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Outlines of Pyrrhonism

Sextus Empiricus
(Mary Mills Patrick, tr.)

BOOK I

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CHAPTER XV.

The Five Tropes.

¹⁶⁴ The later Sceptics, however, teach the following five Tropes of *ἐποχή*: first, the one based upon contradiction; second, the *regressus in infinitum*; third, relation; fourth, the hypothetical; fifth, the *circulus in probando*. ¹⁶⁵ The one based upon contradiction is the one from which we find, that in reference to the thing put before us for investigation, a position has been developed which is impossible to be judged, either practically, or theoretically, and therefore, as we are not able to either accept or reject anything, we end in suspending the judgment. ¹⁶⁶ The one based upon the *regressus in infinitum* is that in which we say that the proof brought forward for the thing set before us calls for another proof, and that one another, and so on to infinity, so that, not having anything from which to begin the reasoning, the suspension of judgment follows. ¹⁶⁷ The one based upon relation, as we have said before, is that one in which the object appears of this kind or that kind, as related to the judge and to the things regarded together with it, but we suspend our judgment as to what it is in reality. ¹⁶⁸ The one based upon hypothesis is illustrated by the Dogmatics, when in the *regressus in infinitum* they begin from something that they do not found on reason, but which they simply take for granted without proof. ¹⁶⁹ The Trope, *circulus in probando*, arises when the thing which ought to prove the thing sought for, needs to be sustained by the thing sought for, and as we are unable to take the one for the proof of the other, we suspend our judgment in regard to both. Now we shall briefly show that it is possible to refer every thing under investigation to one or another of these Tropes, as follows: ¹⁷⁰ the thing before us is either sensible or intellectual; difference of opinion exists, however, as to what it is in itself, for some say that only the things of sense are true, others, only those belonging to the understanding, and others say that some things of sense, and some of thought, are true. Now, will it be said that this difference of opinion can be judged or cannot be judged? If it cannot be judged, then we have the result necessarily of suspension of judgment, because it is impossible to express opinion in

regard to things about which a difference of opinion exists which cannot be judged. If it can be judged, then we ask how it is to be judged? ¹⁷¹ For example, the sensible, for we shall limit the argument first to this—Is it to be judged by sensible or by intellectual standards? For if it is to be judged by a sensible one, since we are in doubt about the sensible, that will also need something else to sustain it; and if that proof is also something sensible, something else will again be necessary to prove it, and so on *in infinitum*. ¹⁷² If, on the contrary, the sensible must be judged by something intellectual, as there is disagreement in regard to the intellectual, this intellectual thing will require also judgment and proof. Now, how is it to be proved? If by something intellectual, it will likewise be thrown into *infinitum*; if by something sensible, as the intellectual has been taken for the proof of the sensible, and the sensible has been taken for that of the intellectual, the *circulus in probando* is introduced. ¹⁷³ If, however, in order to escape from this, the one who is speaking to us expects us to take something for granted which has not been proved, in order to prove what follows, the hypothetical Trope is introduced, which provides no way of escape. For if the one who makes the hypothesis is worthy of confidence, we should in every case be no less worthy of confidence in making a contrary hypothesis. If the one who makes the assumption assumes something true, he makes it suspicious by using it as a hypothesis, and not as an established fact; if it is false, the foundation of the reasoning is unsound. ¹⁷⁴ If a hypothesis is any help towards a trustworthy result, let the thing in question itself be assumed, and not something else, by which, forsooth, one would establish the thing under discussion. If it is absurd to assume the thing questioned, it is also absurd to assume that upon which it rests. ¹⁷⁵ That all things belonging to the senses are also in relation to something else is evident, because they are in relation to those who perceive them. It is clear then, that whatever thing of sense is brought before us, it may be easily referred to one of the five Tropes. And we come to a similar conclusion in regard to intellectual things. For if it should be said that there is a difference of opinion regarding them which cannot be judged, it will be granted that we must suspend the judgment concerning it. ¹⁷⁶ In case the difference of opinion can be judged, if it is judged through anything intellectual, we fall into the *regressus in infinitum*, and if through anything sensible into the *circulus in probando*; for, as the sensible is again subject to difference of opinion, and cannot be judged by the sensible on account of the *regressus in infinitum*, it will have need of the intellectual, just as the intellectual has need of the sensible. ¹⁷⁷ But he who accepts anything which is hypothetical again is absurd. Intellectual things stand also in relation, because the form in which they are expressed depends on the mind of

the thinker, and, if they were in reality exactly as they are described, there would not have been any difference of opinion about them. Therefore the intellectual also is brought under the five Tropes, and consequently it is necessary to suspend the judgment altogether with regard to every thing that is brought before us. Such are the five Tropes taught by the later Sceptics. They set them forth, not to throw out the ten Tropes, but in order to put to shame the audacity of the Dogmatics in a variety of ways, by these Tropes as well as by those.

