Most of the introductory material preceding this selection in Culver concerns H. L. A. Hart, who we won’t read for a few weeks, but look at the first paragraph (p. 89), which has some biographical information about Austin.
The content of Austin’s work makes him a legal positivist, but the style of his work has a label, too; it is sometimes called “analytic jurisprudence.” His approach to understanding the law is, as much as anything, an effort to analyze legal concepts and express his analyses in careful definitions. Your key task in thinking about Austin will be, first, to understand his system of definitions and, second, to ask yourself whether it is correct and illuminating. Correctness applies primarily to the definition of law he ends up with since many of his other definitions will introduce special technical senses of words; the test of those other definitions will be whether the concepts he introduces with them are useful in thinking about the law.
Austin’s first lecture has a lot to say about law in the specific sense that Aquinas calls “human law” and Austin calls “positive law,” but what he defines at this stage is a broader concept that applies to other things as well. The notes below distinguish three segments of this part of the lecture and suggest things to look for in each.
• The first, and most important, part of Austin’s discussion (pp. 96-101) concerns the related concepts of command, duty, and sanction. He summarizes this discussion on p. 101. Much of the special character of his account of law derives from the meaning he attaches to “command.” How close or far do you think it is from the ordinary meaning? (It doesn’t invalidate Austin’s account of law if he attaches a new meaning to “command,” but it will be important to be clear about any differences from the ordinary meaning as you read what he says about law in terms of it.)
• Next (pp. 101-104) Austin distinguishes rules (or laws in a broad sense) from other commands (in his sense). His discussion will make it clear how someone might disagree with him. Do you think his view or an opposing one is closer to the truth?
• The short discussion of what he calls “superiority” (pp. 104-105) provides a transition to his account (in his sixth lecture) of law in the strictest sense, but it is important also for understanding exactly what he means by “command” and “duty.” In particular, think about his comment that, in the case of human beings, the relations of superiority and inferiority are “reciprocal” (p. 105 c.1).