| Phi 110 Fall 2015 |
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Mill’s last chapter is arguably the most important part of his book. His version of utilitarianism has two components—the claim that the consequences of actions should be evaluated in terms of the resulting pleasure (in his broad sense) and the claim that actions are to be evaluated in terms of their consequences. Chs. 2-4 contribute in different ways to the support of the first claim, and ch. 5 supports the second.
This chapter can be divided into two main parts: (i) Mill’s analysis of the concept of justice, and (ii) his argument that utilitarianism captures the moral content of justice.
(i) After introductory remarks (pp. 42-43), Mill discusses justice in a manner than recalls Aristotle: he notes things that are generally said of justice and then sketchs an account intended to capture them.
(a) Mill’s survey of applications of the term ‘just’ (pp. 44-47) and his discussion of the etymology of the word (pp. 47-48) are key parts of the chapter for our purposes since they provide a relatively rich account of the idea of justice that is independent of Mill’s own moral theory.
(b) Mill’s analysis is completed by a discussion (pp. 48-50) of how the idea of justice fits into moral thinking more generally.
(ii) The core of Mill’s effort to reconcile the idea of justice to utilitarianism rests on his claim that while the sentiment associated with justice does not rest on utilitarian considerations, “whatever is moral in it does” (p. 51).
(a) Mill first argues (pp. 51-55) that the moral force of justice derives from the widening, by sympathy, to all people of the “animal desire” (p. 53) to respond to injury to yourself or those close to you.
(b) He then argues, considering a series of three examples (pp. 55-59), that ordinary principles of justice produce conflicts when applied to particular cases that must be settled by appeals to utilitarian considerations.
(c) Mill’s concluding remarks (pp. 59-64) argue that, although no specific principles of justice are conclusive, general considerations of justice “stand higher in the scale of utility” (p. 63) and thus deserve special respect even from a utilitarian point of view.