CHAPTER XVI.

The Two Tropes.

¹⁷⁸ Two other Tropes of ἐποχή are also taught. For as it appears that everything that is comprehended is either comprehended through itself or through something else, it is thought that this fact introduces doubt in regard to all things. And that nothing can be understood through itself is evident, it is said, from the disagreement which exists altogether among the physicists in regard to sensible and intellectual things. I mean, of course, a disagreement which cannot be judged, as we are not able to use a sensible or an intellectual criterion in judging it, for everything that we would take has a part in the disagreement, and is untrustworthy. ¹⁷⁹ Nor is it conceded that anything can be comprehended through something else; for if a thing is comprehended through something, that must always in turn be comprehended through something else, and the *regressus in infinitum* or the *circulus in probando* follow. If, on the contrary, a thing is comprehended through something that one wishes to use as if it had been comprehended through itself, this is opposed to the fact that nothing can be comprehended through itself, according to what we have said. We do not know how that which contradicts itself can be comprehended, either through itself or through something else, as no criterion of the truth or of comprehension appears, and signs without proof would be rejected, as we shall see in the next book. So much will suffice for the present about suspension of judgment.

CHAPTER XVII.

What are the Tropes for the overturning of Aetiology?

¹⁸⁰ In the same manner as we teach the Tropes of ἐποχή, some set forth Tropes through which we oppose the Dogmatics, by expressing doubt in regard to the aetiology of which they are especially proud. So Aenesidemus teaches eight Tropes, by which he thinks that he can prove all the dogmatic aetiology useless. ¹⁸¹ The first of these Tropes, he said, relates to the character of aetiology in general, which does not give incontestable testimony in regard to phenomena, because it treats of unseen things. The second Trope states that although abundant

resources exist by which to investigate the cause of a thing in question, some Dogmatics investigate it in one way only. ¹⁸² The third Trope states that the Dogmatics assign causes which do not show any order for things which have taken place in an orderly manner. The fourth Trope states that the Dogmatics, accepting phenomena as they take place, think that they also understand how unseen things take place, although perhaps the unseen things have taken place in the same way as the phenomena, and perhaps in some other way peculiar to themselves. ¹⁸³ The fifth Trope states that they all, so to speak, assign causes according to their own hypotheses about the elements, but not according to any commonly accepted methods. The sixth states that they often explain things investigated according to their own hypotheses, but ignore opposing hypotheses which have equal probability. ¹⁸⁴ The seventh states that they often give reasons for things that not only conflict with phenomena, but also with their own hypotheses. The eighth states that although that which seems manifest, and that which is to be investigated, are often equally inscrutable, they build up a theory from the one about the other, although both are equally inscrutable. ¹⁸⁵ It is not impossible, Aenesidemus said also, that some Dogmatics should fail in their theories of causality from other combinations of reasons deducible from the Tropes given above. Perhaps also the five Tropes of ἐποχή are sufficient to refute aetiology, for he who proposes a cause will propose one which is either in harmony with all the sects of philosophy, with Scepticism, and with phenomena, or one that is not. Perhaps, however, it is not possible that a cause should be in harmony with them, for phenomena and unknown things altogether disagree with each other. ¹⁸⁶ If it is not in harmony with them, the reason of this will also be demanded of the one who proposed it; and if he accepts a phenomenon as the cause of a phenomenon, or something unknown as the cause of the unknown, he will be thrown into the *regressus in infinitum*; if he uses one cause to account for another one, into the *circulus in probando*; but if he stops anywhere, he will either say that the cause that he proposes holds good so far as regards the things that have been said, and introduce relation, abolishing an absolute standpoint; or if he accepts anything by hypothesis, he will be attacked by us. Therefore it is perhaps possible to put the temerity of the Dogmatics to shame in aetiology by these Tropes.

CHAPTER XVIII.

The Sceptical Formulae.

