| Phi 109-02 Fall 2015 |
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Strawson’s article will serve us in a couple of ways.
First, it presents a distinctive view of one issue concerning freedom of will: many people we have discussed have taken the existence of moral responsibility for granted and have tried to insure that their views on free will were compatible with it, but Strawson argues on the contrary that there is no true moral responsibility. And he bases his argument not on determinism (as does Williams’ character Daniel) but rather on problems he sees with the idea of moral responsibility itself.
Second, Strawson is at least as much interested in considering reactions to his argument as he is in presenting the argument itself. So this discussion will provide an opportunity to look back at other things we have discussed.
• Wed. 12/9: §§1-5 (pp. 289-299). The focus of these sections is Strawson’s argument; he begins with one presentation of it and ends with another. Between these presentations of the argument, he considers some reactions to it. (The Latin phrase ‘causa sui’ that you see in the first presentation is, in effect, translated immediately after its first occurrence: it means ‘cause of itself’.)
• Fri. 12/11: §§6-7 (pp. 299-305). In his §6, which is the bulk of this assignment, Strawson gives extended consideration to several sorts of responses to his argument. As you read his accounts of these responses, think how the people we’ve discussed earlier might respond, either in the ways Strawson points to or in others.