| Phi 109-02 Fall 2013 |
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This assignment provides an introduction to the two quite different, but still related, conceptions of the soul found in Plato and Aristotle. In the case of Plato, I’ve selected a passage from his Phaedo, a dialogue set on the day of Socrates’ death; we’ll read more from that dialogue for next time. The passages from Aristotle come from a work, On the Soul, which is frequently referred as De Anima, using the Latin translation of its title.
• The passage from the Phaedo is an argument for the immortality of the soul. In developing this argument, Socrates has much to say about the nature of the soul (especially on p. 3) and about its relation to the body (especially on p. 6).
Much of this discussion makes use of a distinction between “divine” and “mortal” realms. This has obvious theological significance and had a deep influence on Christian theology, but it also has a more philosophical rationale. This appears (on p. 2) in the contrast between forms, ideas, or essences and the particular things that exemplify them, and between the mind or understanding and the senses.
• The selections from Aristotle address three overlapping topics. His general characterization of the soul and distinctions among kinds of souls are found in the first group, the next group come from his discussion of sensation, and the final selections include key passages from his discussion of thought.
• In the first group (pp. 7-12, from De An. ii 1-4), Aristotle quickly offers his definition of ‘soul’ (see the bottom of p. 7) and then comments on it. Note his discussion of the variety of souls and especially his references to plants. One test of your understanding of what Aristotle means by ‘soul’ (or psyche in Greek) is whether it seems natural for him to say that plants have souls and that nutrition is the exercise of a “psychic” power.
• The second group of selections (pp. 12-13, from De An. ii 8, 12) are focused on Aristotle’s discussion of sound and hearing. I’ve chosen these because it is here that Aristotle is closest to our own views. Although he never speaks of sound waves and comparisons to waves in water began to appear only later in antiquity, what he says about sound is consistent such a view of it. The idea of a wave is also a good route into Aristotle’s idea of “sensible forms,” which both derive from an idea of “form” in the sense of shape and constitute a sort of activity. Notice that all senses take on and share forms with the objects they sense (just as structures in the ear vibrate in response to vibrations in the object making the sound).
• Aristotle’s conception of thought, the topic of third group of selections (pp. 13-15, from De An. iii 4, 5, 8), is parallel to his conception of sensation: the mind takes on the forms of the “thinkable” things that it knows. The comparison is made explicitly in the selections from iii 4 and iii 8.
In between is iii 5, which is a very short chapter (I’ve included all of it) and notoriously difficult to interpret. I’ve included it because, depending on how it is interpreted, it may be a place where Aristotle comes close to the view in Plato’s Phaedo. Part of the difficulty in judging whether he does is knowing whether what Aristotle speaks of as “mind” in the “active” sense, what is sometimes referred to as the “active intellect,” is an aspect of an individual soul or tied to his conception of God. Even if he does come close to Plato here, the selection from iii 8 shows that there are still substantial differences between them.