¹⁸⁷ When we use any one of these Tropes, or the Tropes of ἐποχή, we employ with them certain formulae which show the Sceptical method and our own feeling, as for instance, the sayings, “No more,”

“One must determine nothing,” and certain others. It is fitting therefore to treat of these in this place. Let us begin with “No more.”

CHAPTER XIX.

The Formula “No more.”

¹⁸⁸ We sometimes express this as I have given it, and sometimes thus, “Nothing more.” For we do not accept the “No more,” as some understand it, for the examination of the special, and “Nothing more” for that of the general, but we use “No more” and “Nothing more” without any difference, and we shall at present treat of them as one and the same expression. Now this formula is defective, for as when we say a double one we really mean a double garment, and when we say a broad one we really mean a broad road; so when we say “No more” we mean really no more than this, or in every way the same. ¹⁸⁹ But some of the Sceptics use instead of the interrogation “No?” the interrogation “What, this rather than this?” using the word “what” in the sense of “what is the reason,” so that the formula means, “What is the reason for this rather than for this?” It is a customary thing, however, to use an interrogation instead of a statement, as “Who of the mortals does not know the wife of Jupiter?” and also to use a statement instead of an interrogation, as “I seek where Dion dwells,” and “I ask why one should admire a poet.” The word “what” is also used instead of “what for” by Menander—“(For) what did I remain behind?” ¹⁹⁰ The formula “Not more than this” expresses our own condition of mind, and signifies that because of the equality of the things that are opposed to each other we finally attain to a state of equilibrium of soul. We mean by equality that equality which appears to us as probable, by things placed in opposition to each other we mean simply things which conflict with each other, and by a state of equilibrium we mean a state in which we do not assent to one thing more than to another. ¹⁹¹ Even if the formula “Nothing more” seems to express assent or denial, we do not use it so, but we use it loosely, and not with accuracy, either instead of an interrogation or instead of saying, “I do not know to which of these I would assent, and to which I would not.” What lies before us is to express what appears to us, but we are indifferent to the words by which we express it. This must be understood, however, that we use the formula “Nothing more” without affirming in regard to it that it is wholly sure and true, but we present it as it appears to us.

CHAPTER XX.

Aphasia.

¹⁹² We explain Aphasia as follows: The word *φάσις* is used in two ways, having a general and a special signification. According to the

general signification, it expresses affirmation or negation, as “It is day” or “It is not day”; according to the special signification, it expresses an affirmation only, and negations are not called *φάσεις*. Now Aphasia is the opposite of *φάσις* in its general signification, which, as we said, comprises both affirmation and negation. It follows that Aphasia is a condition of mind, according to which we say that we neither affirm nor deny anything. ¹⁹³ It is evident from this that we do not understand by Aphasia something that inevitably results from the nature of things, but we mean that we now find ourselves in the condition of mind expressed by it in regard to the things that are under investigation. It is necessary to remember that we do not say that we affirm or deny any of those things that are dogmatically stated in regard to the unknown, for we yield assent only to those things which affect our feelings and oblige us to assent to them.

CHAPTER XXI.

“Perhaps,” and “It is possible,” and “It may be.”

¹⁹⁴ The formulae “Perhaps,” and “Perhaps not,” and “It is possible,” and “It is not possible,” and “It may be,” and “It may not be,” we use instead of “Perhaps it is,” and “Perhaps it is not,” and “It is possible that it is,” and “It is possible that it is not,” and “It may be that it is,” and “It may be that it is not.” That is, we use the formula “It is not possible” for the sake of brevity, instead of saying “It is not possible to be,” and “It may not be” instead of “It may not be that it is,” and “Perhaps not” instead of “Perhaps it is not.” ¹⁹⁵ Again, we do not here dispute about words, neither do we question if the formulae mean these things absolutely, but we use them loosely, as I said before. Yet I think it is evident that these formulae express Aphasia. For certainly the formula “Perhaps it is” really includes that which seems to contradict it, *i.e.* the formula “Perhaps it is not,” because it does not affirm in regard to anything that it is really so. It is the same also in regard to the others.

CHAPTER XXII.

ἐποχή or the Suspension of Judgment.

¹⁹⁶ When I say that I suspend my judgment, I mean that I cannot say which of those things presented should be believed, and which should not be believed, showing that things appear equal to me in respect to trustworthiness and untrustworthiness. Now we do not affirm that they are equal, but we state what appears to us in regard to them at the time when they present themselves to us. *ἐποχή* means the holding back of the opinion, so as neither to affirm nor deny anything because of the equality of the things in question.

