Mon. 10/12: pp. 90-96 (col. 1—i.e., up to “A True Theory of Everything”)

Wed. 10/14: pp. 96-100

This article is intended to be accessible, so you probably don’t need much help to find your way through it. I’ll merely suggest some ideas to watch for because they are likely to play a significant role in our discussion. The first two show up in the assignment for Mon.; the rest appear later in the article.

Chalmers’ speculations about a theory of consciousness in the last section of the paper are related to the issue of epiphenomenalism. Chalmers, like Jackson, has argued against objections to this view. But he doesn’t exactly argue for it, either. He has said that he is open to either of two forms of dualism—interactionism and epiphenomenalism—but is most attracted by the sort of view he describes in the last section (something he elsewhere labels “panprotopsychism”), which is a sort of monism.