• You might think of Shaffer’s article as having three parts. In the first, pp. 67-69, he criticizes Smart’s response to objection 3 (and you should reread Smart’s presentation of that objection and response, pp. 59-61). The second part of Shaffer’s article, pp. 69-71, argues for the existence of “nonphysical” properties; and he finally, on pp. 71-72, considers the possibility that such properties might still be reducible to physical ones. By focusing on properties, rather than on substances, Shaffer is addressing issues related to a position that has sometimes been labeled “property dualism.”

• The first part of Cornman’s article (pp. 73-76) concerns Shaffer’s criticisms of Smart and the issues surrounding them. Although he has in mind an article of Shaffer’s earlier than the one you’ve read, which is in part a response to what Cornman says, here you should think whether Shaffer has succeeded in meeting Cornman’s criticisms. You should also, and perhaps especially, think about the way Cornman presents the issues he takes to be at stake.

The remainder of Cornman’s article offers his own criticisms of Smart. A couple of these (on pp. 76f) are close to issues appearing in Shaffer, but Cornman’s final line of criticism (pp. 77-79) employs a new idea, that of a “category mistake.” Cornman does something to explain this idea, so let me merely offer an extreme example: it might be said that to say, “The square root of 2 is fast,” is neither true nor false because terms like ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ apply to a conceptual category different from the real numbers. As a result, so this idea goes, the question ‘Is the square root of two fast?’ simply does not arise and has neither a yes or a no answer.