CHAPTER XXIII.

The Formula "I determine Nothing."

¹⁹⁷ In regard to the formula "I determine nothing," we say the following: By "determine" we mean, not simply to speak, but to give assent to an affirmation with regard to some unknown thing. For it will soon be found that the Sceptic determines nothing, not even the formula "I determine nothing," for this formula is not a dogmatic opinion, that is an assent to something unknown, but an expression declaring what our condition of mind is. When, for example, the Sceptic says, "I determine nothing," he means this: "According to my present feeling I can assert or deny nothing dogmatically regarding the things under investigation," and in saying this he expresses what appears to him in reference to the things under discussion. He does not express himself positively, but he states what he feels.

CHAPTER XXIV.

The Formula "Every thing is Undetermined."

¹⁹⁸ The expression "Indetermination" furthermore shows a state of mind in which we neither deny nor affirm positively anything regarding things that are investigated in a dogmatic way, that is the things that are unknown. When then the Sceptic says "Every thing is undetermined," he uses "is undetermined," in the sense of "it appears undetermined to him." The words "every thing" do not mean all existences, but those that he has examined of the unknown things that are investigated by the Dogmatists. By "undetermined," he means that there is no preference in the things that are placed in opposition to each other, or that they simply conflict with each other in respect to trustworthiness or untrustworthiness. ¹⁹⁹ And as the one who says "I am walking" really means "It is I that am walking," so he who says "Every thing is undetermined" means at the same time, according to our teachings, "as far as I am concerned," or "as it appears to me," as if he were saying "As far as I have examined the things that are under investigation in a dogmatic manner, it appears to me that no one of them excels the one which conflicts with it in trustworthiness or untrustworthiness."

CHAPTER XXV.

The Formula "Every thing is Incomprehensible."

²⁰⁰ We treat the formula "Every thing is incomprehensible" in the same way. For "every thing" we interpret in the same way as above, and we supply the words "to me" so that what we say is this: "As far as I have inspected the unknown things which are dogmatically examined, it appears to me that every thing is incomprehensible." This

is not, however, to affirm that the things which are examined by the Dogmatists are of such a nature as to be necessarily incomprehensible, but one expresses his own feeling in saying "I see that I have not thus far comprehended any of those things because of the equilibrium of the things that are placed in opposition to each other." Whence it seems to me that every thing that has been brought forward to dispute our formulae has fallen wide of the mark.

CHAPTER XXVI.

The Formulae "I do not comprehend" and "I do not understand."

²⁰¹ The formulae "I do not comprehend" and "I do not understand" show a condition of mind in which the Sceptic stands aloof for the present from asserting or denying anything in regard to the unknown things under investigation, as is evident from what we said before about the other formulae.

CHAPTER XXVII.

The Formula "To place an equal Statement in opposition to every Statement."

²⁰² Furthermore, when we say "Every statement may have an equal statement placed in opposition to it," by "every," we mean all the statements that we have examined; we do not use the word "statement" simply, but for a statement which seeks to prove something dogmatically about things that are unknown, and not at all one that shows a process of reasoning from premises and conclusions, but something which is put together in any sort of way. We use the word "equal" in reference to trustworthiness or untrustworthiness. "Is placed in opposition" we use instead of the common expression "to conflict with," and we supply "as it appears to me." ²⁰³ When therefore one says, "It seems to me that every statement which I have examined, which proves something dogmatically, may have another statement placed in opposition to it which also proves something dogmatically, and which is equal to it in trustworthiness and untrustworthiness," this is not asserted dogmatically, but is an expression of human feeling as it appears to the one who feels it. ²⁰⁴ Some Sceptics express the formula as follows: "Every statement should have an equal one placed in opposition to it," demanding it authoritatively thus: "Let us place in opposition to every statement that proves something dogmatically another conflicting statement which also seeks to prove something dogmatically, and is equal to it in trustworthiness and untrustworthiness." Naturally this is directed to the Sceptics, but the infinitive should be used instead of the imperative, that is, "to oppose" instead of "let us oppose." ²⁰⁵ This formula is recommended to the Sceptic, lest he should be deceived by

the Dogmatists and give up his investigations, and rashly fail of the *ἀταραξία* which is thought to accompany *ἐποχή* in regard to everything, as we have explained above.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

General Observations on the Formulae of the Sceptics.

