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## Outlines of Pyrrhonism

Sextus Empiricus  
(Mary Mills Patrick, tr.)

### BOOK I

#### CHAPTER I.

##### *The Principal Differences between Philosophers.*

<sup>1</sup> It is probable that those who seek after anything whatever, will either find it as they continue the search, will deny that it can be found and confess it to be out of reach, or will go on seeking it. <sup>2</sup> Some have said, accordingly, in regard to the things sought in philosophy, that they have found the truth, while others have declared it impossible to find, and still others continue to seek it. Those who think that they have found it are those who are especially called Dogmatics, as for example, the Schools of Aristotle and Epicurus, the Stoics and some others. <sup>3</sup> Those who have declared it impossible to find are Clitomachus, Carneades, with their respective followers, and other Academicians. Those who still seek it are the Sceptics. <sup>4</sup> It appears therefore, reasonable to conclude that the three principal kinds of philosophy are the Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Sceptic. Others may suitably treat of the other Schools, but as for the Sceptical School, we shall now give an outline of it, remarking in advance that in respect to nothing that will be said do we speak positively, that it must be absolutely so, but we shall state each thing historically as it now appears to us.

#### CHAPTER II.

##### *Ways of Treating Scepticism.*

<sup>5</sup> One way of treating the Sceptical philosophy is called general, and the other special. The general method is that by which we set forth the character of Scepticism, declaring what its idea is, what its principles are, its mode of reasoning, its criterion, and its aim. It presents also, the aspects of doubt, *οἱ τρόποι τῆς ἐποχῆς*, and the way in which we should understand the Sceptical formulae, and the distinction between Scepticism and the related Schools of philosophy. <sup>6</sup> The special method, on the contrary, is that by which we speak against each part of so-called philosophy. Let us then treat Scepticism at first in the general way, beginning our delineation with the nomenclature of the Sceptical School.

## CHAPTER III.

### *The Nomenclature of Scepticism.*

<sup>7</sup> The Sceptical School is also called the “Seeking School,” from its spirit of research and examination; the “Suspending School,” from the condition of mind in which one is left after the search, in regard to the things that he has examined; and the “Doubting School,” either because, as some say, the Sceptics doubt and are seeking in regard to everything, or because they never know whether to deny or affirm. It is also called the Pyrrhonian School, because Pyrrho appears to us the best representative of Scepticism, and is more prominent than all who before him occupied themselves with it.

## CHAPTER IV.

### *What is Scepticism?*

<sup>8</sup> The *δύναμις* of the Sceptical School is to place the phenomenal in opposition to the intellectual “in any way whatever,” and thus through the equilibrium of the reasons and things (*ἰσοσθένεια τῶν λόγων*) opposed to each other, to reach, first the state of suspension of judgment, *ἐποχή*, and afterwards that of imperturbability, *ἀταραξία*.<sup>9</sup> We do not use the word *δύναμις* in any unusual sense, but simply, meaning the force of the system. By the phenomenal, we understand the sensible, hence we place the intellectual in opposition to it. The phrase “in any way whatever,” may refer to the word *δύναμις* in order that we may understand that word in a simple sense as we said, or it may refer to the placing the phenomenal and intellectual in opposition. For we place these in opposition to each other in a variety of ways, the phenomenal to the phenomenal, and the intellectual to the intellectual, or reciprocally, and we say “in any way whatever,” in order that all methods of opposition may be included. Or “in any way whatever” may refer to the phenomenal and the intellectual, so that we need not ask how does the phenomenal appear, or how are the thoughts conceived, but that we may understand these things in a simple sense.<sup>10</sup> By “reasons opposed to each other,” we do not by any means understand that they deny or affirm anything, but simply that they offset each other. By equilibrium, we mean equality in regard to trustworthiness and untrustworthiness, so that of the reasons that are placed in opposition to each other, one should not excel another in trustworthiness. *ἐποχή* is a holding back of the opinion, in consequence of which we neither deny nor affirm anything. *ἀταραξία* is repose and tranquillity of soul. We shall explain how *ἀταραξία* accompanies *ἐποχή* when we speak of the aim.

## CHAPTER V.

### *The Sceptic.*

<sup>11</sup> What is meant by a Pyrrhonian philosopher can be understood from the idea of the Sceptical School. He is a Pyrrhonian, namely, who identifies himself with this system.

## CHAPTER VI.

### *The Origin of Scepticism.*

<sup>12</sup> Scepticism arose in the beginning from the hope of attaining ἀταραξία; for men of the greatest talent were perplexed by the contradiction of things, and being at a loss what to believe, began to question what things are true, and what false, hoping to attain ἀταραξία as a result of the decision. The fundamental principle of the Sceptical system is especially this, namely, to oppose every argument by one of equal weight, for it seems to us that in this way we finally reach the position where we have no dogmas.

## CHAPTER VII.

### *Does the Sceptic Dogmatise?*

<sup>13</sup> We say that the Sceptic does not dogmatise. We do not say this, meaning by the word dogma the popular assent to certain things rather than others (for the Sceptic does assent to feelings that are a necessary result of sensation, as for example, when he is warm or cold, he cannot say that he thinks he is not warm or cold), but we say this, meaning by dogma the acceptance of any opinion in regard to the unknown things investigated by science. For the Pyrrhonian assents to nothing that is unknown. <sup>14</sup> Furthermore, he does not dogmatise even when he utters the Sceptical formulae in regard to things that are unknown, such as “Nothing more,” or “I decide nothing,” or any of the others about which we shall speak later. For the one who dogmatises regards the thing about which he is said to dogmatise, as existing in itself; the Sceptic does not however regard these formulae as having an absolute existence, for he assumes that the saying “All is false,” includes itself with other things as false, and likewise the saying “Nothing is true”; in the same way “Nothing more,” states that together with other things it itself is nothing more, and cancels itself therefore, as well as other things. We say the same also in regard to the other Sceptical expressions. <sup>15</sup> In short, if he who dogmatises, assumes as existing in itself that about which he dogmatises, the Sceptic, on the contrary, expresses his sayings in such a way that they are understood to be themselves included, and it cannot be said that he dogmatises in saying these things. The principal thing in uttering these formulae is that he says what appears to him, and communicates his own feelings

in an unprejudiced way, without asserting anything in regard to external objects.

## CHAPTER VIII.

### *Is Scepticism a Sect?*

<sup>16</sup> We respond in a similar way if we are asked whether Scepticism is a sect or not. If the word sect is defined as meaning a body of persons who hold dogmas which are in conformity with each other, and also with phenomena, and dogma means an assent to anything that is unknown, then we reply that we have no sect. <sup>17</sup> If, however, one means by sect, a school which follows a certain line of reasoning based on phenomena, and that reasoning shows how it is possible to apparently live rightly, not understanding “rightly” as referring to virtue only, but in a broader sense; if, also, it leads one to be able to suspend the judgment, then we reply that we have a sect. For we follow a certain kind of reasoning which is based upon phenomena, and which shows us how to live according to the habits, laws, and teachings of the fatherland, and our own feelings.

## CHAPTER IX.

### *Does the Sceptic Study Natural Science?*

<sup>18</sup> We reply similarly also to the question whether the Sceptic should study natural science. For we do not study natural science in order to express ourselves with confidence regarding any of the dogmas that it teaches, but we take it up in order to be able to meet every argument by one of equal weight, and also for the sake of *ἀταραξία*. In the same way we study the logical and ethical part of so-called philosophy.

## CHAPTER X.

### *Do the Sceptics deny Phenomena?*

<sup>19</sup> Those who say that the Sceptics deny phenomena appear to me to be in ignorance of our teachings. For as we said before, we do not deny the sensations which we think we have, and which lead us to assent involuntarily to them, and these are the phenomena. When, however, we ask whether the object is such as it appears to be, while we concede that it appears so and so, we question, not the phenomenon, but in regard to that which is asserted of the phenomenon, and that is different from doubting the phenomenon itself. <sup>20</sup> For example, it appears to us that honey is sweet. This we concede, for we experience sweetness through sensation. We doubt, however, whether it is sweet by reason of its essence, which is not a question of the phenomenon, but of that which is asserted of the phenomenon. Should we, however, argue directly against the

phenomena, it is not with the intention of denying their existence, but to show the rashness of the Dogmatics. For if reasoning is such a deceiver that it well nigh snatches away the phenomena from before your eyes, how should we not distrust it in regard to things that are unknown, so as not to rashly follow it?

## CHAPTER XI.

### *The Criterion of Scepticism.*

<sup>21</sup> It is evident that we pay careful attention to phenomena from what we say about the criterion of the Sceptical School. The word criterion is used in two ways. First, it is understood as a proof of existence or non-existence, in regard to which we shall speak in the opposing argument. Secondly, when it refers to action, meaning the criterion to which we give heed in life, in doing some things and refraining from doing others, and it is about this that we shall now speak. <sup>22</sup> We say, consequently, that the criterion of the Sceptical School is the phenomenon, and in calling it so, we mean the idea of it. It cannot be doubted, as it is based upon susceptibility and involuntary feeling. Hence no one doubts, perhaps, that an object appears so and so, but one questions if it is as it appears. <sup>23</sup> Therefore, as we cannot be entirely inactive as regards the observances of daily life, we live by giving heed to phenomena, and in an unprejudiced way. But this observance of what pertains to the daily life, appears to be of four different kinds. Sometimes it is directed by the guidance of nature, sometimes by the necessity of the feelings, sometimes by the tradition of laws and of customs, and sometimes by the teaching of the arts. <sup>24</sup> It is directed by the guidance of nature, for by nature we are capable of sensation and thought; by the necessity of the feelings, for hunger leads us to food, and thirst to drink; by the traditions of laws and customs, for according to them we consider piety a good in daily life, and impiety an evil; by the teaching of the arts, for we are not inactive in the arts we undertake. We say all these things, however, without expressing a decided opinion.

## CHAPTER XII.

### *What is the aim of Scepticism?*

<sup>25</sup> It follows naturally in order to treat of the aim of the Sceptical School. An aim is that for which as an end all things are done or thought, itself depending on nothing, or in other words, it is the ultimatum of things to be desired. We say, then, that the aim of the Sceptic is *ἀταραξία* in those things which pertain to the opinion, and moderation in the things that life imposes. <sup>26</sup> For as soon as he began to philosophise he wished to discriminate between ideas, and to understand which are true and which are false, in order to attain

*ἀταραξία*. He met, however, with contradictions of equal weight, and, being unable to judge, he withheld his opinion; and while his judgment was in suspension *ἀταραξία* followed, as if by chance, in regard to matters of opinion. <sup>27</sup> For he who is of the opinion that anything is either good or bad by nature is always troubled, and when he does not possess those things that seem to him good he thinks that he is tortured by the things which are by nature bad, and pursues those that he thinks to be good. Having acquired them, however, he falls into greater perturbation, because he is excited beyond reason and without measure from fear of a change, and he does everything in his power to retain the things that seem to him good. <sup>28</sup> But he who is undecided, on the contrary, regarding things that are good and bad by nature, neither seeks nor avoids anything eagerly, and is therefore in a state of *ἀταραξία*. For that which is related of Apelles the painter happened to the Sceptic. It is said that as he was once painting a horse he wished to represent the foam of his mouth in the picture, but he could not succeed in doing so, and he gave it up and threw the sponge at the picture with which he had wiped the colors from the painting. As soon, however, as it touched the picture it produced a good copy of the foam. <sup>29</sup> The Sceptics likewise hoped to gain *ἀταραξία* by forming judgments in regard to the anomaly between phenomena and the things of thought, but they were unable to do this, and so they suspended their judgment; and while their judgment was in suspension *ἀταραξία* followed, as if by chance, as the shadow follows a body. Nevertheless, we do not consider the Sceptic wholly undisturbed, but he is disturbed by some things that are inevitable. We confess that sometimes he is cold and thirsty, and that he suffers in such ways. <sup>30</sup> But in these things even the ignorant are beset in two ways, from the feelings themselves, and not less also from the fact that they think these conditions are bad by nature. The Sceptic, however, escapes more easily, as he rejects the opinion that anything is in itself bad by nature. Therefore we say that the aim of the Sceptic is *ἀταραξία* in matters of opinion, and moderation of feeling in those things that are inevitable. Some notable Sceptics have added also suspension of judgment in investigation.

