Phi 109-01
Fall 2015
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Phi 109-01 F15
Reading guide for Wed. 9/2: further selections from Plato’s Phaedo, 73a-76a, 85d-86d, 91e-95a, 97b-99c (handout: 1up for viewing, 2up for printing, bkl for printing as a booklet)

This assignment focuses on a view of the soul opposed to the one that we discussed on Mon.

The first selection (73a-76a) presents a view of knowledge as “recollection” that is referred to in one of Socrates’ arguments against this second view. The “proof” of the doctrine of recollection that Cebes describes at the beginning of this selection fits an incident in Plato’s dialogue Meno in which Socrates guides an uneducated boy toward seeing the truth of a simple geometric theorem by asking him questions. (When people speak of a “Socratic method” in education, they will often have this example in mind.) As the selection goes on, you get an introduction to Plato’s theory of “Forms” (the “essences” referred to here and in the selection we discussed last time).

The view of the soul and body that is opposed to Socrates’ is presented in the second selection, 85d-86d. It is the more interesting for our purposes of two views opposed to Socrates’ that are discussed in the dialogue. There is evidence that a view like it was held by some people at the time—so it is not just an invention of Plato for the purposes of the dialogue—however, it isn’t clear who exactly held the view.

Socrates responds to this view in the third selection, 91e-95a (in the dialogue, this comes after the presentation of the other view opposed to Socrates’ and a kind of interlude). His response consists of a series of arguments against it (the first of which involves the doctrine of recollection). Think about which of his arguments seems the strongest and which the weakest.

The final selection (97b-99c) is one of the few places in Plato’s dialogues where the character Socrates speaks of his intellectual development. It’s of interest to us because it expresses a form of dissatisfaction with materialist accounts of the mind that is somewhat different from the ones mentioned in the third selection.