²⁰⁶ We have treated of a sufficient number of these formulae for an outline, especially since what we have said about those mentioned applies also to others that we have omitted. In regard to all the Sceptical formulae, it must be understood in advance that we do not affirm them to be absolutely true, because we say that they can even refute themselves, since they are themselves included in those things to which they refer, just as cathartic medicines not only purge the body of humors, but carry off themselves with the humors. ²⁰⁷ We say then that we use these formulae, not as literally making known the things for which they are used, but loosely, and if one wishes, inaccurately. It is not fitting for the Sceptic to dispute about words, especially as it contributes to our purpose to say that these formulae have no absolute meaning; their meaning is a relative one, that is, relative to the Sceptics. ²⁰⁸ Besides, it is to be remembered that we do not say them about all things in general, but about the unknown, and things that are dogmatically investigated, and that we say what appears to us, and that we do not express ourselves decidedly about the nature of external objects. By this means I think that every sophism brought against the Sceptical formulae can be overturned. ²⁰⁹ We have now shown the character of Scepticism by examining its idea, its parts, its criterion and aim, and also the Tropes of *ἐποχή*, and by treating of the Sceptical formulae. We think it therefore appropriate to enter briefly into the distinction between Scepticism and the nearly related schools of philosophy in order to more clearly understand the Sceptical School. We will begin with the philosophy of Heraclitus.

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CHAPTER XXXIII.

In what does Scepticism differ from the Academic Philosophy?

²²⁰ Some say further that the Academic philosophy is the same as Scepticism, therefore it seems appropriate to me to treat of that also. There have been, as the most say, three Academies—the most ancient one, that of Plato and his followers; the second and middle one, that of Arcesilaus and his followers, Arcesilaus being the pupil of Polemo; the third and new Academy, that of Carneades and Clitomachus and their followers; some add also a fourth, that of Philo and Charmides, and their followers; and some count even a fifth, that of Antiochus and his followers. ²²¹ Beginning then from the old Academy, let us

consider the difference between the schools of philosophy mentioned. Now some have said that Plato was a Dogmatic, others that he was a Sceptic, and others that he was in some things a Sceptic and in some things a Dogmatic. For in the fencing dialogues, where Socrates is introduced as either making sport of someone or contending against the Sophists, Plato has, they say, a fencing and sceptical character, but he is dogmatic when he expresses himself seriously, either through Socrates or Timaeus or any such person. ²²² In regard to those who say that he is a Dogmatic, or a Dogmatic in some things and a Sceptic in others, it would be superfluous, it seems to me, to speak now, for they themselves grant that he is different from us. The question as to whether he was really a Sceptic or not we treat more fully in the Memoranda, but here we state briefly that according to Menodotus and Aenesidemus (for these especially defended this position) Plato dogmatizes when he expresses himself regarding ideas, and regarding the existence of Providence, and when he states that the virtuous life is more to be chosen than the one of vice. If he assents to these things as true, he dogmatizes; or even if he accepts them as more probable than otherwise he departs from the sceptical character, since he gives a preference to one thing above another in trustworthiness or untrustworthiness; for how foreign this is to us is evident from what we have said before. ²²³ Even if when he performs mental gymnastics, as they say, he expresses some things sceptically, he is not because of this a Sceptic. For he who dogmatizes about one thing, or, in short, gives preference to one mental image over another in trustworthiness or untrustworthiness in respect to anything that is unknown, is a Dogmatic in character, as Timon shows by what he said of Xenophanes. ²²⁴ For after having praised Xenophanes in many things, and even after having dedicated his Satires to him, he made him mourn and say—

“Would that I also might gain that mind profound,
Able to look both ways. In a treacherous path have I been
decoyed,
And still in old age am with all wisdom unwed.
For wherever I turned my view
All things were resolved into unity; all things, always
From all sources drawn, were merged into nature the same.”

Timon calls him somewhat, but not entirely, free from vanity, when he said—

“Xenophanes somewhat free from vanity, mocker of Homeric deceit,
Far from men he conceived a god, on all sides equal,
Above pain, a being spiritualised, or intellect.”