### CHAPTER XIII.

#### *The General Method of Scepticism.*

<sup>31</sup> Since we have said that *ἀταραξία* follows the suspension of judgment in regard to everything, it behooves us to explain how the suspension of judgment takes place. Speaking in general it takes place through placing things in opposition to each other. We either place phenomena in opposition to phenomena, or the intellectual in opposition to the intellectual, or reciprocally. <sup>32</sup> For example, we place

phenomena in opposition to phenomena when we say that this tower appears round from a distance but square near by; the intellectual in opposition to the intellectual, when to the one who from the order of the heavens builds a tower of reasoning to prove that a providence exists, we oppose the fact that adversity often falls to the good and prosperity to the evil, and that therefore we draw the conclusion that there is no providence.<sup>33</sup> The intellectual is placed in opposition to phenomena, as when Anaxagoras opposed the fact that snow is white, by saying that snow is frozen water, and, as water is black, snow must also be black. Likewise we sometimes place the present in opposition to the present, similarly to the above-mentioned cases, and sometimes also the present in opposition to the past or the future. As for example, when someone proposes an argument to us that we cannot refute,<sup>34</sup> we say to him, “Before the founder of the sect to which you belong was born, the argument which you propose in accordance with it had not appeared as a valid argument, but was dormant in nature, so in the same way it is possible that its refutation also exists in nature, but has not yet appeared to us, so that it is not at all necessary for us to agree with an argument that now seems to be strong.”<sup>35</sup> In order to make it clearer to us what we mean by these oppositions, I will proceed to give the Tropes (τρόποι), through which the suspension of judgment is produced, without asserting anything about their meaning or their number, because they may be unsound, or there may be more than I shall enumerate.

#### CHAPTER XIV.

##### *The Ten Tropes.*

<sup>36</sup> Certain Tropes were commonly handed down by the older Sceptics, by means of which ἐποχή seems to take place. They are ten in number, and are called synonymously λόγοι and τρόποι. They are these: The first is based upon the differences in animals; the second upon the differences in men; the third upon the difference in the constitution of the organs of sense; the fourth upon circumstances; the fifth upon position, distance, and place; the sixth upon mixtures;<sup>37</sup> the seventh upon the quantity and constitution of objects; the eighth upon relation; the ninth upon frequency or rarity of occurrences; the tenth upon systems, customs, laws, mythical beliefs, and dogmatic opinions.<sup>38</sup> We make this order ourselves. These Tropes come under three general heads: the standpoint of the judge, the standpoint of the thing judged, and the standpoint of both together. Under the standpoint of the judge come the first four, for the judge is either an animal, or a man, or a sense, and exists under certain circumstances. Under the standpoint of that which is judged, come the seventh and the tenth. Under the one composed of both together, come the fifth and the sixth,

the eighth and the ninth. <sup>39</sup> Again, these three divisions are included under the Trope of relation, because that is the most general one; it includes the three special divisions, and these in turn include the ten. We say these things in regard to their probable number, and we proceed in the following chapter to speak of their meaning.

### THE FIRST TROPE.

<sup>40</sup> The first Trope, we said, is the one based upon the differences in animals, and according to this Trope, different animals do not get the same ideas of the same objects through the senses. This we conclude from the different origin of the animals, and also from the difference in the constitution of their bodies. <sup>41</sup> In regard to the difference in origin, some animals originate without mixture of the sexes, while others originate through sexual intercourse. Of those which originate without intercourse of the sexes, some come from fire, as the little animals which appear in the chimneys, others from stagnant water, as musquitoes, others from fermented wine, as the stinging ants, others from the earth, others from the mud, like the frogs, others from slime, as the worms, others from donkeys, as the beetles, others from cabbage, as caterpillars, others from fruit, as the gall insect from the wild figs, others from putrified animals, as bees from bulls, and wasps from horses. <sup>42</sup> Again, of those originating from intercourse of the sexes, some come from animals of the same kind, as in most cases, and others from those of different kinds, as mules. Again, of animals in general, some are born alive, as men, others from eggs, as birds, and others are born a lump of flesh, as bears. <sup>43</sup> It is probable therefore, that the inequalities and differences in origin cause great antipathies in the animals, and the result is incompatibility, discord, and conflict between the sensations of the different animals. <sup>44</sup> Again, the differences in the principal parts of the body, especially in those fitted by nature to judge and to perceive, may cause the greatest differences in their ideas of objects, according to the differences in the animals themselves. As for example, those who have the jaundice call that yellow which appears to us white, and those who have bloodshot eyes call it blood-red. Accordingly, as some animals have yellow eyes, and others blood-shot ones, and still others whitish ones, and others eyes of other colors, it is probable, I think, that they have a different perception of colors. <sup>45</sup> Furthermore, when we look steadily at the sun for a long time, and then look down at a book, the letters seem to us gold colored, and dance around. Now some animals have by nature a lustre in their eyes, and these emit a fine and sparkling light so that they see at night, and we may reasonably suppose that external things do not appear the same to them as to us. <sup>46</sup> Jugglers by lightly rubbing the wick of the lamp with metal rust, or with the dark yellow fluid of the sepia, make those who are present appear now copper-colored and



now black, according to the amount of the mixture used; if this be so it is much more reasonable to suppose that because of the mixture of different fluids in the eyes of animals, their ideas of objects would be different. <sup>47</sup> Furthermore, when we press the eye on the side, the figures, forms and sizes of things seen appear elongated and narrow. It is therefore probable that such animals as have the pupil oblique and long, as goats, cats, and similar animals, have ideas different from those of the animals which have a round pupil. <sup>48</sup> Mirrors according to their different construction, sometimes show the external object smaller than reality, as concave ones, and sometimes long and narrow, as the convex ones do; others show the head of the one looking into it down, and the feet up. <sup>49</sup> As some of the vessels around the eye fall entirely outside the eye, on account of their protuberance, while others are more sunken, and still others are placed in an even surface, it is probable that for this reason also the ideas vary, and dogs, fishes, lions, men, and grasshoppers do not see the same things, either of the same size, or of similar form, but according to the impression on the organ of sight of each animal respectively. <sup>50</sup> The same thing is true in regard to the other senses; for how can it be said that shell-fish, birds of prey, animals covered with spines, those with feathers and those with scales would be affected in the same way by the sense of touch? and how can the sense of hearing perceive alike in animals which have the narrowest auditory passages, and in those that are furnished with the widest, or in those with hairy ears and those with smooth ones? For we, even, hear differently when we partially stop up the ears, from what we do when we use them naturally. <sup>51</sup> The sense of smell also varies according to differences in animals, since even our sense of smell is affected when we have taken cold and the phlegm is too abundant, and also when parts around our head are flooded with too much blood, for we then avoid odors that seem agreeable to others, and feel as if we were injured by them. Since also some of the animals are moist by nature and full of secretions, and others are very full of blood, and still others have either yellow or black bile prevalent and abundant, it is reasonable because of this to think that odorous things appear different to each one of them. <sup>52</sup> And it is the same in regard to things of taste, as some animals have the tongue rough and dry and others very moist. We too, when we have a dry tongue in fever, think that whatever we take is gritty, bad tasting, or bitter; and this we experience because of the varying degrees of the humors that are said to be in us. Since, then, different animals have different organs for taste, and a greater or less amount of the various humors, it can well be that they form different ideas of the same objects as regards their taste. <sup>53</sup> For just as the same food on being absorbed becomes in some places veins, in other places arteries, and in other places bones, nerves,

or other tissues, showing different power according to the difference of the parts receiving it; just as the same water absorbed by the trees becomes in some places bark, in other places branches, and in other places fruit, perhaps a fig or a pomegranate, or something else; <sup>54</sup> just as the breath of the musician, one and the same when blown into the flute, becomes sometimes a high tone and sometimes a low one, and the same pressure of the hand upon the lyre sometimes causes a deep tone and sometimes a high tone, so it is natural to suppose that external objects are regarded differently according to the different constitution of the animals which perceive them. <sup>55</sup> We may see this more clearly in the things that are sought for and avoided by animals. For example, myrrh appears very agreeable to men and intolerable to beetles and bees. Oil also, which is useful to men, destroys wasps and bees if sprinkled on them; and sea-water, while it is unpleasant and poisonous to men if they drink it, is most agreeable and sweet to fishes. <sup>56</sup> Swine also prefer to wash in vile filth rather than in pure clean water. Furthermore, some animals eat grass and some eat herbs; some live in the woods, others eat seeds; some are carnivorous, and others lactivorous; some enjoy putrified food, and others fresh food; some raw food and others that which is prepared by cooking; and in general that which is agreeable to some is disagreeable and fatal to others, and should be avoided by them. <sup>57</sup> Thus hemlock makes the quail fat, and henbane the hogs, and these, as it is known, enjoy eating lizards; deer also eat poisonous animals, and swallows, the cantharidae. Moreover, ants and flying ants, when swallowed by men, cause discomfort and colic; but the bear, on the contrary, whatever sickness he may have, becomes stronger by devouring them. <sup>58</sup> The viper is benumbed if one twig of the oak touches it, as is also the bat by a leaf of the plane-tree. The elephant flees before the ram, and the lion before the cock, and seals from the rattling of beans that are being pounded, and the tiger from the sound of the drum. Many other examples could be given, but that we may not seem to dwell longer than is necessary on this subject, we conclude by saying that since the same things are pleasant to some and unpleasant to others, and the pleasure and displeasure depend on the ideas, it must be that different animals have different ideas of objects. <sup>59</sup> And since the same things appear different according to the difference in the animals, it will be possible for us to say how the external object appears to us, but as to how it is in reality we shall suspend our judgment. For we cannot ourselves judge between our own ideas and those of other animals, being ourselves involved in the difference, and therefore much more in need of being judged than being ourselves able to judge. <sup>60</sup> And furthermore, we cannot give the preference to our own mental representations over those of other animals, either without evidence or

with evidence, for besides the fact that perhaps there is no evidence, as we shall show, the evidence so called will be either manifest to us or not. If it is not manifest to us, then we cannot accept it with conviction; if it is manifest to us, since the question is in regard to what is manifest to animals, and we use as evidence that which is manifest to us who are animals, then it is to be questioned if it is true as it is manifest to us. <sup>61</sup> It is absurd, however, to try to base the questionable on the questionable, because the same thing is to be believed and not to be believed, which is certainly impossible. The evidence is to be believed in so far as it will furnish a proof, and disbelieved in so far as it is itself to be proved. We shall therefore have no evidence according to which we can give preference to our own ideas over those of so-called irrational animals. Since therefore ideas differ according to the difference in animals, and it is impossible to judge them, it is necessary to suspend the judgment in regard to external objects.

