This philosophical essay by Juan Carlos Gomez is part of a growing discussion by philosophers, psychologists, biologists, and other scholars about the nature and boundaries of personhood. Indeed, prominent thinkers from many disciplines have entered this discussion of (a) the characteristics of a “person” and (b) what kinds of animals exhibit such characteristics.

The essay is likely to challenge readers in at least two ways. First, the lay reader will have to suspend her/his common understanding of the word “person” as synonymous with “human.” It should be clear from the beginning that Gomez is not arguing that apes are human and thus, that the term “person” is NOT being used synonymously with “human.” Instead, for philosophers, a “person” refers to an organism that exhibits some collection of characteristics that define “personhood.” In general, humans tend to qualify (both according to laypersons and scholars) as persons. On the other hand, philosophers debate intensely whether and how these criteria of personhood might apply to non-human animals. This essay is part of that debate.

Second, the essay was written for other philosophers, and as such, it uses complicated language and sentence structure. Grasping the essential arguments of the text will take careful, possibly multiple, readings and a willingness to explore the meanings of terms with which one is not familiar.

As you read, consider carefully what criteria of personhood are being proposed by Gomez and by Dennett (the philosopher to whose ideas Gomez is reacting). How are they similar and different? How do each philosopher’s ideas either include or exclude apes from the category of persons? How do the authors seem to think humans compare to apes and other animals on these criteria? How do you think we compare? Are there subsets of humans who might not be considered persons?

Also, think about what is missing from the personhood criteria about which you read. Could you imagine other personhood criteria that would NOT be unique to humans but would be limiting enough to maintain some relevance of the label “person”?

Finally, consider why any of this matters? That is, why is it important (if at all) that one considers the personhood of a species?