the issue and Buchanan’s view. Buchanan’s suggested criteria for recognition use considerations of justice that he refers to as “minimal justice.” He has arguments both for employing minimal criteria and for employing considerations of justice at all, and Naticchia outlines these arguments in that order.

• Section II presents three objections to Buchanan and, along the way, fills out Naticchia’s alternative views regarding criteria of recognition (which were sketched briefly in the introduction). The first identifies “a kind of inconsistency” (p. 246) in Buchanan’s approach. You should ask yourself not only whether Buchanan’s approach has the consequences Naticchia claims but also whether such consequences represent a serious problem. The other two objections concern the level set for “minimal” justice. Since Naticchia argues that this must be set on pragmatic grounds if Buchanan’s view is to work, this discussion provides some sense of the sort of considerations that Naticchia thinks should be used to settle questions of recognition directly. However, the discussion is still fairly abstract and you should think about how the points made might be illustrated with more concrete examples.

• Naticchia’s last section looks at possible objections to his views. Such objections could be seen as possible responses by Buchanan or someone sympathetic to him. The bulk of the section is devoted to two analogous objections, one (pp. 250-253) turning on considerations justice and another (pp 253-257) turning on considerations of the legitimacy of a state with respect to its own citizens (as opposed to “recognitional legitimacy” with respect to other states). At a number of points in this part of his discussion (as well as earlier), Naticchia has argued that his approach has the advantage of “candor” and he develops that idea a bit further at the end in a brief reply to a final objection.