David Hume (1711-1776) lived about a century after Hobbes and Descartes, and his concerns and point of view are somewhat different from both of theirs. In the selections from Treatise 1.4.5 (i.e., book 1, part 4, section 5), you will find him criticizing positions analogous to the ones they held.

Hume’s own view treats minds and physical objects (including bodies) in quite analogous ways. The problem posed by the “scepticism with regard to the senses” that he begins discussing is the justification for a belief in anything beyond the content of our sense impressions, whether this be objects causing them or a mind or soul which has them. His approach to a solution is typical of his approach to other philosophical problems (such as the nature of causal necessity): he asks what leads us to believe in things beyond our sense impressions.

The details of Hume’s solution appear in his account of “personal identity” in Treatise 1.4.6. This fills out the idea he alludes to at the beginning of the handout of a “heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations” (1.4.2.39) and fills it out as an account of what makes you who you are. This is the longest part of the handout, and it will probably occupy the bulk of our discussion.