*Have the So-called Irrational Animals Reason?*

<sup>62</sup> We continue the comparison of the so-called irrational animals with man, although it is needless to do so, for in truth we do not refuse to hold up to ridicule the conceited and bragging Dogmatics, after having given the practical arguments. Now most of our number were accustomed to compare all the irrational animals together with man, <sup>63</sup> but because the Dogmatics playing upon words say that the comparison is unequal, we carry our ridicule farther, although it is most superfluous to do so, and fix the discussion on one animal, as the dog, if it suits you, which seems to be the most contemptible animal; for we shall even then find that animals, about which we are speaking, are not inferior to us in respect to the trustworthiness of their perceptions. <sup>64</sup> Now the Dogmatics grant that this animal is superior to us in sense perception, for he perceives better through smell than we, as by this sense he tracks wild animals that he cannot see, and he sees them quicker with his eyes than we do, and he perceives them more acutely by hearing. <sup>65</sup> Let us also consider reasoning, which is of two kinds, reasoning in thought and in speech. Let us look first to that of thought. This kind of reasoning, judging from the teachings of those Dogmatics who are now our greatest opponents, those of the Stoa, seems to fluctuate between the following things: the choice of the familiar, and avoidance of the alien; the knowledge of the arts that lead to this choice; and the comprehension of those virtues that belong to the individual nature, as regards the feelings. <sup>66</sup> The dog then, upon whom it was decided to fix the argument as an example, makes a choice of things suitable to him, and avoids those that are harmful, for he hunts for food, but draws back when the whip is lifted up; he possesses also an art by which he procures the things that are suitable

for him, the art of hunting. <sup>67</sup> He is not also without virtue; since the true nature of justice is to give to every one according to his merit, as the dog wags his tail to those who belong to the family, and to those who behave well to him, guards them, and keeps off strangers and evil doers, he is surely not without justice. <sup>68</sup> Now if he has this virtue, since the virtues follow each other in turn, he has the other virtues also, which the wise men say, most men do not possess. We see the dog also brave in warding off attacks, and sagacious, as Homer testified when he represented Odysseus as unrecognised by all in his house, and recognised only by Argos, because the dog was not deceived by the physical change in the man, and had not lost the *φαντασία καταληπτική* which he proved that he had kept better than the men had. <sup>69</sup> But according to Chrysippus even, who most attacked the irrational animals, the dog takes a part in the dialectic about which so much is said. At any rate, the man above referred to said that the dog follows the fifth of the several non-apodictic syllogisms, for when he comes to a meeting of three roads, after seeking the scent in the two roads, through which his prey has not passed, he presses forward quickly in the third without scenting it. For the dog reasons in this way, potentially said the man of olden time; the animal passed through this, or this, or this; it was neither through this nor this, therefore it was through this. <sup>70</sup> The dog also understands his own sufferings and mitigates them. As soon as a sharp stick is thrust into him, he sets out to remove it, by rubbing his foot on the ground, as also with his teeth; and if ever he has a wound anywhere, for the reason that uncleansed wounds are difficult to cure, and those that are cleansed are easily cured, he gently wipes off the collected matter; <sup>71</sup> and he observes the Hippocratic advice exceedingly well, for since quiet is a relief for the foot, if he has ever a wound in the foot, he lifts it up, and keeps it undisturbed as much as possible. When he is troubled by disturbing humours, he eats grass, with which he vomits up that which was unfitting, and recovers. <sup>72</sup> Since therefore it has been shown that the animal that we fixed the argument upon for the sake of an example, chooses that which is suitable for him, and avoids what is harmful, and that he has an art by which he provides what is suitable, and that he comprehends his own sufferings and mitigates them, and that he is not without virtue, things in which perfection of reasoning in thought consists, so according to this it would seem that the dog has reached perfection. It is for this reason, it appears to me, that some philosophers have honoured themselves with the name of this animal. <sup>73</sup> In regard to reasoning in speech, it is not necessary at present to bring the matter in question. For some of the Dogmatics, even, have put this aside, as opposing the acquisition of virtue, for which reason they practiced silence when studying. Besides, let it be supposed that a

man is dumb, no one would say that he is consequently irrational. However, aside from this, we see after all, that animals, about which we are speaking, do produce human sounds, as the jay and some others. <sup>74</sup> Aside from this also, even if we do not understand the sounds of the so-called irrational animals, it is not at all unlikely that they converse, and that we do not understand their conversation. For when we hear the language of foreigners, we do not understand but it all seems like one sound to us. <sup>75</sup> Furthermore, we hear dogs giving out one kind of sound when they are resisting someone, and another sound when they howl, and another when they are beaten, and a different kind when they wag their tails, and generally speaking, if one examines into this, he will find a great difference in the sounds of this and other animals under different circumstances; so that in all likelihood, it may be said that the so-called irrational animals partake also in spoken language. <sup>76</sup> If then, they are not inferior to men in the accuracy of their perceptions, nor in reasoning in thought, nor in reasoning by speech, as it is superfluous to say, then they are not more untrustworthy than we are, it seems to me, in regard to their ideas. <sup>77</sup> Perhaps it would be possible to prove this, should we direct the argument to each of the irrational animals in turn. As for example, who would not say that the birds are distinguished for shrewdness, and make use of articulate speech? for they not only know the present but the future, and this they augur to those that are able to understand it, audibly as well as in other ways. <sup>78</sup> I have made this comparison superfluously, as I pointed out above, as I think I had sufficiently shown before, that we cannot consider our own ideas superior to those of the irrational animals. In short, if the irrational animals are not more untrustworthy than we in regard to the judgment of their ideas, and the ideas are different according to the difference in the animals, I shall be able to say how each object appears to me, but in regard to what it is by nature I shall be obliged to suspend my judgment.

#### THE SECOND TROPE.

<sup>79</sup> Such is the first Trope of ἐποχή. The second, we said above, is based upon the differences in men. For even if one assent to the hypothesis that men are more trustworthy than the irrational animals, we shall find that doubt arises as soon as we consider our own differences. For since man is said to be composed of two things, soul and body, we differ from each other in respect to both of these things; for example, as regards the body, we differ both in form and personal peculiarities. <sup>80</sup> For the body of a Scythian differs from the body of an Indian in form, the difference resulting, it is said, from the different control of the humors. According to different control of the humors, differences in ideas arise also, as we represented under the first Trope. For this reason there is certainly a great difference among men in the

choice and avoidance of external things. The Indians delight in different things from our own people, and the enjoyment of different things is a sign that different ideas are received of the external objects.

<sup>81</sup> We differ in personal peculiarities, as some digest beef better than the little fish from rocky places, and some are affected with purging by the weak wine of Lesbos. There was, they say, an old woman in Attica who could drink thirty drachmas of hemlock without danger, and Lysis took four drachmas of opium unhurt, <sup>82</sup> and Demophon, Alexander's table waiter, shivered when he was in the sun or in a hot bath, and felt warm in the shade; Athenagoras also, from Argos, did not suffer harm if stung by scorpions and venomous spiders; the so-called Psylli were not injured when bitten by snakes or by the aspis, <sup>83</sup> and the Tentyrites among the Egyptians are not harmed by the crocodiles around them; those also of the Ethiopians who live on the Hydaspes river, opposite Meroe, eat scorpions and serpents, and similar things without danger; Rufinus in Chalcis could drink hellebore without vomiting or purging, and he enjoyed and digested it as something to which he was accustomed; <sup>84</sup> Chrysermos, the Herophilian, ran the risk of stomach-ache if he ever took pepper, and Soterichus, the surgeon, was seized by purging if he perceived the odor of roasting shad; Andron, the Argive, was so free from thirst that he could travel even through the waterless Libya without looking for a drink; Tiberius, the emperor, saw in the dark, and Aristotle tells the story of a certain Thracian, who thought that he saw the figure of a man always going before him as a guide. <sup>85</sup> While therefore such a difference exists in men in regard to the body, and we must be satisfied with referring to a few only of the many examples given by the Dogmatics, it is probable that men also differ from each other in respect to the soul itself, for the body is a kind of type of the soul, as the physiognomical craft also shows. The best example of the numerous and infinite differences of opinion among men is the contradiction in the sayings of the Dogmatics, not only about other things, but about what it is well to seek and to avoid.

<sup>86</sup> The poets have also fittingly spoken about this, for Pindar said—

“One delights in getting honors and crowns through storm-footed horses,  
Another in passing life in rooms rich in gold,  
Another still, safe travelling enjoys, in a swift ship, on a wave of the sea.”

And the poet says—

“One man enjoys this, another enjoys that.”

The tragedies also abound in such expressions, for instance, it is said—

“If to all, the same were good and wise,  
Quarrels and disputes among men would not have been.”

And again—

“It is awful indeed, that the same thing some mortals should please,  
And by others be hated.”

<sup>87</sup> Since therefore the choice and the avoidance of things, depends on the pleasure and displeasure which they give, and the pleasure and displeasure have their seat in perception and ideas, when some choose the things that others avoid, it is logical for us to conclude that they are not acted upon similarly by the same things, for otherwise they would have chosen or avoided alike. Now if the same things act upon different men differently, on account of the difference in the men, for this cause also suspension of the judgment may reasonably be introduced, and we may perhaps say how each object appears to us, and what its individual differences are, but we shall not be able to declare what it is as to the nature of its essence. <sup>88</sup> For we must either believe all men or some men; but to believe all is to undertake an impossibility, and to accept things that are in opposition to each other. If we believe some only, let someone tell us with whom to agree, for the Platonist would say with Plato, the Epicurean with Epicurus, and others would advise in a corresponding manner; and so as they disagree, with no one to decide, they bring us round again to the suspension of judgment. <sup>89</sup> Furthermore, he who tells us to agree with the majority proposes something childish, as no one could go to all men and find out what pleases the majority, for it is possible that in some nations which we do not know the things which to us are rare are common to the majority, and those things which happen commonly to us are rare. As for example, it might happen that the majority should not suffer when bitten by venomous spiders, or that they should seldom feel pain, or have other personal peculiarities similar to those spoken of above. It is necessary therefore to suspend the judgment on account of the differences in men.