In saying that he was somewhat free from vanity, he meant that he was in some things free from vanity. He called him a mocker of the Homeric deceit because he had scoffed at the deceit in Homer. ²²⁵

Xenophanes also dogmatized, contrary to the assumptions of other men, that all things are one, and that God is grown together with all things, that He is spherical, insensible, unchangeable, and reasonable, whence the difference of Xenophanes from us is easily proved. In short, from what has been said, it is evident that although Plato expresses doubt about some things, so long as he has expressed himself in certain places in regard to the existence of unknown things, or as preferring some things to others in trustworthiness, he cannot be, it seems to me, a Sceptic.²²⁶ Those of the New Academy, although they say that all things are incomprehensible, differ from the Sceptics, perhaps even in saying that all things are incomprehensible (for they assert decidedly in regard to this, but the Sceptic thinks it possible that some things may be comprehended), but they differ evidently still further from us in their judgment of good and evil. For the Academicians say that there is such a thing as good and evil, not as we say it, but more with the conviction that that which they call good exists than that it does not; and likewise in regard to the evil, while we do not say anything is good or evil with the conviction that it is probably so, but we live our lives in an unprejudiced way in order not to be inactive.²²⁷ Moreover, we say that our ideas are equal to each other in trustworthiness and untrustworthiness, as far as their nature goes, while they say that some are probable and others improbable. They make a difference also between the improbable ones, for they believe that some of them are only probable, others probable and undisputed, still others probable, undisputed, and tested. As for example, when a coiled rope is lying in a somewhat dark room, he who comes in suddenly gets only a probable idea of it, and thinks that it is a serpent;²²⁸ but it appears to be a rope to him who has looked carefully around, and found out that it does not move, and that it is of such a color, and so on, according to an idea which is probable and undisputed. The tested idea is like this: It is said that Hercules led Alcestis after she was dead back again from Hades and showed her to Admetus, and he received an idea that was probable and undisputed regarding Alcestis. As, however, he knew that she was dead, his mind drew back from belief and inclined to disbelief.²²⁹ Now those belonging to the New Academy prefer the idea which is probable and undisputed to the simply probable one. To both of these, however, they prefer that which is probable, undisputed, and tested. If, however, both those of the Academy and the Sceptics say that they believe certain things, there is an evident difference between the two schools of philosophy even in this;²³⁰ for “to believe” is used in a different sense, meaning, on the one hand, not to resist, but simply to accept without strong inclination and approval, as the child is said to believe the teacher; on the other hand, “to believe” is used to signify assenting

to something with choice, and, as it were, with the sympathy that accompanies strong will, as the prodigal follows the one who chooses to live a luxurious life. Therefore, since Carneades, Clitomachus, and their followers say that they are strongly inclined to believe that a thing is probable, and we simply allow that it may be so without assent, we differ from them, I think, in this way.²³¹ We differ from the New Academy likewise in things concerning the aim; for while the men who say that they govern themselves according to that School avail themselves of the idea of the probable in life, we live according to the laws and customs, and our natural feelings, in an unprejudiced way. We could say more regarding the distinction between the two schools if we did not aim at brevity.²³² Nevertheless, Arcesilaus, who as we said was the leader and chief of the Middle Academy, seems to me to have very much in common with the Pyrrhonian teachings, so that his school and ours are almost one. For neither does one find that he expressed an opinion about the existence or non-existence of anything, nor does he prefer one thing to another as regards trustworthiness or untrustworthiness; he suspends his judgment regarding all things, and the aim of his philosophy is *ἐποχή*, which is accompanied by *ἀταραξία*, and this agrees with what we have said.²³³ But he calls the particular instances of *ἐποχή* *bona* [i.e., good], and the particular instances of assent *mala* [i.e., bad]. The difference is that we say these things according to what appears to us, and not affirmatively, while he says them as if speaking of realities, that is, he says that *ἐποχή* is in itself good, and assent an evil.²³⁴ If we are to believe also the things that are said about him, he appeared at first sight to be a Pyrrhonian, but he was in truth a Dogmatic, for he used to test his companions by the method of doubt to see whether they were gifted enough to take in Plato’s dogmas, so that he appeared to be a Sceptic, but at the same time he communicated the doctrines of Plato to those of his companions who were gifted. Hence Ariston also said about him—

“Plato in front, Pyrrhon behind, Diodorus in the middle,”

because he availed himself of the dialectic of Diodorus, but was wholly a Platonist.²³⁵ Now Philo and his followers say that as far as the Stoic criterion is concerned, that is to say the *φαντασία καταληπτική*, things are incomprehensible, but as far as the nature of things is concerned, they are comprehensible. Antiochus, however, transferred the Stoa to the Academy, so that it was even said of him that he taught the Stoic philosophy in the Academy, because he tried to show that the Stoic doctrines are found in Plato. The difference, therefore, between the Sceptical School and the Fourth and Fifth Academy is evident.

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