In preparing for the exam, secure your understanding of each of the concepts, distinctions, and groups of related concepts below. In particular:
• For each item, be able to supply (as appropriate) a short definition, explanation of a distinction, or account of the relation between concepts.
• When related topics are listed for two philosophers, be able to compare their views in connection with these topics.
(One example of related topics discussed by two philosophers would be Austin’s account of obligation on the one hand and, on the other, Hart’s distinction between being obliged and having an obligation.)
The exam will consist of essay questions that you can answer on the basis of your understanding of these ideas. Some questions may ask you simply to explain an idea; others will ask you about the relations among two or more ideas, perhaps ideas presented by different philosophers. You can expect some freedom of choice in the questions you answer but not enough to enable you to safely ignore more than a few items on this list.
In formulating this list, I have chosen terms or phrases that appear in the text, but some appear more prominently than others. If, as you are studying, you have any doubt about what I have in mind or where discussions of these ideas appear, I’ll be happy to supply more information.
Topics
Aquinas • definition of “law” • eternal, natural, and human law • 2 forms of derivation of human law from natural law Austin • command, obligation, and sanction • political sovereign Holmes • legal duty • bad man’s point of view Kelsen • efficacy • dynamic vs. static theory of law • basic norm Hart • convergent behavior vs. existence of a rule • duty-imposing vs. power-conferring rule • the possibility of regarding nullity as a sanction • habitual obedience vs. rights of succession • “was obliged” vs. “had an obligation” • primary vs. secondary rules • rules of recognition, change, and adjudication |
Hart continued • internal vs. external statement or point of view • legal validity • open texture • scoring rules vs. “scorer’s discretion” • minimum content of natural law • problem of “grudge informers” Dworkin • pedigree • acceptance vs. validity • rules vs. principles (including policies) • 3 senses of discretion • the possibility of binding principles • “hard cases” • “rights thesis” • differing political responsibilities of legislators and judges • rights vs. goals • abstract vs. concrete rights • background vs. institutional rights • contested concepts and the conceptions admitted by them • canonical statement of a rule • enactment force vs. gravitational force • “seamless web” • mistakes • Hercules vs. Herbert |