### THE THIRD TROPE.

<sup>90</sup> While, however, the Dogmatics are conceited enough to think that they should be preferred to other men in the judgement of things, we know that their claim is absurd, for they themselves form a part of the disagreement; and if they give themselves preference in this way in the judgment of phenomena, they beg the question before they begin the judgment, as they trust the judgment to themselves. <sup>91</sup> Nevertheless, in order that we should reach the result of the suspension of judgment by limiting the argument to one man, one who for example they deem to be wise, let us take up the third Trope. This is the one that is based upon differences in perception. That the perceptions differ from each other is evident. <sup>92</sup> For example, paintings seem to have hollows and prominences to the sense of sight, but not to the sense of touch, and honey to the tongue of some people

appears pleasant, but unpleasant to the eyes; therefore it is impossible to say whether it is really pleasant or unpleasant. In regard to myrrh it is the same, for it delights the sense of smell, but disgusts the sense of taste.<sup>93</sup> Also in regard to euphorbium, since it is harmful to the eyes and harmless to all the rest of the body, we are not able to say whether it is really harmless to bodies or not, as far as its own nature is concerned. Rain-water, too, is useful to the eyes, but it makes the trachea and the lungs rough, just as oil does, although it soothes the skin; and the sea-torpedo placed on the extremities makes them numb, but is harmless when placed on the rest of the body. Wherefore we cannot say what each of these things is by nature. It is possible only to say how it appears each time.<sup>94</sup> We could cite more examples than these, but in order not to spend too long in laying out the plan of this book we shall simply say the following: Each of the phenomena perceived by us seems to present itself in many forms, as the apple, smooth, fragrant, sweet, yellow. Now it is not known whether it has in reality only those qualities which appear to us, or if it has only one quality, but appears different on account of the different constitution of the sense organs, or if it has more qualities than appear to us, but some of them do not affect us.<sup>95</sup> That it has only one quality might be concluded from what we have said about the food distributed in bodies, and the water distributed in trees, and the breath in the flute and syrinx, and in similar instruments; for it is possible that the apple also has only one quality, but appears different on account of the difference in the sense organs by which it is perceived.<sup>96</sup> On the other hand, that the apple has more qualities than those that appear to us, can be argued in this way: Let us imagine someone born with the sense of touch, of smell, and of taste, but neither hearing nor seeing. He will then assume that neither anything visible nor anything audible exists at all, but only the three kinds of qualities which he can apprehend.<sup>97</sup> It is possible then that as we have only the five senses, we apprehend only those qualities of the apple which we are able to grasp, but it may be supposed that other qualities exist which would affect other sense organs if we possessed them; as it is, we do not feel the sensations which would be felt through them.<sup>98</sup> But nature, one will say, has brought the senses into harmony with the objects to be perceived. What kind of nature? Among the Dogmatics a great difference of opinion reigns about the real existence of nature anyway; for he who decides whether there is a nature or not, if he is an uneducated man, would be according to them untrustworthy; if he is a philosopher, he is a part of the disagreement, and is himself to be judged, but is not a judge.<sup>99</sup> In short, if it is possible that only those qualities exist in the apple which we seem to perceive, or that more than these are there, or that not even those which we perceive exist, it



will be unknown to us what kind of a thing the apple is. The same argument holds for other objects of perception. If, however, the senses do not comprehend the external world, the intellect cannot comprehend it either, so that for this reason also it will appear that the suspension of judgment follows in regard to external objects.

#### THE FOURTH TROPE.

<sup>100</sup> In order to attain to ἐποχή by fixing the argument on each separate sense, or even by putting aside the senses altogether, we take up the fourth Trope of ἐποχή. This is the one based upon circumstances, and by circumstances we mean conditions. This Trope comes under consideration, we may say, with regard to conditions that are according to nature, or contrary to nature; such as waking or sleeping, the age of life, moving or keeping still, hating or loving, need or satiety, drunkenness or sobriety, predispositions, being courageous or afraid, sorrowing or rejoicing. <sup>101</sup> For example, things appear different as they are according to nature, or contrary to it; as for instance, the insane and those inspired by a god, think that they hear gods, while we do not; in like manner they often say that they perceive the odor of storax or frankincense, or the like, and many other things which we do not perceive. Water, also, that seems lukewarm to us, if poured over places that are inflamed, will feel hot, and a garment that appears orange-coloured to those that have blood-shot eyes, would not look so to me, and the same honey appears sweet to me, but bitter to those who have the jaundice. <sup>102</sup> If one should say that those who are not in a natural state have unusual ideas of objects, because of the intermingling of certain humors, then one must also say, that it may be that objects which are really what they seem to be to those who are in an unnatural condition, appear different to those who are in health, for even those who are in health have humors that are mixed with each other. <sup>103</sup> For to give to one kind of fluid a power to change objects, and not to another kind, is a fiction of the mind; for just as those who are in health are in a condition that is natural to those who are in health, and contrary to the nature of those who are not in health, so also those who are not in health, are in a condition contrary to the nature of those in health, but natural to those not in health, and we must therefore believe that they also are in some respect in a natural condition. <sup>104</sup> Furthermore, in sleep or in waking, the ideas are different, because we do not see things in the same way when we are awake as we do in sleep; neither do we see them in the same way in sleep as we do when awake, so that the existence or non-existence of these things is not absolute, but relative, that is in relation to a sleeping or waking condition. It is therefore probable that we see those things in sleep which in a waking condition do not exist, but they are not altogether non-existent, for they exist in sleep, just as those things

which exist when we are awake, exist, although they do not exist in sleep. <sup>105</sup> Furthermore, things present themselves differently according to the age of life, for the same air seems cold to the aged, but temperate to those in their prime, and the same color appears dim to those who are old, and bright to those in their prime, and likewise the same tone seems faint to the former, and audible to the latter. <sup>106</sup> People in different ages are also differently disposed towards things to be chosen or avoided; children, for example, are very fond of balls and hoops, while those in their prime prefer other things, and the old still others, from which it follows that the ideas in regard to the same objects differ in different periods of life. <sup>107</sup> Furthermore, things appear different in a condition of motion and rest, since that which we see at rest when we are still, seems to move when we are sailing by it. <sup>108</sup> There are also differences which depend on liking or disliking, as some detest swine flesh exceedingly, but others eat it with pleasure. As Menander said—

“O how his face appears  
Since he became such a man! What a creature!  
Doing no injustice would make us also beautiful.”

Many also that love ugly women consider them very beautiful. <sup>109</sup> Furthermore, there are differences which depend on hunger or satiety, as the same food seems agreeable to those who are hungry, and disagreeable to those who are satisfied. There are also differences depending on drunkenness and sobriety, as that which we consider ugly when we are sober does not appear ugly to us when we are drunk. <sup>110</sup> Again, there are differences depending on predispositions, as the same wine appears sourish to those who have previously eaten dates or dried figs, but agreeable to those who have taken nuts or chickpeas; the vestibule of the bath warms those who enter from without, but cools those who go out, if they rest in it. <sup>111</sup> Furthermore, there are differences depending on being afraid or courageous, as the same thing seems fearful and terrible to the coward, but in no wise so to him who is brave. There are differences, also, depending on being sad or joyful, as the same things are unpleasant to the sad, but pleasant to the joyful. <sup>112</sup> Since therefore the anomalies depending on conditions are so great, and since men are in different conditions at different times, it is perhaps easy to say how each object appears to each man, but not so of what kind it is, because the anomaly is not of a kind to be judged. For he who would pass judgment upon this is either in some one of the conditions mentioned above, or is in absolutely no condition whatever; but to say that he is in no condition at all, as, for example, that he is neither in health nor in illness, that he is neither moving nor quiet, that he is not of any age, and also that he is free from the other conditions, is wholly absurd. But if he judges the ideas while he is in

any condition whatever, he is a part of the contradiction, <sup>113</sup> and, besides, he is no genuine critic of external objects, because he is confused by the condition in which he finds himself. Therefore neither can the one who is awake compare the ideas of those who are asleep with those who are awake, nor can he who is in health compare the ideas of the sick with those of the well; for we believe more in the things that are present, and affecting us at present, than in the things not present. <sup>114</sup> In another way, the anomaly in such ideas is impossible to be judged, for whoever prefers one idea to another, and one condition to another, does this either without a criterion and a proof, or with a criterion and a proof; but he can do this neither without them, for he would then be untrustworthy, nor with them; for if he judges ideas, he judges them wholly by a criterion, <sup>115</sup> and he will say that this criterion is either true or false. But if it is false, he will be untrustworthy; if, on the contrary, he says that it is true, he will say that the criterion is true either without proof or with proof. If without proof, he will be untrustworthy; if he says that it is true with proof, it is certainly necessary that the proof be true, or he will be untrustworthy. Now will he say that the proof which he has accepted for the accrediting of the criterion is true, having judged it, or without having judged it? <sup>116</sup> If he says so without judging it, he will be untrustworthy; if he has judged it, it is evident that he will say that he has judged according to some criterion, and we must seek a proof for this criterion, and for that proof a criterion. For the proof always needs a criterion to establish it, and the criterion needs a proof that it may be shown to be true; and a proof can neither be sound without a pre-existing criterion that is true, nor a criterion true without a proof that is shown beforehand to be trustworthy. <sup>117</sup> And so both the criterion and the proof are thrown into the *circulus in probando*, by which it is found that they are both of them untrustworthy, for as each looks for proof from the other, each is as untrustworthy as the other. Since then one cannot prefer one idea to another, either without a proof and a criterion or with them, the ideas that differ according to different conditions cannot be judged, so that the suspension of judgment in regard to the nature of external objects follows through this Trope also.

#### THE FIFTH TROPE.

<sup>118</sup> The fifth Trope is that based upon position, distance, and place, for, according to each of these, the same things appear different, as for example, the same arcade seen from either end appears curtailed, but from the middle it looks symmetrical on every side; and the same ship appears small and motionless from afar, and large and in motion near by, and the same tower appears round from a distance, but square near by. <sup>119</sup> So much for distance. Now in reference to place, we say that

the light of the lamp appears dim in the sun, but bright in the dark; and the same rudder appears broken in the sea, but straight out of it; and the egg in the bird is soft, but in the air hard; and the lyngurion is a fluid in the lynx, but is hard in the air; and the coral is soft in the sea, but hard in the air; and a tone of voice appears different produced by a syrinx, and by a flute, and different simply in the air. <sup>120</sup> Also in reference to position, the same picture leaned back appears smooth, and leaned forward a little seems to have hollows and protuberances, and the necks of doves appear different in color according to the difference in inclination. <sup>121</sup> Since then all phenomena are seen in relation to place, distance, and position, each of which relation makes a great difference with the idea, as we have mentioned, we shall be obliged by this Trope also to come to the suspension of judgment. For he who wishes to give preference to certain ones of these ideas will attempt the impossible. <sup>122</sup> For if he simply makes the decision without proof he will be untrustworthy. If, however, he wishes to make use of a proof, should he say that the proof is false, he contradicts himself, but if he declares the proof to be true, proof of its proof will be demanded of him, and another proof for that, which proof also must be true, and so on to the *regressus in infinitum*. It is impossible, however, to present proofs *in infinitum*, <sup>123</sup> so that one will not be able to prove that one idea is to be preferred to another. Since then one cannot either without proof or with proof judge the ideas in question, the suspension of judgment results, and how each thing appears according to this or that position, or this or that distance, or this or that place, we perhaps are able to say, but what it really is it is impossible to declare, for the reasons which we have mentioned.

#### THE SIXTH TROPE.

<sup>124</sup> The sixth Trope is the one based upon mixtures, according to which we conclude that since no object presents itself alone, but always together with something else, it is perhaps possible to say of what nature the mixture is, of the thing itself, and of that with which it is seen, but of what sort the external object really is we shall not be able to say. Now it is evident, I think, that nothing from without is known to us by itself, but always with something else, and that because of this fact it appears different. <sup>125</sup> The color of our skin, for example, is different seen in warm air from what it is in cold, and we could not say what our color really is, only what it is when viewed under each of these conditions. The same sound appears different in rare air from what it is in dense, and aromas are more overpowering in the warm bath and in the sun than they are in the cold air, and a body surrounded by water is light, but by air heavy. <sup>126</sup> Leaving aside, however, outer mixtures, our eyes have inside of them coatings and humors. Since then visible things are not seen without these, they will

not be accurately comprehended, for it is the mixture that we perceive, and for this reason those who have the jaundice see everything yellow, and those with bloodshot eyes bloody. Since the same sound appears different in broad open places from what it does in narrow and winding ones, and different in pure air and in impure, it is probable that we do not perceive the tones unmixed; for the ears have narrow winding passages filled with vaporous secretions, which it is said gather from places around the head.<sup>127</sup> Since also there are substances present in the nostrils and in the seat of the sense of taste, we perceive the things smelled and the things tasted in connection with them, and not unmixed. So that because of mixture the senses do not perceive accurately what the external objects are.<sup>128</sup> The intellect even does not do this, chiefly because its guides, the senses, make mistakes, and perhaps it itself adds a certain special mixture to those messages communicated by the senses; for in each place where the Dogmatics think that the ruling faculty is situated, we see that certain humors are present, whether one would locate it in the region of the brain, in the region of the heart, or somewhere else. Since therefore according to this Trope also, we see that we cannot say anything regarding the nature of external objects, we are obliged to suspend our judgment.

