In preparing for the exam, secure your understanding of each of the concepts, distinctions, and groups of related concepts below. In particular:
• For each item, be able to supply (as appropriate) a short definition, explanation of a distinction, or account of the relation between concepts.
• When related topics are listed for two philosophers, be able to compare their views in connection with these topics.
The exam will consist of essay questions that you can answer on the basis of your understanding of these ideas. Some questions may ask you simply to explain an idea but, more often, you will be asked about the relations among two or more ideas. You can expect some freedom of choice in the questions you answer but not enough to enable you to safely ignore more than a few items on this list.
In formulating this list, I have chosen terms or phrases that appear in the text, but some appear more prominently than others. If, as you are studying, you have any doubt about what I have in mind or where discussions of these ideas appear, I’ll be happy to supply more information.
Topics
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Rawls • retributive vs. utilitarian view of punishment—JSTOR, pp. 4-5 • summary vs. practice conception of rules—JSTOR, pp. 19, 24 Hohfeld • “right” in the four senses: claim, liberty (or privilege), power, and immunity—ho pp. 4, 5, 12, 19 • correlatives and opposites to the senses of “right”*—ho pp. 4, 5, 12, 19 Mill • Mill’s harm principle (he doesn’t use this label for it)—Culver, pp. 326, 328f, 333f • self-regarding actions—Culver, pp. 326, 327f, 335 Gerald Dworkin • paternalism—Culver, p. 343 • pure vs. impure paternalism—Culver, p. 345 Hart • role, causal, capacity, and liability responsibility—Culver, pp. 405, 406f, 412, 415f • strict, vicarious, and fault liability†—Culver, p. 408 Duff • belief and intent principles—Culver, p. 419 • exculpatory vs. inculpatory conditions—Culver, p. 420 • choice vs. character conception of criminal liability—Culver, pp. 418f, 420f, 429 Fletcher • paradigms of reciprocity and reasonableness—JSTOR, pp. 540f, 542f • non-reciprocal risk-taking—JSTOR, pp. 542, 550, 572 |
Posner • wealth vs. utility—JSTOR, pp. 111f, 119f • hypothetical market—JSTOR, p. 120 • utility monster—JSTOR, p. 116, 131 Kronman • advantage-taking—JSTOR, p. 480 • principle of paretianism—JSTOR, p. 484 Grotius • sociability**—Culver, p. 466 • natural law, law of nations, and municipal law—Culver, pp. 468, 470 Kelsen • monism vs. dualism regarding national (i.e., municipal) and international law—JSTOR, p. 67 • primacy of national or international law—JSTOR, p. 68 Hart • need for and possibility of organized sanctions in municipal and international law—Culver, pp. 481f • voluntarist (or autolimitation) theories of international law—Culver, pp. 484f • international law vs. morality—Culver, pp. 487-489 Koskenniemi • Rule of Law (vs. politics)—Culver, p. 495 • concreteness and normativity—Culver, p. 497 |
* This is a correction; the original version had “among” instead of “to”
† Hart doesn’t use the last term, but it is commonly used for the more ordinary alternative to strict and vicarious responsibility, an alternative for which Hart uses no special term