Although Buchanan doesn’t really challenge Naticchia’s presentation of his views, he does provide more detail as he replies to Naticchia’s objections; and, of course, he presents the arguments for his side more fully than an opponent could be expected to.

• The key material in the introductory section I is his outline of what he takes to be Naticchia’s key arguments. You should look for each of these in Naticchia’s paper, but don’t expect to find them in the order in which Buchanan lists them. The remainder of the paper addresses these arguments one by one.

• The first issue on Buchanan’s list—whether his approach lacks “candor” or muddies the distinction between justice and criteria of recognition—is one of the simplest but it may be the most important. As you read Buchanan’s response think not only whether he meets concerns but also whether someone on the other side of him from Naticchia would have reason to say that he still makes too much use of pragmatic considerations.

• It is section III that deals most directly with the difference between his view and Naticchia’s that is presented in his title. The difference is analogous to the difference between the sort of “rule-utilitarianism” discussed by Rawls and an “act-utilitarianism” that assesses the utility of acts directly. The reason that Buchanan speaks of “act-consequentialism” here is that the consequences of acts are evaluated not in terms of happiness but instead in terms of the prevalence of peace and justice.

• In section IV, Buchanan considers the main arguments offered in Naticchia’s final section—that is, Naticchia’s replies to the objections he imagined Buchanan might make. In the final paragraph of his section IV, Buchanan makes it clear that he would not offer the second of the objections Naticchia considers (the one concerning a state’s legitimacy with respect to it citizens) so his remarks apply only to the first part of Naticchia’s discussion. The key question here is probably whether Buchanan has adequately responded to Naticchia’s claim that the level of justice required for recognition will end up being set on the basis of pragmatic considerations.

• Buchanan’s final section addresses Naticchia’s claim that there is a “kind of inconsistency” in Buchanan’s view. What Naticchia sees as an inconsistency Buchanan sees as no problem at all, so they end up talking past each other here. But the exchange does point to an interesting question: is the sort of political justice we should aim for in the interaction of states required to establish the content of international law fundamentally different from the political justice that states should exhibit internally?