#### THE SEVENTH TROPE.

<sup>129</sup> The seventh Trope is the one which, as we said, is based upon the quantity and constitution of objects, constitution commonly meaning composition. And it is evident that we are obliged to suspend our judgment according to this Trope also in regard to the nature of things. As for example, filings from the horn of the goat appear white when they are seen separately and without being put together; put together, however, in the form of a horn, they look black. And the parts of silver, the filings that is, by themselves appear black, but as a whole appear white;<sup>130</sup> and parts of the Taenarus stone look white when ground, but in the whole stone appear yellow; grains of sand scattered apart from each other appear to be rough, but put together in a heap, they produce a soft feeling; hellebore taken fine and downy, causes choking, but it no longer does so when taken coarse;<sup>131</sup> wine also taken moderately strengthens us, but when taken in excess relaxes the body; food similarly, has a different effect according to the quantity, at least, it often disturbs the body when too much is taken, causing dyspepsia and discharge.<sup>132</sup> We shall be able here also to say of what kind the cutting from the horn is, and what many cuttings put together are, of what kind a filing of silver is, and what many of them put together are, of what kind the tiny Taenarus stone, and what one composed of many small ones is, and in regard to the grains of sand, and the hellebore, and the wine, and the food, what they are in relation, but no longer the nature of the thing by itself, because of the

anomaly in the ideas which we have of things, according to the way in which they are put together. <sup>133</sup> In general it appears that useful things become harmful when an intemperate use is made of them, and things that seem harmful when taken in excess, are not injurious in a small quantity. What we see in the effect of medicines witnesses especially to this fact, as an exact mixture of simple remedies makes a compound which is helpful, but sometimes when a very small inclination of the balance is overlooked, the medicine is not only not helpful, but very harmful, and often poisonous. <sup>134</sup> So the argument based upon the quantity and constitution of objects, puts in confusion the existence of external objects. Therefore this Trope naturally leads us to suspend our judgment, as we are not able to declare exactly the nature of external objects.

### THE EIGHTH TROPE.

<sup>135</sup> The eighth Trope is the one based upon relation, from which we conclude to suspend our judgment as to what things are absolutely, in their nature, since every thing is in relation to something else. And we must bear in mind that we use the word *is* incorrectly, in place of *appears*, meaning to say, every thing *appears* to be in relation. This is said, however, with two meanings: first, that every thing is in relation to the one who judges, for the external object, *i.e.* the thing judged, appears to be in relation to the judge; the other way is that every thing is in relation to the things considered together with it, as the relation of the right hand to the left. <sup>136</sup> But we came to the conclusion above, that every thing is in relation to something, as for example, to the one judging; each thing appears in relation to this or that animal, and this or that man, and this or that sense, and in certain circumstances; as regards things considered together, also, each thing appears in relation to this or that mixture, and this or that Trope, and this or that composition, quantity and place. <sup>137</sup> And in another way it is possible to conclude that every thing is in relation to something, as follows: does the being in difference differ from the being in relation, or not? If it does not differ, then it is the same as relation; if it does differ, since every thing which differs is in some relation, for it is said to be in relation to that from which it differs, those things which are in a difference are in a relation to something. <sup>138</sup> Now according to the Dogmatics, some beings belong to the highest genera, others to the lowest species, and others to both genera and species at the same time; all of these are in relation to something, therefore every thing is in relation to something. Furthermore, among things, some things are manifest, and others are hidden, as the Dogmatics themselves say, and the things that make themselves known to us are the phenomena, and the things that are made known to us by the phenomena are the hidden things, for according to the Dogmatics, the phenomena are the

outward appearance of the unknown; then that which makes known, and that which is made known, are in relation to something; every thing, therefore, is in relation to something. <sup>139</sup> In addition to this, some things are similar to each other, and others are dissimilar, some are equal, and others are unequal. Now these things are in relation to something, therefore every thing is in relation to something, and whoever says that every thing is not in relation to something, himself establishes the fact that every thing is in relation to something, for even in saying that every thing is not in relation to something, he proves it in reference to us, and not in general, by his objections to us. <sup>140</sup> In short, as we have shown that every thing is in relation to something, it is then evident that we shall not be able to say exactly what each object is by nature, but what it appears to be like in relation to something else. It follows from this, that we must suspend our judgment regarding the nature of things.

#### THE NINTH TROPE.

<sup>141</sup> In regard to the Trope based on the frequency and rarity of events, which we call the ninth of the series, we give the following explanation: The sun is certainly a much more astonishing thing than a comet, but because we see the sun continually and the comet rarely we are so much astonished at the comet that it even seems an omen, while we are not at all astonished at the sun. If, however, we should imagine the sun appearing at rare intervals, and at rare intervals setting, in the first instance suddenly lighting up all things, and in the second casting everything into shade, we should see great astonishment at the sight. <sup>142</sup> An earthquake, too, does not trouble those who experience it for the first time in the same manner as those who have become accustomed to it. How great the astonishment of a man who beholds the sea for the first time! And the beauty of the human body, seen suddenly for the first time, moves us more than if we are accustomed to seeing it. <sup>143</sup> That which is rare seems valuable, while things that are familiar and easily obtained seem by no means so. If, for example, we should imagine water as rare, of how much greater value would it seem than all other valuable things! or if we imagine gold as simply thrown about on the ground in large quantities like stones, to whom do we think it would be valuable, or by whom would it be hoarded, as it is now? <sup>144</sup> Since then the same things according to the frequency or rarity that they are met with seem to be now valuable and now not so, we conclude that it may be that we shall be able to say what kind of a thing each of them appears to be according to the frequency or rarity with which it occurs, but we are not able to say what each external object is absolutely. Therefore, according to this Trope also, we suspend our judgment regarding these things.

## THE TENTH TROPE.

<sup>145</sup> The tenth Trope is the one principally connected with morals, relating to schools, customs, laws, mythical beliefs, and dogmatic opinions. Now a school is a choice of a manner of life, or of something held by one or many, as for example the school of Diogenes or the Laconians. <sup>146</sup> A law is a written contract among citizens, the transgressor of which is punished. A custom or habit, for there is no difference, is a common acceptance of a certain thing by many, the deviator from which is in no wise punished. For example, it is a law not to commit adultery, and it is a custom with us τὸ μὴ δημοσίᾳ γυναικὶ μίγνυσθαι. <sup>147</sup> A mythical belief is a tradition regarding things which never took place, but were invented, as among others, the tales about Cronus, for many are led to believe them. A dogmatic opinion is the acceptance of something that seems to be established by a course of reasoning, or by some proof, as for example, that atoms are elements of things, and that they are either homogeneous, or infinitesimal, or of some other description. <sup>148</sup> Now we place each of these things sometimes in opposition to itself, and sometimes in opposition to each one of the others. For example, we place a custom in opposition to a custom thus: some of the Ethiopians tattoo new-born children, but we do not, and the Persians think it is seemly to have a garment of many colors and reaching to the feet, but we think it not so. The Indians ταῖς γυναιξὶ δημοσίᾳ μίγνυνται, but most of the other nations consider it a shame. <sup>149</sup> We place a law in opposition to a law in this way: among the Romans he who renounces his paternal inheritance does not pay his father's debts, but among the Rhodians he pays them in any case; and among the Tauri in Scythia it was a law to offer strangers in sacrifice to Artemis, but with us it is forbidden to kill a man near a temple. <sup>150</sup> We place a school in opposition to a school when we oppose the school of Diogenes to that of Aristippus, or that of the Laconians to that of the Italians. We place a mythical belief in opposition to a mythical belief, as by some traditions Jupiter is said to be the father of men and gods, and by others Oceanus, as we say—

“Oceanus father of the gods, and Tethys the mother.”

<sup>151</sup> We place dogmatic opinions in opposition to each other, when we say that some declare that there is only one element, but others that they are infinite in number, and some that the soul is mortal, others that it is immortal; and some say that our affairs are directed by the providence of the gods, but others that there is no providence. <sup>152</sup> We place custom in opposition to other things, as for example to a law, when we say that among the Persians it is the custom to practice ἀρρενομξίαι, but among the Romans it is forbidden by law to do it; by us adultery is forbidden, but among the Massagetæ indifference in



this respect is allowed by custom, as Eudoxos of Cnidus relates in the first part of his book of travels; among us it is forbidden *μητράσι μίγνυσθαι*, but among the Persians it is the custom by preference to marry so; the Egyptians marry sisters also, which among us is forbidden by law. <sup>153</sup> Further, we place a custom in opposition to a school, when we say that most men *ἀναχωροῦντες μίγνύονται ταῖς ἐαυτῶν γυναιξίν*, ὁ δὲ Κράτης τῆ Ἰππαρχία δημοσία, and Diogenes went around with one shoulder bare, but we go around with our customary clothes. <sup>154</sup> We place a custom in opposition to a mythical belief, as when the myths say that Cronus ate his own children, while with us it is the custom to take care of our children; and among us it is the custom to venerate the gods as good, and not liable to evil, but they are described by the poets as being wounded, and also as being jealous of each other. <sup>155</sup> We place a custom in opposition to a dogmatic opinion when we say that it is a custom with us to seek good things from the gods, but that Epicurus says that the divine pays no heed to us; Aristippus also held it to be a matter of indifference to wear a woman's robe, but we consider it shameful. <sup>156</sup> We place a school in opposition to a law, as according to the law it is not allowed to beat a free and noble born man, but the wrestlers and boxers strike each other according to the teaching of their manner of life, and although murder is forbidden, the gladiators kill each other for the same reason. <sup>157</sup> We place a mythical belief in opposition to a school when we say that, although the myths say of Hercules that in company with Omphale—

“He carded wool, and bore servitude,”

and did things that not even an ordinary good man would have done, yet Hercules' theory of life was noble. <sup>158</sup> We place a mythical belief in opposition to a dogmatic opinion when we say that athletes seeking after glory as a good, enter for its sake upon a laborious profession, but many philosophers, on the other hand, teach that glory is worthless. <sup>159</sup> We place law in opposition to mythical belief when we say the poets represent the gods as working adultery and sin, but among us the law forbids those things. <sup>160</sup> We place law in opposition to dogmatic opinion when we say that the followers of Chrysippus hold that it is a matter of indifference to marry one's mother or sister, but the law forbids these things. <sup>161</sup> We place a mythical belief in opposition to a dogmatic opinion when we say that the poets represent Jupiter as descending and holding intercourse with mortal women, but the Dogmatics think this was impossible; <sup>162</sup> also that the poet says that Jupiter, on account of his sorrow for Sarpedon, rained drops of blood upon the earth, but it is a dogma of the philosophers that the divine is exempt from suffering; and they deny the myth of the horse-centaurs, giving us the horse-centaur as an example of non-existence.

<sup>163</sup> Now we could give many other examples of each of the antitheses mentioned above, but for a brief argument, these are sufficient. Since, however, such anomaly of things is shown by this Trope also, we shall not be able to say what objects are by nature, but only what each thing appears to be like, according to this or that school, or this or that law, or this or that custom, or according to each of the other conditions. Therefore, by this Trope also, we must suspend our judgment in regard to the nature of external objects. Thus we arrive at *ἐποχή* through the ten Tropes.

## CHAPTER XV.

### *The Five Tropes.*

<sup>164</sup> The later Sceptics, however, teach the following five Tropes of *ἐποχή*: first, the one based upon contradiction; second, the *regressus in infinitum*; third, relation; fourth, the hypothetical; fifth, the *circulus in probando*. <sup>165</sup> The one based upon contradiction is the one from which we find, that in reference to the thing put before us for investigation, a position has been developed which is impossible to be judged, either practically, or theoretically, and therefore, as we are not able to either accept or reject anything, we end in suspending the judgment. <sup>166</sup> The one based upon the *regressus in infinitum* is that in which we say that the proof brought forward for the thing set before us calls for another proof, and that one another, and so on to infinity, so that, not having anything from which to begin the reasoning, the suspension of judgment follows. <sup>167</sup> The one based upon relation, as we have said before, is that one in which the object appears of this kind or that kind, as related to the judge and to the things regarded together with it, but we suspend our judgment as to what it is in reality. <sup>168</sup> The one based upon hypothesis is illustrated by the Dogmatics, when in the *regressus in infinitum* they begin from something that they do not found on reason, but which they simply take for granted without proof. <sup>169</sup> The Trope, *circulus in probando*, arises when the thing which ought to prove the thing sought for, needs to be sustained by the thing sought for, and as we are unable to take the one for the proof of the other, we suspend our judgment in regard to both. Now we shall briefly show that it is possible to refer every thing under investigation to one or another of these Tropes, as follows: <sup>170</sup> the thing before us is either sensible or intellectual; difference of opinion exists, however, as to what it is in itself, for some say that only the things of sense are true, others, only those belonging to the understanding, and others say that some things of sense, and some of thought, are true. Now, will it be said that this difference of opinion can be judged or cannot be judged? If it cannot be judged, then we have the result necessarily of suspension of judgment, because it is impossible to express opinion in

regard to things about which a difference of opinion exists which cannot be judged. If it can be judged, then we ask how it is to be judged? <sup>171</sup> For example, the sensible, for we shall limit the argument first to this—Is it to be judged by sensible or by intellectual standards? For if it is to be judged by a sensible one, since we are in doubt about the sensible, that will also need something else to sustain it; and if that proof is also something sensible, something else will again be necessary to prove it, and so on *in infinitum*. <sup>172</sup> If, on the contrary, the sensible must be judged by something intellectual, as there is disagreement in regard to the intellectual, this intellectual thing will require also judgment and proof. Now, how is it to be proved? If by something intellectual, it will likewise be thrown into *infinitum*; if by something sensible, as the intellectual has been taken for the proof of the sensible, and the sensible has been taken for that of the intellectual, the *circulus in probando* is introduced. <sup>173</sup> If, however, in order to escape from this, the one who is speaking to us expects us to take something for granted which has not been proved, in order to prove what follows, the hypothetical Trope is introduced, which provides no way of escape. For if the one who makes the hypothesis is worthy of confidence, we should in every case be no less worthy of confidence in making a contrary hypothesis. If the one who makes the assumption assumes something true, he makes it suspicious by using it as a hypothesis, and not as an established fact; if it is false, the foundation of the reasoning is unsound. <sup>174</sup> If a hypothesis is any help towards a trustworthy result, let the thing in question itself be assumed, and not something else, by which, forsooth, one would establish the thing under discussion. If it is absurd to assume the thing questioned, it is also absurd to assume that upon which it rests. <sup>175</sup> That all things belonging to the senses are also in relation to something else is evident, because they are in relation to those who perceive them. It is clear then, that whatever thing of sense is brought before us, it may be easily referred to one of the five Tropes. And we come to a similar conclusion in regard to intellectual things. For if it should be said that there is a difference of opinion regarding them which cannot be judged, it will be granted that we must suspend the judgment concerning it. <sup>176</sup> In case the difference of opinion can be judged, if it is judged through anything intellectual, we fall into the *regressus in infinitum*, and if through anything sensible into the *circulus in probando*; for, as the sensible is again subject to difference of opinion, and cannot be judged by the sensible on account of the *regressus in infinitum*, it will have need of the intellectual, just as the intellectual has need of the sensible. <sup>177</sup> But he who accepts anything which is hypothetical again is absurd. Intellectual things stand also in relation, because the form in which they are expressed depends on the mind of

the thinker, and, if they were in reality exactly as they are described, there would not have been any difference of opinion about them. Therefore the intellectual also is brought under the five Tropes, and consequently it is necessary to suspend the judgment altogether with regard to every thing that is brought before us. Such are the five Tropes taught by the later Sceptics. They set them forth, not to throw out the ten Tropes, but in order to put to shame the audacity of the Dogmatics in a variety of ways, by these Tropes as well as by those.

## CHAPTER XVI.

### *The Two Tropes.*

<sup>178</sup> Two other Tropes of ἐποχή are also taught. For as it appears that everything that is comprehended is either comprehended through itself or through something else, it is thought that this fact introduces doubt in regard to all things. And that nothing can be understood through itself is evident, it is said, from the disagreement which exists altogether among the physicists in regard to sensible and intellectual things. I mean, of course, a disagreement which cannot be judged, as we are not able to use a sensible or an intellectual criterion in judging it, for everything that we would take has a part in the disagreement, and is untrustworthy. <sup>179</sup> Nor is it conceded that anything can be comprehended through something else; for if a thing is comprehended through something, that must always in turn be comprehended through something else, and the *regressus in infinitum* or the *circulus in probando* follow. If, on the contrary, a thing is comprehended through something that one wishes to use as if it had been comprehended through itself, this is opposed to the fact that nothing can be comprehended through itself, according to what we have said. We do not know how that which contradicts itself can be comprehended, either through itself or through something else, as no criterion of the truth or of comprehension appears, and signs without proof would be rejected, as we shall see in the next book. So much will suffice for the present about suspension of judgment.

## CHAPTER XVII.

### *What are the Tropes for the overturning of Aetiology?*

<sup>180</sup> In the same manner as we teach the Tropes of ἐποχή, some set forth Tropes through which we oppose the Dogmatics, by expressing doubt in regard to the aetiology of which they are especially proud. So Aenesidemus teaches eight Tropes, by which he thinks that he can prove all the dogmatic aetiology useless. <sup>181</sup> The first of these Tropes, he said, relates to the character of aetiology in general, which does not give incontestable testimony in regard to phenomena, because it treats of unseen things. The second Trope states that although abundant

resources exist by which to investigate the cause of a thing in question, some Dogmatics investigate it in one way only. <sup>182</sup> The third Trope states that the Dogmatics assign causes which do not show any order for things which have taken place in an orderly manner. The fourth Trope states that the Dogmatics, accepting phenomena as they take place, think that they also understand how unseen things take place, although perhaps the unseen things have taken place in the same way as the phenomena, and perhaps in some other way peculiar to themselves. <sup>183</sup> The fifth Trope states that they all, so to speak, assign causes according to their own hypotheses about the elements, but not according to any commonly accepted methods. The sixth states that they often explain things investigated according to their own hypotheses, but ignore opposing hypotheses which have equal probability. <sup>184</sup> The seventh states that they often give reasons for things that not only conflict with phenomena, but also with their own hypotheses. The eighth states that although that which seems manifest, and that which is to be investigated, are often equally inscrutable, they build up a theory from the one about the other, although both are equally inscrutable. <sup>185</sup> It is not impossible, Aenesidemus said also, that some Dogmatics should fail in their theories of causality from other combinations of reasons deducible from the Tropes given above. Perhaps also the five Tropes of ἐποχή are sufficient to refute aetiology, for he who proposes a cause will propose one which is either in harmony with all the sects of philosophy, with Scepticism, and with phenomena, or one that is not. Perhaps, however, it is not possible that a cause should be in harmony with them, for phenomena and unknown things altogether disagree with each other. <sup>186</sup> If it is not in harmony with them, the reason of this will also be demanded of the one who proposed it; and if he accepts a phenomenon as the cause of a phenomenon, or something unknown as the cause of the unknown, he will be thrown into the *regressus in infinitum*; if he uses one cause to account for another one, into the *circulus in probando*; but if he stops anywhere, he will either say that the cause that he proposes holds good so far as regards the things that have been said, and introduce relation, abolishing an absolute standpoint; or if he accepts anything by hypothesis, he will be attacked by us. Therefore it is perhaps possible to put the temerity of the Dogmatics to shame in aetiology by these Tropes.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

### *The Sceptical Formulae.*

<sup>187</sup> When we use any one of these Tropes, or the Tropes of ἐποχή, we employ with them certain formulae which show the Sceptical method and our own feeling, as for instance, the sayings, “No more,”

“One must determine nothing,” and certain others. It is fitting therefore to treat of these in this place. Let us begin with “No more.”

## CHAPTER XIX.

### *The Formula “No more.”*

<sup>188</sup> We sometimes express this as I have given it, and sometimes thus, “Nothing more.” For we do not accept the “No more,” as some understand it, for the examination of the special, and “Nothing more” for that of the general, but we use “No more” and “Nothing more” without any difference, and we shall at present treat of them as one and the same expression. Now this formula is defective, for as when we say a double one we really mean a double garment, and when we say a broad one we really mean a broad road; so when we say “No more” we mean really no more than this, or in every way the same. <sup>189</sup> But some of the Sceptics use instead of the interrogation “No?” the interrogation “What, this rather than this?” using the word “what” in the sense of “what is the reason,” so that the formula means, “What is the reason for this rather than for this?” It is a customary thing, however, to use an interrogation instead of a statement, as “Who of the mortals does not know the wife of Jupiter?” and also to use a statement instead of an interrogation, as “I seek where Dion dwells,” and “I ask why one should admire a poet.” The word “what” is also used instead of “what for” by Menander—“(For) what did I remain behind?” <sup>190</sup> The formula “Not more this than this” expresses our own condition of mind, and signifies that because of the equality of the things that are opposed to each other we finally attain to a state of equilibrium of soul. We mean by equality that equality which appears to us as probable, by things placed in opposition to each other we mean simply things which conflict with each other, and by a state of equilibrium we mean a state in which we do not assent to one thing more than to another. <sup>191</sup> Even if the formula “Nothing more” seems to express assent or denial, we do not use it so, but we use it loosely, and not with accuracy, either instead of an interrogation or instead of saying, “I do not know to which of these I would assent, and to which I would not.” What lies before us is to express what appears to us, but we are indifferent to the words by which we express it. This must be understood, however, that we use the formula “Nothing more” without affirming in regard to it that it is wholly sure and true, but we present it as it appears to us.

## CHAPTER XX.

### *Aphasia.*

<sup>192</sup> We explain Aphasia as follows: The word *φάσις* is used in two ways, having a general and a special signification. According to the

general signification, it expresses affirmation or negation, as “It is day” or “It is not day”; according to the special signification, it expresses an affirmation only, and negations are not called *φάσεις*. Now Aphasia is the opposite of *φάσεις* in its general signification, which, as we said, comprises both affirmation and negation. It follows that Aphasia is a condition of mind, according to which we say that we neither affirm nor deny anything.<sup>193</sup> It is evident from this that we do not understand by Aphasia something that inevitably results from the nature of things, but we mean that we now find ourselves in the condition of mind expressed by it in regard to the things that are under investigation. It is necessary to remember that we do not say that we affirm or deny any of those things that are dogmatically stated in regard to the unknown, for we yield assent only to those things which affect our feelings and oblige us to assent to them.

#### CHAPTER XXI.

*“Perhaps,” and “It is possible,” and “It may be.”*

<sup>194</sup> The formulae “Perhaps,” and “Perhaps not,” and “It is possible,” and “It is not possible,” and “It may be,” and “It may not be,” we use instead of “Perhaps it is,” and “Perhaps it is not,” and “It is possible that it is,” and “It is possible that it is not,” and “It may be that it is,” and “It may be that it is not.” That is, we use the formula “It is not possible” for the sake of brevity, instead of saying “It is not possible to be,” and “It may not be” instead of “It may not be that it is,” and “Perhaps not” instead of “Perhaps it is not.”<sup>195</sup> Again, we do not here dispute about words, neither do we question if the formulae mean these things absolutely, but we use them loosely, as I said before. Yet I think it is evident that these formulae express Aphasia. For certainly the formula “Perhaps it is” really includes that which seems to contradict it, *i.e.* the formula “Perhaps it is not,” because it does not affirm in in regard to anything that it is really so. It is the same also in regard to the others.

#### CHAPTER XXII.

*ἐποχή or the Suspension of Judgment.*

<sup>196</sup> When I say that I suspend my judgment, I mean that I cannot say which of those things presented should be believed, and which should not be believed, showing that things appear equal to me in respect to trustworthiness and untrustworthiness. Now we do not affirm that they are equal, but we state what appears to us in regard to them at the time when they present themselves to us. *ἐποχή* means the holding back of the opinion, so as neither to affirm nor deny anything because of the equality of the things in question.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

### *The Formula "I determine Nothing."*

<sup>197</sup> In regard to the formula "I determine nothing," we say the following: By "determine" we mean, not simply to speak, but to give assent to an affirmation with regard to some unknown thing. For it will soon be found that the Sceptic determines nothing, not even the formula "I determine nothing," for this formula is not a dogmatic opinion, that is an assent to something unknown, but an expression declaring what our condition of mind is. When, for example, the Sceptic says, "I determine nothing," he means this: "According to my present feeling I can assert or deny nothing dogmatically regarding the things under investigation," and in saying this he expresses what appears to him in reference to the things under discussion. He does not express himself positively, but he states what he feels.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

### *The Formula "Every thing is Undetermined."*

<sup>198</sup> The expression "Indetermination" furthermore shows a state of mind in which we neither deny nor affirm positively anything regarding things that are investigated in a dogmatic way, that is the things that are unknown. When then the Sceptic says "Every thing is undetermined," he uses "is undetermined," in the sense of "it appears undetermined to him." The words "every thing" do not mean all existences, but those that he has examined of the unknown things that are investigated by the Dogmatists. By "undetermined," he means that there is no preference in the things that are placed in opposition to each other, or that they simply conflict with each other in respect to trustworthiness or untrustworthiness. <sup>199</sup> And as the one who says "I am walking" really means "It is I that am walking," so he who says "Every thing is undetermined" means at the same time, according to our teachings, "as far as I am concerned," or "as it appears to me," as if he were saying "As far as I have examined the things that are under investigation in a dogmatic manner, it appears to me that no one of them excels the one which conflicts with it in trustworthiness or untrustworthiness."

## CHAPTER XXV.

### *The Formula "Every thing is Incomprehensible."*

<sup>200</sup> We treat the formula "Every thing is incomprehensible" in the same way. For "every thing" we interpret in the same way as above, and we supply the words "to me" so that what we say is this: "As far as I have inspected the unknown things which are dogmatically examined, it appears to me that every thing is incomprehensible." This



is not, however, to affirm that the things which are examined by the Dogmatists are of such a nature as to be necessarily incomprehensible, but one expresses his own feeling in saying “I see that I have not thus far comprehended any of those things because of the equilibrium of the things that are placed in opposition to each other.” Whence it seems to me that every thing that has been brought forward to dispute our formulae has fallen wide of the mark.

#### CHAPTER XXVI.

*The Formulae “I do not comprehend” and “I do not understand.”*

<sup>201</sup> The formulae “I do not comprehend” and “I do not understand” show a condition of mind in which the Sceptic stands aloof for the present from asserting or denying anything in regard to the unknown things under investigation, as is evident from what we said before about the other formulae.

#### CHAPTER XXVII.

*The Formula “To place an equal Statement in opposition to every Statement.”*

<sup>202</sup> Furthermore, when we say “Every statement may have an equal statement placed in opposition to it,” by “every,” we mean all the statements that we have examined; we do not use the word “statement” simply, but for a statement which seeks to prove something dogmatically about things that are unknown, and not at all one that shows a process of reasoning from premises and conclusions, but something which is put together in any sort of way. We use the word “equal” in reference to trustworthiness or untrustworthiness. “Is placed in opposition” we use instead of the common expression “to conflict with,” and we supply “as it appears to me.” <sup>203</sup> When therefore one says, “It seems to me that every statement which I have examined, which proves something dogmatically, may have another statement placed in opposition to it which also proves something dogmatically, and which is equal to it in trustworthiness and untrustworthiness,” this is not asserted dogmatically, but is an expression of human feeling as it appears to the one who feels it. <sup>204</sup> Some Sceptics express the formula as follows: “Every statement should have an equal one placed in opposition to it,” demanding it authoritatively thus: “Let us place in opposition to every statement that proves something dogmatically another conflicting statement which also seeks to prove something dogmatically, and is equal to it in trustworthiness and untrustworthiness.” Naturally this is directed to the Sceptics, but the infinitive should be used instead of the imperative, that is, “to oppose” instead of “let us oppose.” <sup>205</sup> This formula is recommended to the Sceptic, lest he should be deceived by

the Dogmatists and give up his investigations, and rashly fail of the ἀταραξία which is thought to accompany ἐποχή in regard to everything, as we have explained above.

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

### *General Observations on the Formulae of the Sceptics.*

<sup>206</sup> We have treated of a sufficient number of these formulae for an outline, especially since what we have said about those mentioned applies also to others that we have omitted. In regard to all the Sceptical formulae, it must be understood in advance that we do not affirm them to be absolutely true, because we say that they can even refute themselves, since they are themselves included in those things to which they refer, just as cathartic medicines not only purge the body of humors, but carry off themselves with the humors. <sup>207</sup> We say then that we use these formulae, not as literally making known the things for which they are used, but loosely, and if one wishes, inaccurately. It is not fitting for the Sceptic to dispute about words, especially as it contributes to our purpose to say that these formulae have no absolute meaning; their meaning is a relative one, that is, relative to the Sceptics. <sup>208</sup> Besides, it is to be remembered that we do not say them about all things in general, but about the unknown, and things that are dogmatically investigated, and that we say what appears to us, and that we do not express ourselves decidedly about the nature of external objects. By this means I think that every sophism brought against the Sceptical formulae can be overturned. <sup>209</sup> We have now shown the character of Scepticism by examining its idea, its parts, its criterion and aim, and also the Tropes of ἐποχή, and by treating of the Sceptical formulae. We think it therefore appropriate to enter briefly into the distinction between Scepticism and the nearly related schools of philosophy in order to more clearly understand the Sceptical School. We will begin with the philosophy of Heraclitus.

## CHAPTER XXIX.

### *In what does the Sceptical School differ from the Philosophy of Heraclitus?*

<sup>210</sup> Now that this school differs from ours is evident, for Heraclitus expresses himself about many unknown things dogmatically, which we do not, as has been said. Aenesidemus and his followers said that the Sceptical School is the way to the philosophy of Heraclitus. They gave as a reason for this that the statement that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing, leads the way to the statement that contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the same thing; and as the Sceptics say that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing, the Heraclitans proceed

from this to the doctrine that such predicates are in reality applicable. We reply to this that the statement that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing is not a dogma of the Sceptics, but is a fact that presents itself not only to the Sceptics, but to other philosophers, and to all men. <sup>211</sup> No one, for instance, would venture to say that honey does not taste sweet to those in health, and bitter to those who have the jaundice, so that the Heraclitans start from a preconception common to all men, as do we also, and perhaps the other schools of philosophy likewise. If, however, they had attributed the origin of the statement that contradictory predicates are present in the same thing to any of the Sceptical teachings, as, for example, to the formula "Every thing is incomprehensible," or "I determine nothing," or any of the other similar ones, it may be that which they say would follow; but since they start from that which is a common experience, not only to us, but to other philosophers, and in life, why should one say that our school is a path to the philosophy of Heraclitus more than any of the other schools of philosophy, or than life itself, as we all make use of the same subject matter? <sup>212</sup> On the other hand, the Sceptical School may not only fail to help towards the knowledge of the philosophy of Heraclitus, but may even hinder it! For the Sceptic attacks all the dogmas of Heraclitus as having been rashly given, and opposes on the one hand the doctrine of conflagration, and on the other, the doctrine that contradictory predicates in reality apply to the same thing, and in regard to every dogma of Heraclitus he scorns his dogmatic rashness, and then, in the manner that I have before referred to, adduces the formulae "I do not understand" and "I determine nothing," which conflict with the Heraclitan doctrines. It is absurd to say that this conflicting school is a path to the very sect with which it conflicts. It is then absurd to say that the Sceptical School is a path to the philosophy of Heraclitus.

### CHAPTER XXX.

#### *In what does the Sceptical School differ from the Philosophy of Democritus?*

<sup>213</sup> The philosophy of Democritus is also said to have community with Scepticism, because it seems to use the same matter that we do. For, from the fact that honey seems sweet to some and bitter to others, Democritus reasons, it is said, that honey is neither sweet nor bitter, and therefore he accords with the formula "No more," which is a formula of the Sceptics. But the Sceptics and the Democritans use the formula "No more" differently from each other, for they emphasise the negation in the expression, but we, the not knowing whether both of the phenomena exist or neither one, <sup>214</sup> and so we differ in this respect. The distinction, however, becomes most evident when

Democritus says that atoms and empty space are real, for by real he means existing in reality. Now, although he begins with the anomaly in phenomena, yet, since he says that atoms and empty space really exist, it is superfluous, I think, even to say that he differs from us.

#### CHAPTER XXXI.

*In what does Scepticism differ from the Cyrenaic Philosophy?*

<sup>215</sup> Some say that the Cyrenaic School is the same as the Sceptical, because that school also claims to comprehend only conditions of mind. It differs, however, from it, because, while the former makes pleasure and the gentle motion of the flesh its aim, we make *ἀταραξία* ours, and this is opposed to the aim of their school. For whether pleasure is present or not, confusion awaits him who maintains that pleasure is an aim, as I have shown in what I said about the aim. And then, in addition, we suspend our judgment as far as the reasoning with regard to external objects is concerned, but the Cyrenaics pronounce the nature of these inscrutable.

#### CHAPTER XXXII.

*In what does Scepticism differ from the Philosophy of Protagoras?*

<sup>216</sup> Protagoras makes man the measure of all things, of things that are that they are, and things that are not that they are not, meaning by measure, criterion, and by things, events, that is to say really, man is the criterion for all events, of things that are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not. And for that reason he accepts only the phenomena that appear to each man, and thus he introduces relation. <sup>217</sup> Therefore he seems to have community with the Pyrrhoneans. He differs, however, from them, and we shall see the difference after we have somewhat explained how things seemed to Protagoras. He says, for example, that matter is fluid, and as it flows, additions are constantly made in the place of that which is carried away; the perceptions also are arranged anew and changed, according to the age and according to other conditions of the body. <sup>218</sup> He says also, that the reasons of all phenomena are present in matter, so that matter can be all that it appears to be to all men as far as its power is concerned. Men, however, apprehend differently at different times, according to the different conditions that they are in; for he that is in a natural condition will apprehend those qualities in matter that can appear to those who are in a natural condition, while on the contrary, those who are in an unnatural condition will apprehend those qualities that can appear to the abnormal. <sup>219</sup> Furthermore, the same reasoning would hold true in regard to differences in age, to sleeping and waking, and each of the other different conditions. Therefore man becomes the criterion of things that are, for all things that appear to

men exist for men, and those things that do not appear to any one among men do not exist. We see that he dogmatizes in saying that matter is fluid, and also in saying that the reasons for all phenomena have their foundation in matter, while these things are unknown, and to us are things regarding which we suspend our judgment.

### CHAPTER XXXIII.

#### *In what does Scepticism differ from the Academic Philosophy?*

<sup>220</sup> Some say further that the Academic philosophy is the same as Scepticism, therefore it seems appropriate to me to treat of that also. There have been, as the most say, three Academies—the most ancient one, that of Plato and his followers; the second and middle one, that of Arcesilaus and his followers, Arcesilaus being the pupil of Polemo; the third and new Academy, that of Carneades and Clitomachus and their followers; some add also a fourth, that of Philo and Charmides, and their followers; and some count even a fifth, that of Antiochus and his followers. <sup>221</sup> Beginning then from the old Academy, let us consider the difference between the schools of philosophy mentioned. Now some have said that Plato was a Dogmatic, others that he was a Sceptic, and others that he was in some things a Sceptic and in some things a Dogmatic. For in the fencing dialogues, where Socrates is introduced as either making sport of someone or contending against the Sophists, Plato has, they say, a fencing and sceptical character, but he is dogmatic when he expresses himself seriously, either through Socrates or Timaeus or any such person. <sup>222</sup> In regard to those who say that he is a Dogmatic, or a Dogmatic in some things and a Sceptic in others, it would be superfluous, it seems to me, to speak now, for they themselves grant that he is different from us. The question as to whether he was really a Sceptic or not we treat more fully in the Memoranda, but here we state briefly that according to Menodotus and Aenesidemus (for these especially defended this position) Plato dogmatizes when he expresses himself regarding ideas, and regarding the existence of Providence, and when he states that the virtuous life is more to be chosen than the one of vice. If he assents to these things as true, he dogmatizes; or even if he accepts them as more probable than otherwise he departs from the sceptical character, since he gives a preference to one thing above another in trustworthiness or untrustworthiness; for how foreign this is to us is evident from what we have said before. <sup>223</sup> Even if when he performs mental gymnastics, as they say, he expresses some things sceptically, he is not because of this a Sceptic. For he who dogmatizes about one thing, or, in short, gives preference to one mental image over another in trustworthiness or untrustworthiness in respect to anything that is unknown, is a Dogmatic in character, as Timon shows by what he said of

Xenophanes. <sup>224</sup> For after having praised Xenophanes in many things, and even after having dedicated his Satires to him, he made him mourn and say—

“Would that I also might gain that mind profound,  
Able to look both ways. In a treacherous path have I been  
decoyed,  
And still in old age am with all wisdom unwed.  
For wherever I turned my view  
All things were resolved into unity; all things, always  
From all sources drawn, were merged into nature the same.”

Timon calls him somewhat, but not entirely, free from vanity, when he said—

“Xenophanes somewhat free from vanity, mocker of Homeric deceit,  
Far from men he conceived a god, on all sides equal,  
Above pain, a being spiritualised, or intellect.”

In saying that he was somewhat free from vanity, he meant that he was in some things free from vanity. He called him a mocker of the Homeric deceit because he had scoffed at the deceit in Homer. <sup>225</sup> Xenophanes also dogmatised, contrary to the assumptions of other men, that all things are one, and that God is grown together with all things, that He is spherical, insensible, unchangeable, and reasonable, whence the difference of Xenophanes from us is easily proved. In short, from what has been said, it is evident that although Plato expresses doubt about some things, so long as he has expressed himself in certain places in regard to the existence of unknown things, or as preferring some things to others in trustworthiness, he cannot be, it seems to me, a Sceptic. <sup>226</sup> Those of the New Academy, although they say that all things are incomprehensible, differ from the Sceptics, perhaps even in saying that all things are incomprehensible (for they assert decidedly in regard to this, but the Sceptic thinks it possible that some things may be comprehended), but they differ evidently still further from us in their judgment of good and evil. For the Academicians say that there is such a thing as good and evil, not as we say it, but more with the conviction that that which they call good exists than that it does not; and likewise in regard to the evil, while we do not say anything is good or evil with the conviction that it is probably so, but we live our lives in an unprejudiced way in order not to be inactive. <sup>227</sup> Moreover, we say that our ideas are equal to each other in trustworthiness and untrustworthiness, as far as their nature goes, while they say that some are probable and others improbable. They make a difference also between the improbable ones, for they believe that some of them are only probable, others probable and undisputed, still others probable, undisputed, and tested. As for example, when a coiled rope is lying in a somewhat dark room, he who comes in suddenly gets only a probable idea of it, and thinks that

it is a serpent; <sup>228</sup> but it appears to be a rope to him who has looked carefully around, and found out that it does not move, and that it is of such a color, and so on, according to an idea which is probable and undisputed. The tested idea is like this: It is said that Hercules led Alcestis after she was dead back again from Hades and showed her to Admetus, and he received an idea that was probable and undisputed regarding Alcestis. As, however, he knew that she was dead, his mind drew back from belief and inclined to disbelief. <sup>229</sup> Now those belonging to the New Academy prefer the idea which is probable and undisputed to the simply probable one. To both of these, however, they prefer that which is probable, undisputed, and tested. If, however, both those of the Academy and the Sceptics say that they believe certain things, there is an evident difference between the two schools of philosophy even in this; <sup>230</sup> for “to believe” is used in a different sense, meaning, on the one hand, not to resist, but simply to accept without strong inclination and approval, as the child is said to believe the teacher; on the other hand, “to believe” is used to signify assenting to something with choice, and, as it were, with the sympathy that accompanies strong will, as the prodigal follows the one who chooses to live a luxurious life. Therefore, since Carneades, Clitomachus, and their followers say that they are strongly inclined to believe that a thing is probable, and we simply allow that it may be so without assent, we differ from them, I think, in this way. <sup>231</sup> We differ from the New Academy likewise in things concerning the aim; for while the men who say that they govern themselves according to that School avail themselves of the idea of the probable in life, we live according to the laws and customs, and our natural feelings, in an unprejudiced way. We could say more regarding the distinction between the two schools if we did not aim at brevity. <sup>232</sup> Nevertheless, Arcesilaus, who as we said was the leader and chief of the Middle Academy, seems to me to have very much in common with the Pyrrhonian teachings, so that his school and ours are almost one. For neither does one find that he expressed an opinion about the existence or non-existence of anything, nor does he prefer one thing to another as regards trustworthiness or untrustworthiness; he suspends his judgment regarding all things, and the aim of his philosophy is *ἐποχή*, which is accompanied by *ἀταραξία*, and this agrees with what we have said. <sup>233</sup> But he calls the particular instances of *ἐποχή* *bona* [i.e., good], and the particular instances of assent *mala* [i.e., bad]. The difference is that we say these things according to what appears to us, and not affirmatively, while he says them as if speaking of realities, that is, he says that *ἐποχή* is in itself good, and assent an evil. <sup>234</sup> If we are to believe also the things that are said about him, he appeared at first sight to be a Pyrrhonian, but he was in truth a Dogmatic, for he used to test his

companions by the method of doubt to see whether they were gifted enough to take in Plato's dogmas, so that he appeared to be a Sceptic, but at the same time he communicated the doctrines of Plato to those of his companions who were gifted. Hence Ariston also said about him—

“Plato in front, Pyrrhon behind, Diodorus in the middle,”

because he availed himself of the dialectic of Diodorus, but was wholly a Platonist.<sup>235</sup> Now Philo and his followers say that as far as the Stoic criterion is concerned, that is to say the *φαντασία καταληπτική*, things are incomprehensible, but as far as the nature of things is concerned, they are comprehensible. Antiochus, however, transferred the Stoa to the Academy, so that it was even said of him that he taught the Stoic philosophy in the Academy, because he tried to show that the Stoic doctrines are found in Plato. The difference, therefore, between the Sceptical School and the Fourth and Fifth Academy is evident.

#### CHAPTER XXXIV.

##### *Is Empiricism in Medicine the same as Scepticism?*

<sup>236</sup> Some say that the medical sect called Empiricism is the same as Scepticism. Yet the fact must be recognised, that even if Empiricism does maintain the impossibility of knowledge, it is neither Scepticism itself, nor would it suit the Sceptic to take that sect upon himself. He could rather, it seems to me, belong to the so-called Methodic School.<sup>237</sup> For this alone, of all the medical sects, does not seem to proceed rashly in regard to unknown things, and does not presume to say whether they are comprehensible or not, but is guided by phenomena, and receives from them the same help which they seem to give to the Sceptical system. For we have said in what has gone before, that the every-day life which the Sceptic lives is of four parts, depending on the guidance of nature, on the necessity of the feelings, on the traditions of laws and customs, and on the teaching of the arts.<sup>238</sup> Now as by necessity of the feelings the Sceptic is led by thirst to drink, and by hunger to food, and to supply similar needs in the same way, so also the physician of the Methodic School is led by the feelings to find suitable remedies; in constipation he produces a relaxation, as one takes refuge in the sun from the shrinking on account of intense cold; he is led by a flux to the stopping of it, as those in a hot bath who are dripping from a profuse perspiration and are relaxed, hasten to check it by going into the cold air. Moreover, it is evident that the Methodic physician forces those things which are of a foreign nature to adapt themselves to their own nature, as even the dog tries to get a sharp stick out that is thrust into him.<sup>239</sup> In order, however, that I should not overstep the outline character of this work



by discussing details, I think that all the things that the Methodics have thus said can be classified as referring to the necessity of the feelings that are natural or those that are unnatural. Besides this, it is common to both schools to have no dogmas, and to use words loosely. <sup>240</sup> For as the Sceptic uses the formula “I determine nothing,” and “I understand nothing,” as we said above, so the Methodic also uses the expressions “Community,” and “To go through,” and other similar ones without over much care. In a similar way he uses the word “Indication” undogmatically, meaning that the symptoms of the patient either natural or unnatural, indicate the remedies that would be suitable, as we said in speaking of thirst, hunger, and other things. <sup>241</sup> It will thus be seen that the Methodic School of medicine has a certain relationship to Scepticism which is closer than that of the other medical sects, speaking comparatively if not absolutely from these and similar tokens. Having said so much in reference to the schools that seem to closely resemble Scepticism, we conclude the general consideration of Scepticism and the First Book of the Sketches.